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Abstract	in	Danish		 Registrering	og	identifikation	af	internationale	migranter	er	én	af	de	største	opgaver	for	grænseagenturer	rundt	om	i	verden.	Disse	procedurer	udgør	kernen	i	det	sæt	af	processer,	der	konstituerer	verdens	grænser.	Registreringssystemernes	udformning,	vedligeholdelse	og	funktion	er	multifaktorielle	sociale	processer,	der	udfordrer	og	medskaber	hvad	moderne	statsgrænser	består	af	i	nyere	tid.	International	migration	og	specielt	ureglementeret	eller	ulovlig	migration	udfordrer	omvendt	den	traditionelle	grænsefunktion	som	en	brandvæg,	der	enten	tillader	eller	blokerer	et	menneskes	mobilitet.	Således	er	spørgsmålet	om	grænser	ofte	associeret	med	sikkerhedsdiskurser,	orden,	den	modtagende	stats	nationale	identitet	og	humanitarisme.	Diskursen	omkring	migration	og	grænser	er	gennemsyret	med	tilstedeværelsen	af	klassifikationer	og	kategorier,	som	i	vid	udstrækning	og	tilsyneladende	uproblematisk,	synes	at	cirkulere	uden	hensyn	til	deres	ontologiske	og	epistemologiske	status	-	en	status	som	ofte	er	mere	kompliceret	end	som	så.	Kritiske	forskere	fra	grænse-	og	migrationsfeltet,	overvågningsstudier	og	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS)	har	udfordret	selvfølgeligheden	af	disse	klassifikationer	og	kategorier,	såvel	som	usynligheden	af	det	grænserelaterede	arbejde,	der	skaber,	vedligeholder	og	cirkulerer	dem.	Denne	afhandling	sigter	mod	at	bidrage	til	dette	arbejde	og	samtidig	deltage	i	den	nylige	debat	om	ureglementeret	migration	og	EU's	grænseregime	og	om	den	såkaldte	”migrationskrise”,	der	fandt	sted	foråret	2015.	Dette	gøres	ved	kritisk	at	undersøge	de	sociale	processer,	der	skaber	registrerings-	og	identifikationsprocedurer	af	ureglementerede	eller	ureglementerede’	immigranter	ved	EU’s	ydergrænser,	med	et	etnografisk	fokus	på	de	græske	øer,	der	ligger	ved	de	maritime	grænser	mellem	Grækenland	og	Tyrkiet.	Ydermere	gøres	det	ved	at	lave	en	genealogi	af	Dublinsystemet,	bestående	af	Dublin-	og	
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EURODAC	forordningen,	hvor	sidstnævnte	er	hovedinformations-	kommunikations-	og	teknologiredskabet	(ICT)	brugt	i	EU	til	at	administrere	asylansøgninger	og	governance	af	asylansøgere	og	ureglementerede’immigranter.	Ved	at	foretage	etnografisk	feltarbejde	med	de	aktører,	der	arbejder	med	registrering	og	identifikation	af	ureglementerede	eller	ureglementerede’	immigranter	gives	muligheden	for	en	dybere	forståelse	for	disse	praksisser,	deres	teknologiske	og	diskursive	virkemidler	samt	deres	egen	konceptualisering	og	positionering	i	EU’s	grænseregime.	Ydermere	giver	feltarbejdet	forskeren	mulighed	for	direkte	adgang,	så	vidt	mulig,	til	de	processer,	hvori	klassifikationer	og	kategorier	opstår	samt	reificering	af	håndterbar	data,	der	er	nødvendig	for	governance	af	migrant	populationer.	Interviewmetoden	gør	det	endvidere	muligt	at	genadressere	og	yderligere	udforske	kontroverser	og	”anomalier”	opstået	under	feltarbejdet.	Endelig	udgør	en	kritisk	gennemgang	af	politikker	på	området	fundamentet	for	en	genealogi	af	registreringssystemer,	som	kan	bidrage	til	at	konceptualisere	de	nuværende	praksisser.	Jeg	argumenterer	for	at	disse	praksisser	ikke	kun	handler	om	at	opdage	en	skjult	sandhed,	men	om	at	forme	den;	ikke	kun	om	at	afsløre	migrantens	identitet,	men	også,	og	måske	mere	væsentligt,	om	at	konstruere	og	forklare	den.		Grænse-	og	migrationsrelateret	politikker	har	et	tvetydigt	forhold	til	aktørernes	praksis	på	området.	De	dikterer	og	beslutter	dem,	men	de	forskellige	niveauer	afspejler	to	forskellige	virkeligheder.	Papirer	med	nedskrevne	politikker	og	staters	strategier	betyder	intet	uden	faktisk	implementering	i	felten.	Kompleksiteten	af	begge	niveauer,	såvel	som	forholdet	imellem	dem,	EU’s	organisatoriske	struktur	samt	de	forskellige	politikker	og	praksisser	udviklet	af	hver	enkelt	medlemsstat,	umuliggør	en	universel	beretning	om	”EU’s	grænser”.	I	stedet	kan	geografisk	lokaliserede	samt	politiske	og	kontekstualiserede	beretninger	indfange	øjebliksbilleder	af	det	komplekse	fænomen,	der	udgør	”grænsearbejde”.	Dette	har	været	formålet	med	nærværende	afhandling.					
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Abstract	in	English			 Identification	and	registration	of	international	migrants	is	one	of	the	main	concerns	and	duties	of	border	agencies	around	the	world.	They	are	at	the	core	of	the	set	of	the	processes	that	constitute	contemporary	borders.	The	shaping,	maintenance	and	function	of	registration	systems	is	a	multi-factorial	social	process	that	challenges	and	at	the	same	time	co-shapes	what	modern	nation	borders	are	regarded	to	be	in	the	modern	era.	International	migration	and	more	specifically	irregularised	migration,	in	turn,	challenges	the	traditional	function	of	a	border	as	a	firewall	that	either	allows	or	blocks	a	person’s	mobility.	Thus,	it	is	often	associated	with	discourses	of	security,	order,	national	identity	of	the	receiving	state,	and	humanitarianism.	The	discourse	around	migration	and	borders	is	saturated	with	the	presence	of	a	number	of	categories	that	are	widely	and	unproblematically	circulated	without	consideration	of	their	ontological	and	epistemological	status	which	is	often	more	complicated	than	it	is	presented.	Critical	scholars	from	the	fields	of	border	and	migration	studies,	surveillance	studies	and	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS)	have	challenged	the	naturalization	of	those	categories,	as	well	as	the	invisibility	of	much	of	the	border	related	work	that	produces,	maintains	and	circulates	them.		 This	dissertation	aims	to	contribute	to	the	aforementioned	body	of	work,	and	at	the	same	time	participate	in	the	recent	debate	around	irregularised	migration	and	the	border	regime	of	the	EU,	as	well	as	around	the	so-called	“migration	crisis”	originating	in	the	spring	of	2015.	It	does	so,	by	critically	examining	the	social	processes	that	constitute	what	is	the	identification	and	registration	of	irregularised	migrants	in	the	external	borders	EU,	with	an	ethnographical	focus	on	the	Greek	islands	situated	in	the	maritime	borders	between	Greece	and	Turkey.	Furthermore,	by	constructing	a	genealogy	of	the	Dublin	system,	consisting	of	the	Dublin	Regulation	and	the	EURODAC	Regulation,	
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the	latter	being	the	main	Information	Communication	Technology	(ICT)	tool	used	in	the	EU	for	the	administration	of	asylum	applications	and	the	governance	of	asylum	seekers	and	other	irregularised	migrants.		 Conducting	ethnographic	fieldwork	with	the	actors	that	work	on	identification	and	registration	of	irregularised	migrants	is	a	chance	for	a	deeper	understanding	of	their	practices,	their	technological	and	discursive	tools,	their	own	conceptualization	of	their	work	and	position	in	the	border	regime	of	the	EU.	In	addition,	it	allows	the	researcher	a	direct	(to	the	possible	extent)	access	in	the	process	of	construction	of	categorization	schemes	and	their	reification	in	manageable	data	that	are	crucial	for	the	governance	of	the	migrant	populations.	Furthermore,	the	research	method	of	interviews	allows	for	the	re-addressing	and	further	examination	of	controversies	and	“anomalies”	that	come	up	during	fieldwork.	Finally,	critical	reading	of	policy	papers	is	the	base	for	the	construction	of	a	genealogy	of	registration	systems	that	in	turn	helps	in	the	conceptualizing	of	contemporary	practices.	These	practices,	I	argue	are	not	exclusively	about	discovering	a	well	hidden	truth,	but	also	about	shaping	it;	not	only	about	revealing	a	migrant’s	identity,	but	also	and	perhaps	more	importantly	about	constructing	and	attributing	it.		 Border	and	migration	related	policies	have	an	ambiguous	relationship	with	the	practices	of	actors	in	the	field.	They	dictate	and	determine	them	but	the	level	difference	renders	them	two	distinct	realities.	Policy	papers	and	state	strategies	mean	nothing	outside	their	actual	implementation	by	field	workers.	The	complexity	of	both	levels,	as	well	as	that	of	the	relationship	between	them,	the	organizational	structure	of	the	EU,	and	the	different	practices	and	policies	developed	in	domestic	level	in	each	Member	state	render	universal	accounts	of	the	“EU’s	borders”	an	impossible	task.	Instead,	geographically	localized,	and	politically	and	contextually	situated	accounts	can	capture	instances	of	the	complex	phenomena	that	is	border	work.	And	that	is	a	purpose	in	which	the	present	thesis	ascribes	itself.		 					
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Chapter	1.	Introduction			 This	thesis	explores	the	registration	of	migrants.	More	specifically,	the	registration	of	migrants	whose	mobility	has	been	irregularized1,	and	who	entered	Europe	through	the	sea	border	between	Greece	and	Turkey	in	the	period	between	2015	and	2017	and	may	or	may	not	have	applied	for	asylum.		I	will	begin	this	introductory	chapter	by	unpacking	the	notion	of	registration	of	irregularized	migrants,	before	presenting	my	research	purpose,	briefly	discussing	the	time	conjunction	of	my	fieldwork	and	stating	my	research	questions.	Registration	is	structurally	bonded	with	categorization	and	classification	of	populations	to	the	extent	that	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	one	without	the	other.	The	uncategorized,	the	unregistered	populations,	the	aliens,	the	unknown	in	certain	imaginaries	could	be	and	are	associated	with	challenge	in	a	positive,	productive	sense	as	a	chance	to	extend	the	limits	of	a	pre-existing	notion.	However,	in	the	context	of	migration,	they	carry	strong	connotations	of	danger,	threat	and	abuse.	Migrants	challenge	the	“local”	populations’	existing	feeling	of	belonging,	and	they	do	so	merely	by	their	presence.	In	addition,	administration	and	governance	of	irregular	migrant	populations	are	rendered	under	a	different																																																									1	The	use	of	terms	such	as	illegal	migrant,	irregular	migrant	and	so	on,	have	for	a	long	time	been	criticised	by	critical	scholars	and	activist	communities,	mainly	on	two	accounts.	First,	as	criminalising	the	very	existence	of	migrants	that	cross	borders	in	an	“irregular”	manner,	as	the	act	of	crossing	immediately	includes	them	in	a	condition	of	illegality,	Secondly,	as	“naturalising”	the	not	at	all	natural,	but	instead	very	complex	and	entirely	social	phenomena	that	[constitute]	borders,	migration	and	the	related	policies,	without	which	no	irregular	or	regular	would	exist,	not	even	migrants	for	that	matter,	just	people	on	the	move.	Without	engaging,	or	presenting	in	depth	this	very	important	discussion,	this	thesis	will	refer	to	people	who	have	crossed	EU’s	borders	while	evading	border	controls,	as	“irregularised”,	as	this	term	captures	the	constructed	nature	of	their	condition,	without	stepping	into	legal	fields	and	connotations.	(INSERT	REF)		
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paradigm	compared	to	populations	enjoying	full	citizenship	and	their	respective	rights.	The	practices	that	a	person,	institution	or	state	performs	when	“receiving”	an	outsider	reveal	a	great	deal	about	their	ethics	and	moral	codes.	They	also	tell	us	a	great	deal	about	their	practices	to	date	as	interactions	with	outsiders	shed	light	on	the	underlying	identity	of	the	receiver.	The	infrastructure	and	classification	techniques	employed	are	in	a	constant	process	of	shaping	the	identity	of	both	parties.	Whether	the	result	is	inclusion,	exclusion	or	anything	in	the	wide	and	diverse	spectrum	between	the	two,	one	must	look	at	what	counts	as	critical,	as	evidence,	as	truth,	as	worthy	of	utilization	in	the	processes	of	registration	and	classification.	Perhaps	more	significantly,	one	must	consider	what	is	left	out,	rendered	mundane,	and	considered	irrelevant.		The	heuristic	value	of	these	considerations	is	only	intensified	by	the	overall	condition	of	crisis.	Crises,	and	breakdowns,	fabricated	or	“real”,	externally	caused	or	resulting	from	structural	flaws	and	shortcomings,	reveal	the	invisible	thread	that	holds	infrastructure,	techno-political	systems	and	other	constructions	together.	The	condition	of	crisis	permeated	my	research,	rendering	the	examination	of	bordering	practices	a	significant	point	of	entry	to	analyzing	European	governance.	The	“migrant	crisis”	emerged	as	a	factor	of	great	impact	and	complexity	in	this	already	complex	reality.	It	reshaped	power	balances,	moral	codes	and	obligations	and	practices,	as	well	as	altering	understandings	of	migrants	and	asylum	seekers	as	“figures”.	It	highlighted	not	only	the	limits	of	the	European	border	and	migration	machine	(Dijstelbloem,	Meijer,	&	Besters,	2011)	but	also	revealed	fundamental	issues	underlying	its	design	that	were	either	silenced	or	overlooked.	What	remains	to	be	investigated	is	whether	or	not	the	impact	of	the	the	“migrant	crisis”	brought	the	drastic	changes	that	one	might	expect,	enabled	by	all	the	debate	surrounding	the	need	for	a	radical	recalibration	of	a	“failed	system”	(Hess	&	Kasparek,	2015;	Korteweg	&	Mortera-Martinez,	2015;	Trauner,	2016).		Conceptualizations	of	the	“migrant	crisis”	and	its	triggers	should	also	be	explored,	including	factors	that	enabled	such	changes,	or	prevented	them.	Registration	of	incoming	populations	happens	within	the	wider	context	of	“bordering	practices”,	a	concept	that	border	scholars	have	utilized	to	understand	
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the	fluid,	ever-changing,	de-territorialized	and	often	arbitrary	“thing”	that	borders	are	in	contemporary	societies	(Barker,	2016;	Kaiser,	2012;	Lebuhn,	2013).	Thus,	the	present	thesis	is	inscribed	in,	and	draws	analytical	force	from	the	field	of	Critical	Border	Studies.	Additionally,	registration	of	migrants	is	increasingly	dependent	on	the	development	and	use	of	interconnected	Information	Communication	Technology	(ICT)	systems	(G.	Feldman,	2011).	The	thesis	also	draws	from	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS),	as	this	field	of	research	helps	to	illuminate	the	role	of	ICTs	in	shaping	their	subject	matter.	
1.1.	A	short	epistemological	admission		 Borders	are	a	complex,	highly	historical,	social	phenomena	and	become	only	more	complex	through	the	transformations	enabled	by	the	use	of	ICT	tools	and	methods.	The	sites	where	bordering	practices	take	place,	as	well	as	the	actors	involved,	are	rapidly	growing	(G.	Feldman,	2011),	as	is	the	complexity	of	the	relations	between	them.	Both	are	also	highly	historical	and	subject	to	change	alongside	other	factors	that	shape	bordering	practices,	such	as	power	balances	among	states,	and	shifts	in	policy	making.	Thus,	it	seems	futile	to	utter	conclusions	that	claim	universality	about	borders,	let	alone	theoretical	bodies.	We	can	only	hope	to	imprint	“glimpses”	of	bordering	practices	as	they	happen.	This	thesis	is	strongly	committed	to	and	bound	by	this	methodological	and	theoretical	admittance.	It	seeks	to	present	practices,	events	and	discourses	as	they	happened	in	specific	moments	and	contexts.	While	I	will	refer	to	grander	narratives	and	schemes	of	large-scale	policymaking,	overall	this	is	a	highly	localized	and	situated	(Haraway,	1988)	research	project,	which	aims	to	produce	knowledge	outside	the	frame	of	objective	scientific	orthodoxy	(Galis	&	Hansson,	2012).	
1.2.	Aim	and	research	questions		 The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	critically	investigate	the	registration	techniques	of	irregularized	migrants	upon	their	entrance	into	the	EU	during	the	period	2015-2017.	As	a	first	step	towards	this	aim,	I	will	present	a	history	of	the	main	registration	ICT	tool	for	irregularized	migrants	in	the	EU,	which	is	the	database	of	EURODAC.		Secondly,	I	will	delve	deeper	into	the	practices	that	
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constituted	said	registration	at	the	EU’s	external	borders	between	Greece	and	Turkey.	I	investigate	how	these	practices	came	into	being	related	to	the	political	responses	that	the	EU	mobilized	in	the	face	of	the	“migrant	crisis”.	I	will	also	discuss	the	implementation	of	these	responses	by	the	Greek	state	in	specific	infrastructural	settings	that	pre-existed	or	were	created	to	accommodate	increased	influxes	of	migrants	to	Greece.	For	that	purpose,	I	will	study	the	specific	“conceptualizations	of	crisis”	evident	in	the	responses	of	the	EU.		With	that	under	consideration,	the	thesis	will	explore	the	following	research	questions:		-	How	did	the	European	registration	apparatus	of	EURODAC	evolve	in	the	years	before	the	“migrant	crisis”?	-	How	was	the	“migrant	crisis”	conceptualized	in	the	European	public	eye	and	political	debate	concerning	registration	of	irregular	migrants?	-	How	did	Europe	respond	in	the	face	of	the	“migrant	crisis”	and	how	were	the	registration	processes	performed	in	this	context?	How	were	these	responses	implemented	by	the	Greek	state,	and	under	what	rationale?		-	How	did	the	aforementioned	conceptualizations	and	implementations	find	their	way	to	the	human	agents	of	migration	and	border-related	practices?	The	PhD	project	prompted	by	this	thesis	was	conceived	and	initially	designed	before	the	“migrant	crisis”	became	the	dominant	discursive	factor	that	it	has	been	for	the	last	four	years.	Initially,	the	focus	was	centered	on	EURODAC	and	the	use	and	circulation	of	its	data.	However,	as	events	unfolded	with	great	tension	and	speed,	and	after	the	first	research	trip,	the	focus	was	widened	to	include	as	many	instances	of	the	registration	process	as	possible.	The	initial	goal	was	to	examine	the	function	of	a	specific	database.	However,	this	was	dwarfed	by	the	multiplicity	of	coinciding	events	as	the	“migrant	crisis”	focused	attention	on	the	bordering	practices.	A	proliferation	of	academic	and	non-academic	projects	resulted,	accompanied	by	the	acceleration	and	intensification	of	other	research	projects	in	the	area,	all	struggling	to	captivate	the	changing	reality.		
1.3.	Structure	of	the	thesis		 The	original	focus	on	EURODAC	has	been	revised	in	the	final	form	of	the	thesis.	The	system	is	featured	in	the	first	empirical	chapter,	i.e.	chapter	3,	with	
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the	history	of	EURODAC	presented	as	a	backdrop	for	appreciating	the	wide-ranging	shaping	of	the	registration	process	that	ensued.	From	this	point,	the	focus	widens.	Chapter	4	examines	the	“migrant	crisis”	and	engages	in	a	critical	discussion	of	its	elements,	how	it	was	present	in	the	public	and	political	debate,	as	well	as	its	roots	in	past	EU	policy-making	decisions.	Informed	by	a	body	of	theory	that	critically	examines	the	emergence	of	crisis	in	the	political	life	of	our	times,	it	seeks	to	de-naturalize	the	“migrant	crisis”	and	place	it	in	a	specific	framing.	By	doing	so,	it	sets	the	substrate	for	examining	the	major	response	tactics	and	policies	devised	by	the	EU	in	the	face	of	the	“migrant	crisis”.	Chapter	5	proceeds	to	examine	the	“Hotspot	approach”	as	one	of	said	responses,	as	well	as	the	subsequent	emergence	of	the	“Hotspot”	as	an	infrastructural	unit.	Chapter	6	takes	the	examination	of	the	“Hotspot”	one	step	further,	presenting	the	field	work	conducted	in	the	Hotspots	of	the	Greek	islands	of	Chios	and	Lesvos.	Focusing	on	the	processes	that	comprise	registration	in	the	context	of	the	Hotspot,	the	chapter	provides	an	ethnographic	account	of	the	complex	process	and	the	actors	involved.	Chapter	7,	picks	up	the	thread	of	EU	reactions,	examining	the	“EU-Turkey	Statement”	published	in	March	2016.	There,	I	engage	with	the	conceptual	shifts	that	the	“statement”	prompted,	as	well	as	the	elements	of	continuity	it	presents	with	pre-existing	trends	in	European	border	and	migration	policies	and	practices.	The	focus	is	again	on	the	practices	of	the	Greek	state,	with	a	short	presentation	of	a	specific	instance	of	bordering	practices	centered	on	issues	of	temporality	and	registration.	Chapter	8	sums	up	the	conclusions	of	my	thesis.									
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Chapter	2.	Theoretical	aspirations	on	borders,	technologies	
and	migration		 In	this	section,	I	present	the	theoretical	concepts,	approaches	and	bodies	of	knowledge	that	will	assist	me	in	answering	the	research	questions	identified	above.	Examining	the	practices	and	discourse	that	constitute	the	registration	of	migrants	and	asylum	seekers	in	the	context	of	a	state	and	supra-state	bureaucratic	entity	requires	an	interdisciplinary	theoretical	toolset.	The	theoretical	basis	for	this	study	is	located	at	the	intersection	of	two	broad	fields,	namely	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS),	and	Border	Studies.	Branches	of	performativity	theory	are	also	be	utilized.	Through	this	interdisciplinary	perspective,	the	study	will	analyze	how	borders,	technologies,	human	agents	and	the	overlying	theme	of	crisis,	all	interact	and	interplay,	shaping	policy	making	and	state	practices.	Particularly,	concepts	and	approaches	within	selected	areas	of	STS	support	the	analysis	of	the	empirical	material	by	interlinking	the	process	of	categorization	of	incoming	individuals	for	the	purpose	of	the	biopolitical	administration	of	the	migrant	populations.	Similarly,	border	studies	provide	this	study	with	a	theoretical	and	conceptual	toolset	for	observing	how	the	border	phenomenon	is	present	in	our	times.	Performativity	theory	is	applied	to	strengthen	this	analysis	by	emphasizing	the	open-ended,	performative	character	of	bordering	practices.	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	is	divided	into	six	parts.	The	first	five	present	the	main	theoretical	tools	and	approaches	used	throughout	the	remainder	of	the	thesis.	More	specifically,	the	following	section	presents	a	body	of	work	from	critical	border	studies.	This	is	used	to	understand	and	discuss	the	notion	and	phenomena	of	the	border,	part	of	which	involves	the	registration	of	irregularized	migrants.	Section	2.2.	presents	a	discussion	of	performativity	theory	and	its	interplay	with	border	studies,	which	is	used	in	the	analysis	of	the	empirical	material	in	chapters	7	and	8.	In	section	2.3.	I	briefly	discuss	and	present	some	theoretical	work	concerning	power,	and	modes	of	modern	governance,	which	are	useful	for	exploring	the	practices	of	policy	making	discussed	in	chapters	4,	5	and	6,	as	well	as	the	actions	of	some	of	my	informants	in	chapter	7.	Inspired	by	the	work	of	Susan	Leigh	Star,	section	2.4.	discusses	a	
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theorization	of	the	invisible	work	behind	classification	systems	and	techniques.	Section	2.5.	draws	from	studies	of	infrastructure	and	is	featured	in	my	analysis	of	the	Hotspots.	Finally,	section	2.6.	provides	an	overview	of	critical	literature	surrounding	the	notion	of	“crisis”,	instances	of	its	utterance,	and	application	in	contemporary	societies	and	policy	making.	
2.1.	Border	studies	–	capturing	the	notion	of	the	“border”			 Drawing	from	the	Westphalia	era,	which	is	considered	the	point	of	departure	for	demarcating	the	nation-state	in	geographical	terms	(Zaiotti,	2011),	borders	are	primary	institutions	of	nation	states.	They	are	traditionally	considered	to	comprise	an	empirical-physical	phenomena,	well-defined,	visible	on	a	map	as	a	line	demarcating	the	end	of	territorial	power	of	states	and	guarded	by	the	state’s	armed	forces	(Paasi,	2009).	The	idea	of	the	border	as	a	geopolitical	frontier	relates	to	the	existence	of	the	sovereign	nation	state	in	the	post-Westphalian	era,	together	with	the	idea	of	a	nation	of	people	sharing	a	national	identity,	a	common	history,	language,	religion,	etc.	(Cuttitta,	2006).	In	this	paradigm,	borders,	sometimes	coinciding	with	natural	frontiers,	are	exhaustive.	No	earthly	surface	of	the	planet	escapes	their	determinative	function;	no	piece	of	land	is	left	outside	some	states’	sovereignty.	Dominant	as	they	may	be,	borders,	as	clear	demarcations	between	sovereign	states,	are	not	a-historical	or	inevitable.	Different	forms	of	separation	have	existed	in	the	past,	such	as	the	
marches,	functioning	more	as	buffer	zones	than	clear	demarcation	lines,	enabling	a	much	less	“monopolistic”	exercise	of	power	(Balibar,	2009).		While	in	an	abstract	sense,	borders	are	supposed	to	place	each	individual	under	a	certain	scrutiny	in	order	to	categorize	them	and	act	upon	them	accordingly,	this	“universality”	is	not	universal	at	all.	Border	guards	and	scholars	alike	know	relatively	well	that	not	everyone	is	scrutinized	in	the	same	manner	by	any	border	apparatus.	Balibar	argues	for	the	polysemic	nature	of	the	border.	He	shows	that	crossing	the	Croatia-Montenegro	border	can	be	a	very	different	experience	for	a	person	with	an	Albanian	passport,	compared	to	someone	with	a	German	passport	(Balibar,	2009).	On	a	similar	note,	Broeders	(2011)	discusses	how	anyone	traveling	to	the	EU	who	needs	a	visa	is	“by	definition	already	suspect”	and	thus	subjected	to	a	different	set	of	practices	by	border	officials	
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compared	to	e.g.	a	migrant	from	the	USA.	The	list	of	examples	is	endless,	clearly	revealing	that	different	individuals	receive	different	treatment.			 Other	than	the	“subjective”	experience	of	each	individual	crossing	a	border,	the	deeply	historical	notions	borders	must	also	be	considered.	They	are	one	among	many	ways	in	which	political/sovereign/national	formations	have	demarcated	their	territories/place	of	influence/vital	space.	They	are	also	prone	to	change	in	terms	of	being	“redrawn”,	(usually	enabled	by	violent	clashes)	after	reconfigurations	of	said	demarcations.	Although	both	these	processes	are	of	great	importance,	others	are	perhaps	more	crucial	in	which	borders	are	open-ended.	The	spatial	divide	between	“inside”	and	“outside”	that	borders	produce,	and	the	subsequent	mediation,	facilitation	or	blocking	of	the	mobility	of	populations,	cannot	be	discussed	outside	the	socio-political	relations	existing	within	the	territory	of	different	states,	and	also	involves	relations	between	them	(De	Genova,	2016).		As	Balibar	puts	it,	every	political	border	is	“never	the	mere	boundary	between	two	states,	but	is	always	overdetermined	and,	in	that	sense,	sanctioned,	reduplicated	and	relativized	by	other	geopolitical	divisions”	(Balibar,	2002,	p.	79).	Thus,	there	is	no	linear	pattern	in	the	transformation	of	borders.	They	are	“being	both	multiplied	and	reduced	in	their	localization	and	their	function,	they	are	being	thinned	out	and	doubled” (Balibar, 1998).	In	other	words,	both	the	intensity	of	e.g.	control	at	border	venues	and	in	procedures,	as	well	as	their	symbolic	value	are	subject	to	radical	and	unpredicted	changes	enabled	by	factors	that	by	far	precede	their	locality.	
2.1.1The	border	is	everywhere,	but	in	some	places	more	than	others…		 In	addition	to	being	over	determined	by	the	wider	socio-political	context,	borders	are	being	subjected	to	change	triggered	by	the	use	and	implementation	of	new	available	technologies.	Dijstelbloem,	et	al	(Dijstelbloem	et	al.,	2011)	point	out	three	major	transformations	of	the	border,	enabled	in	part	by	such	new	technologies,	and	more	specifically	digital	technologies.		First	of	all,	border	checks,	an	integral	element	of	borders,	are	increasingly	diffused	in	spatial	contexts	remote	from	the	traditional	borderline.	This	de-territorialization	of	borders	is	dual	in	its	direction.	On	the	one	hand,	we	are	
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seeing	the	externalization	of	border	controls,	with	the	outsourcing	of	border	related	procedures	to	other	states	or	private	actors,	as	in	the	case	of	the	carrier	sanctions	(Mau,	Gülzau,	Laube,	&	Zaun,	2015)	and	the	EU-Turkey	Statement,	which	will	be	discussed	in	further	detail	in	the	present	thesis.	On	the	other	hand,	this	de-territorialization	can	be	seen	as	moving	towards	the	territory	of	the	implementing	states.	This	is	evident,	for	example,	through	migration	raids	(Coleman,	2009),	and	the	extended	detention	in	border	camps	during	periods	of	administrative	limbo	(Cuttitta,	2015)	as	well	as	its	diffusion	in	banal	sites	of	everyday	life	(Johnson	et	al.,	2011).	Secondly,	the	range	of	actors	involved	in	border	control	and	other	border-related	activities	has	expanded	considerably.	Examples	of	these	include:	private	companies	developing	software	solutions	for	ICT	systems,	medical	experts	serving	as	border	“deputies”	(Dijstelbloem	et	al.,	2011)	busy	assessing	the	ages	of	young	migrants,	NGOs	involved	in	the	administration	of	humanitarian	operations	or	management	of	migrant	camps,	and	volunteer	vigilante	border	guards.	Thirdly,	border-related	activities	are	focusing	increasingly	on	targeting	the	body.	The	use	of	biometric	technologies	for	border	and	migration	control,	such	as	eye	and	fingerprint	scanners	and	DNA	tests,	inscribes	the	border	to	the	body,	rendering	it	machine	readable	(Van	der	Ploeg	&	Sprenkels,	2011).	This	allows	new	forms	of	governance	to	emerge	(Ajana,	2013).	These	technologies	challenge	traditional	notions	of	privacy	and	body	integrity	(Van	der	Ploeg,	2003),	while	their	use	in	the	context	of	migration	control	has	been	seen	to	allow	new	forms	of	exclusion	(Heinemann	&	Lemke,	2014).	
2.1.2. From	borders	to	border	practices		 The	increasing	use	of	interconnected	databases	is	present	in	each	of	the	abovementioned	three	ways	that	describe	how	borders	are	subject	to	change.	The	overall	effect	has	been	captioned	by	scholars	as	the	“border	is	everywhere”	(Balibar,	2002),	portable	and	virtual	(Lyon,	2002).	However,	this	catchphrase	must	itself	be	viewed	from	a	somewhat	critical	perspective,	as	despite	the	diffusion	of	border-related	procedures,	certain	spaces	still	retain	their	special,	concentrated	character,	as	“sites	for	the	expression	of	state	power”	(Pickering	&	
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Weber,	2006).	Thus,	theorizing	borders	is	a	complex	task	that	requires	a	researcher	to	make	choices.	It	is	unlikely	that	an	overall	theory	can	encapsulate	the	different	and	unique	nature	of	every	border	on	the	globe.	Equally,	the	complexity	of	borders	and	their	constitutive	practices	in	each	individual	case	are	beyond	the	grasp	of	one	unified	theory.	“Borders	manifest	themselves	in	innumerable	ways	in	daily	lives	and	state-related	practices	and	in	institutions	such	as	language,	culture,	myths,	heritage,	politics,	legislation	and	economy.”	(Paasi,	2011).	An	essentialist	view	of	borders	as	a	concept	with	stable	content	that	only	changes	in	terms	of	spatial	shifting	of	a	borderline,	thus	fails	to	encapsulate	the	plurality	with	which	borders	present	themselves	in	contemporary	societies.	Building	on	that,	border	scholars	have	shifted	from	viewing	borders	as	things	that	exist	in	space	and	disrupt	or	facilitate	mobility,	to	viewing	them	as	“processes,	practices,	discourses,	symbols,	institutions	or	networks	through	which	power	works”	(Johnson	et	al.,	2011).	Moreover,	these	processes	themselves	are	considered	to	be	in	a	constant	process	of	becoming,	in	ways	“that	are	neither	linear	nor	unidirectional,	but	that	are	in	many	ways	event-driven.”	(Kaiser,	2012).  In	the	context	of	terminology,	this	shift	has	been	materialized	with	the	partial	substitution	of	“border”	with	the	more	inclusive	“bordering	practices”.	That	accommodates	the	plurality	of	actors	and	processes	at	play	in	shaping	the	border,	be	they	state	or	non-state	actors,	migrants	or	other	forms	of	actors,	as	well	as	their	distribution	in	geographical	terms.	De	Genova	calls	for a	focus	on	
bordering,	as	a	verb,	an	activity	that	“involves	productive	activity,	a	kind	of	
labour”	(De	Genova,	2016,	p.	47).	My	interpretation	of	this	focus	on	bordering	is	around	two	points,	of	methodological	and	theoretical	texture,	respectively.	The	former	motivated	my	decision	to	conduct	field	research	at	the	border	venues	of	the	Greek	islands,	to	get	a	live	and	as	less	mediated	glimpse	of	said	bordering	practices	and	is	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.	The	latter	was	prompted	by	the	subsequent	decision	to	use	performativity	theory	to	analyze	the	material	I	gathered	during	those	research	trips.	
2.2. Performativity	and	performative	agency		
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Viewing	borders	as	the	outcome	of	bordering	practices	allows	for	a	more	dynamic	exploration	of	the	categories	in	evidence.	To	a	large	extent,	the	principle	function	of	the	border	is	to	categorize	individuals	as	legitimate	travelers,	and	irregular	crossers,	thus	accelerating	and	facilitating	the	mobilities	of	the	latter	and	incommoding	or	even	blocking	the	mobilities	of	the	latter,	thus	producing	the	relevant	scale	of	inclusion	and	exclusion.	This	means	that	in	addition	to	demarcating	geographical	territory,	borders	materialize	in	technologies	of	control	and	are	registered	on	human	bodies.	Borders	also	perform	capitalist	and	statist	constructs	for	conserving	privileges	(Galis	et	al	2016).	The	notion	of	performativity	allows	me	to	delve	deeper	into	the	ontologies	that	these	constructs	enact	as	they	pertain	to	migrant	subjects.		The	branch	of	performativity	that	I	engage	with	draws	from	the	Austinian	tradition	and	the	further	work	and	its	development	by	Butler.	Austin	(Austin,	1962)	noted	that	certain	utterances	of	words	that	do	not	fall	under	the	category	of	nonsense	“do	not	‘describe’	or	‘report’	anything	at	all,	are	not	‘true	or	false’”	while	their	uttering	is	“a	part	of	doing	an	action,	which	again	would	not	normally	be	described	as	saying	something.”	Austin	provides	the	classical	examples	of	promise	and	betting	“I	bet	you	sixpence	it	will	rain	tomorrow”,	“I	promise	I	will	be	there”	as	examples	of	utterance	that	do	(perform),	rather	than	describing,	producing	or	transforming	a	situation	with	their	informational	content.	These	speech	acts	are	called	performatives,	in	contrast	to	constatives,	which	describe	reality.	Performatives	can	be	illocutionary	or	perlocutionary,	the	former	bring	about	certain	realities	at	the	moment	of	utterance,	as	with	a	judge	proclaiming	a	person	guilty	of	a	crime,	while	the	latter	need	certain	kinds	of	conditions	in	order	to	produce	an	effect.	Both	can	fail,	as	a	fallen	king	may	order	troops	to	war	with	no	result,	as	he	does	not	occupy	the	recognized	position	of	authority,	but	when	perlocutionary	performative	utterances	fail,	like	a	promise	proved	false,	it	is	“because	a	certain	discursive	wager	on	what	reality	might	be	fails	to	materialize”(Butler	2010,	p8).	Butler	extended	the	limits	of	the	Austinian	model	of	the	speaking	subject,	liberating	it	from	the	ontological	necessity	of	a	relatively	clear	utterance	of	enunciation	ascribed	to	a	specific	subject.	Her	research	included	,other,	not	strictly	verbal	acts,	such	as	“hesitation,	coughs,	or	a	less	than	enthusiastic	
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adjective”,	which	hold	performative	agency	related	to	the	position	of	power	of	the	speaking	subject.	Butler	famously	discussed	performativity	of	gender,	doubting	its	status	as	a	stable	identity	or	locus	of	agency	that	is	the	source	of	actions,	as	“rather,	it	is	an	identity	tenuously	constituted	in	time	–	an	identity	instituted	through	a	stylized	repetition	of	acts”	(Butler,	1988a).	The	agency	of	this	stylized	repetition	of	acts	has	since	been	expanded	to	include	wider	sets	of	repetitive	practices	through	which	the	production	of	social	categories,	identities	and	signifiers	is	possible.	In	that	sense,	performativity	“seeks	to	counter	a	certain	kind	of	positivisms	according	to	which	we	might	begin	with	already	delimited	understandings	of	what	gender,	the	state	and	the	economy	are”	(Butler,	2010).	Instead,	performativity	examines	the	set	of	processes	that	produce	ontological	effects,	categories	and	identities	that	are	then	“naturalized”,	such	as	the	notions	of	migrants”,	“refugees”	and	“borders”,	and	focuses	on	the	mechanisms	of	this	production.		Performativity	has	been	invested	with	a	liberating	aura	in	the	context	of	queer	studies	as	the	de-naturalization	of	gender	identities	and	the	emphasis	on	their	performative	and	thus	constructed	character	opens	up	the	space	for	decision	and	agency	on	what	kind	of	performances	an	individual	will	prefer	and	thus	what	identities	they	will	adopt.	While	such	performances	are	indeed	available,	and	their	understanding	requires	the	utilization	of	performativity	theory	as	a	conceptualizing	tool,	performativity	is	not	equated	with	performance,	meaning	that	there	is	an	unspecified	quantitative	relation	between	the	two,	which	is	characterized	by	a	ritualistic	repetition	of	performance	in	order	for	the	latter	to	become	performative.	Performativity	cannot	be	reduced	to	performance,	as	performativity	is	“the	reiterative	and	citational	practice	by	which	discourse	produces	the	effects	that	it	names”,	as	this	thesis	explores	in	the	context	of	border	practices.	And	while	instances	of	human	practices	such	as	drag	are	often	discussed	in	terms	of	performativity,	Butler’s	argument	on	gender	is	not	that	gender	is	performance,	but	a	normative	function	of	performativity	(reiterated	and	citational)	(Weber	1998,	p81).	The	detachment	of	the	idea	of	performativity	from	a	speaking	subject,	of	a	certain	someone	that	takes	on	the	task	of	verbally	enunciating	a	reality,	has	an	impact	on	the	notion	of	performative	power	and	agency.	Focusing	specifically	on	
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the	economic	sphere,	Butler	mentions	as	examples	of	performative	power	exercises	:	“(a)	the	mundane	and	repeated	acts	of	delimitation	that	seek	to	maintain	a	separation	among	economic,	social	and	political	spheres,	(b)	modes	of	prediction	and	anticipation	that	constitute	part	of	economic	activity	itself,	and	(c)	organizations	of	human	and	non-human	networks,	including	technology,	that	enter	into	specific	economic	activities	such	as	price-setting”	(Butler,	2010,	p.	150)	.	Thus,	performative	agency	can	be	found	on	bodies	of	theoretical	knowledge,	as	is	the	case	with	economics,	in	Callon’s	work(Callon	&	others,	2007),	and	does	not	presuppose	the	existence	of	a	specific	subject	who	will	complete	the	performative	process,	even	though	this	can	also	be	the	case.	Performative	agency	thus	can	emerge	from	the	“reiteration	of	a	set	of	social	relations”(Butler,	2010,	p.	152),	practices	and	processes	that	produce	ontological	effects,	categories	and	identities	that	are	then	“naturalized”.		Performances	are	not	freely	available	to	the	subject	to	choose	for	themselves,	but	are	“reiterated	under	and	through	constraint,	under	and	through	the	force	of	prohibition	and	taboo,	with	the	threat	of	ostracism	and	even	death	controlling	and	compelling	the	shape	of	the	production”	(Butler	1993,	p95).	In	that	way,	performative	acts	are,	in	most	cases,	statements	that	exercise	power.	They	are	“forms	of	authoritative	speech”,	articulated	within	networks	of	authorization	and	punishment.	This	authoritative	speech	is	uttered	by	individuals,	like	a	border	official	or	a	judge	who	by	naming	a	person	guilty	or	innocent,	installs	the	situation	he	names,	through	citation	of	the	law.	The	binding	power	of	the	words	of	the	judge	is	not	derived	by	his	position	as	a	figure	of	authority	within	a	constellation	of	power,	nor	his	will,	but	instead	through	the	
citation	of	the	law,	which	allows	for	his	performative	act	to	“be	binding	and	conferring	power”.	The	process	of	subjectification	that	corresponds	with	this	view,	is	characterized	by	a	certain	paradox,	as	“the	discursive	condition	of	social	recognition	precedes	and	conditions	the	formation	of	the	subject:	recognition	is	not	conferred	on	a	subject,	but	forms	that	subject”	(Butler	1993,	p226).	The	means	by	which	the	subjectification	is	achieved,	both	legitimating	and	exclusionary,	are	in	principle	rendered	invisible,	and	naturalized	as	the	political	analysis	and	debate	around	them	take	the	very	structures	that	enable	the	subjectification	as	their	foundation.	In	that	way,	once	again,	(juridical)	power	
		 22	
“‘produces’	what	it	claims	merely	to	represent”	(Butler,	2006a,	p.	5).	This	element	of	Butler’s	thought,	deeply	inspired	by	Foucault,	is	pivotal	to	the	examination	of	changing	bordering	practices	explored	in	this	thesis,	and	more	specifically	with	regard	to	the	construction	of	subject	positions	such	as	those	of	the	refugee.	
2.2.1.	The	performative	border			 In	analogy	to	the	performative	construction	of	gender,	scholars	have	theorized	performative	constitutions	of	the	state,	where	state	sovereignty	is	discursively	produced	and	stabilized,	arguing	that	national	states	are	paradoxical	entities,	“which	do	not	possess	prediscursive,	stable	identities”(Campbell,	1992,	p.	22),	but	are	instead	in	a	constant	process	of	becoming	constantly	shaped	and	never	finished	as	entities.	In	the	context	of	bordering,	a	similar	concept	of	performativity	leads	in	two	directions.	Borders	perform	and	construct	categories	and	identities,	but	they	are	also	performed	themselves.	Bordering,	despite	being	a	largely	(and	increasingly)	technologically	mediated	set	of	practices,	legislated	by	complex	and	intertwined	legal	frameworks,	is	still	largely	performed	by	human	agents	who,	are	essentially	“people	who	are	informed	in	their	practices	by	notions	of	what	constitutes	border,…,	and	so	their	efforts	might	or	might	not	turn	out	in	the	way	intended.”(Green,	2010,	p.	262).	What	Salter	refers	to	as	the	formal	performance	of	the	border,	namely	the	“description	and	defense	of	particular	territorial	borders”,	and	its	practical	performance,	including	“the	actual	politics	of	enforcing	the	admission/expulsion	and	filtering	process”	(Johnson	et	al.,	2011,	p.	66)	often	do	not	coincide.	Or	as	Wonders	puts	it,	“state	policies	have	little	meaning	until	they	are	‘performed’	by	border	agents”	(Wonders,	2006,	p.	66).	This	distinction	has	important	methodological	consequences	and	is	discussed	further	in	chapter	3.	Without	adopting	a	naïve	position	that	would	imply	that	state/border	agents	are	free	to	perform	the	border	in	any	way	they	find	fit,	we	need	to	include	in	our	analysis	the	way	that	prejudice,	worldview	and	work	ethics	find	their	way	into	what	bordering	is	and	how	it	is	performed.	Other	than	being	performed,	borders,	seen	as	bordering	practices,	have	performative	agency	over	their	subjects.	Although	categories	and	dichotomies	
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are	presented	as	regular/irregular,	or	migrant/refugee	as	“natural	categories”	existing	in	the	wild,	it	is	the	bordering	practices	and	their	performative	nature	that	shape	and	circulate	the	said	categories.	It	is	through	the	construction	of	these	categories,	and	the	attribution	of	the	subsequent	identities,	that	“nation	states	legalize	forms	of	belonging”	(Mountz,	2003).	This	aspect	of	bordering	practices	is	related	to	the	concept	of	subjectification,	which	must	be	unpacked	through	the	utilization	of	other	theoretical	bodies,	discussed	in	the	following	section	of	this	chapter.	
2.3.	Subjectification,	biopower	and	state	of	exception		 Foucault	examines	the	processes	that	render	human	beings	as	subjects.	He	achieves	this	by	analyzing	the	functions	of	modern	and	early	modern	state	institutions,	among	others	clinics,	military	hospitals	and	prisons.	The	notion	of	subject	has	two	meanings	in	Foucault’s	work:	“subject	to	someone	else	by	control	and	dependence;	and	tied	to	his	own	identity	by	a	conscience	or	self-knowledge”	(Foucault,	1982,	p.	781).	Neither	of	the	two	exist	outside	their	production	by	systems	of	power	relations	that	are	ontologically	prior	to	the	subject	(Foucault,	2001).	Thus,	the	question	of	the	subject	cannot	be	addressed	without	addressing	the	issue	of	power.		The	Foucauldian	term	of	“biopower”	is	of	particular	importance	for	this	thesis.	Foucault	coined	the	term	to	describe	the	new	form	of	power	that	came	about	during	early	modernity	and	conceptualizes	the	management	of	the	population	by	the	state.	Biopower	is	distinguished	from	previous	forms	of	power	in	the	feudal	era,	namely	the	power	of	the	sovereign,	in	a	number	of	ways.	The	power	of	the	sovereign	“was	essentially	a	right	of	seizure:	of	things,	time,	bodies,	and	ultimately	life	itself;	it	culminated	in	the	privilege	to	seize	hold	of	life	in	order	to	suppress	it”,	and	“the	sovereign	exercised	his	right	of	life	only	by	exercising	his	right	to	kill,	or	by	refraining	from	killing;	he	evidenced	his	power	over	life	only	through	the	death	he	was	capable	of	requiring”.		Bio-power	and	the	
subjectification	that	it	enabled,	entered	the	realm	of	life	in	every	domain	through	its	institutions,	not	so	much	as	a	threat	to	life,	but	more	as	an	administrator	of	it,	or	regulator	of	how	life	can	be	lived.		
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All	phenomena	peculiar	to	life	now	had	to	enter	the	realm	of	political	techniques	and	administration,	the	order	of	knowledge	and	power.	This	included	e.g.	the	improvement	of	agricultural	techniques,	which	helped	with	dealing	with	threats	such	as	starvation	and	plague	(at	least	for	the	Western	states)	as	well	as	extended	and	systematic	observation	and	measurement	of	every	aspect	of	human	life.	“Western	man	was	gradually	learning	what	it	meant	to	be	a	living	species	in	a	living	world,	to	have	a	body,	conditions	of	existence,	probabilities	of	life,	an	individual	and	collective	welfare,	forces	that	could	be	modified,	and	a	space	in	which	they	could	be	distributed	in	an	optimal	manner”.			This	power	over	life	takes	two	basic	forms,	which,	without	being	antithetical,	constitute	its	development.	The	first,	namely	an	“anatomo-politics	of	
the	human	body”	(REF)	aims	at	the	optimization	of	the	productive	capacities	of	the	human	body,	looking	at	it	as	a	machine	that	can	be	fine-tuned	to	perform	at	its	maximum	for	the	longest	period	possible.	The	second	form	is	focused	on	the	species’	body,	supervising	aspects	of	the	biological	process	of	human	existence	such	as	“births,	mortality,	the	level	of	health,	life	expectancy	and	longevity,	with	all	the	conditions	that	can	cause	these	to	vary”,	namely	biopower.	The	organization	of	political	life	associated	with	bio-power	is	bio-politics,	the	politics	of	the	social	body.	In	bio-politics,	power	is	exercised	at	the	level	of	life,	and	the	right	to	kill,	or	let	live,	has	been	gradually	replaced	with	the	practice	of	making	live,	and	letting	die.	In	the	context	of	this	thesis,	Foucault’s	work	allows	me	to	theorize	the	role	of	registration	of	populations	for	the	purposes	of	state	administration.	In	order	for	populations	to	be	governable	nowadays,	they	must	be	known,	categorized,	and	digitized.	In	addition,	Foucault	sets	another	ontological	precondition	for	power.	Power	cannot	only	be	a	negative	force	that	suppresses.	Such	a	practice	would	generate	a	resistance	so	tense	that	even	if	it	did	not	have	the	capacity	of	subversion,	it	would	at	least	cause	turbulence	to	the	extent	of	social	malfunction.	Instead,	power	needs	to	have	a	productive,	or	positive,	function	that	offers	solutions,	enhances	the	possibilities	of	its	subjects,	and	facilitates	its	realizations.	Only	then	is	the	subjectification	of	a	population	possible.	Building	on	Foucault’s	work,	scholars	have	stressed	the	importance	of	state	acts,	such	as	censuses,	for	modern	practices	of	governance	(Bowker	&	Star,	
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1999;	Hacking,	2015;	Pelizza,	2019;	Rose,	2001).	Foucault’s	examination	of	biopower,	and	his	examination	of	the	importance	of	confession	in	the	process	of	subjectification,	helps	illuminate	the	performativity	of	similar	processes	present	in	bordering	practices,	such	as	the	asylum	interview.	It	is	undoubtedly	a	crucial	tool	in	examining	the	governance	of	populations	of	citizens.	However,	when	it	comes	to	bordering,	additional	theoretical	resources	are	required,	since	bordering	reveals	itself	as	functioning	in	a	context	that	occasionally	escapes	the	limits	of	biopower.		Agamben	argues	that	at	the	heart	of	every	democratic	state,	and	in	the	function	of	biopolitics,	a	“state	of	exception”	exists	under	the	rule	of	law.	Under	this	provision,	when	an	emergency	is	announced,	the	state	is	empowered	to	act	outside	the	constraints	of	law,	adopting	extreme,	extra-juridical	measures.	Agamben	bases	his	argument	on	Schmitt’s	view	of	the	exception	as	“a	case	of	extreme	peril,	a	danger	to	the	existence	of	the	state,	or	the	like”	(Schmitt,	2006)	that	does	not	allow	for	the	continuation	of	the	rule	of	law.	According	to	Agamben,	again	drawing	from	Schmitt,	the	existence	of	the	possibility	for	a	state	of	exception	is	a	constitutional	aspect	of	State	authority.	It	is	an	element	of	sovereign	power	surviving	in	the	era	of	bio-politics	as	a	“zone	of	indistinction,	between	inside	and	outside,	where	there	is	no	difference	between	law	and	force,	wherein	individuals	are	subject	to	the	law	but	not	subjects	in	the	law”	(Agamben,	1998).		While	the	state	of	exception	is	used	mainly	in	reference	to	social	phenomena	like	the	emergence	of	the	Third	Reich	and	the	death	camps,	or	Guantanamo	Bay,	scholars	have	argued	that	it	can	be	traced	in	mundane	everyday	practices	of	governance	of	minorities	(Agamben,	1998).	Specifically,	border	and	migration	policies	are	seen	as	being	under	a	permanent	state	of	exception	(S.	Taylor,	2005)(Bigo,	2006).	Overall,	Agamben	argues	that	the	increasing	appearance	of	the	state	of	exception	tends	to	render	it	the	“dominant	paradigm	in	contemporary	politics”	(Agamben,	2005).	Butler	(Butler,	2006b)	argues	that	even	though	Foucault	held	an	analytic	distinction	between	sovereign	power	and	govermentality,	he	kept	the	possibility	of	coexistence	of	the	two	open,	without,	however,	providing	a	point	of	view	that	could	predict	how	this	
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coexistence	would	emerge	under	emergency	conditions.	The	ground	where	this	coexistence	attains	its	highest	degree	of	visibility	is	the	suspension	of	the	rule	of	law	(p.	55),	or	its	rendering	of	a	utility	(p.	57),	mobilized	for	the	constraining	of	specific	populations.	However,	in	the	suspension	of	law,	precisely	because	governmentality	is	the	paradigm,	there	is	no	concentration	of	power	in	one	single	unity	that	reinstates	its	sovereignty	like	the	figure	of	the	sovereign.	The	anachronism	does	not	run	so	deep.	Instead,	within	the	paradigm	of	governmentality,	“petty	sovereigns”	(p.	56)	emerge	“reigning	in	the	midst	of	bureaucratic	army	institutions	mobilized	by	aims	and	tactics	of	power	that	they	do	not	inaugurate	or	fully	control”	(p.	56).	They	are	part	of	the	apparatus	of	governmentality.	The	exception,	as	a	space	for	sovereignty	within	the	biopolitical	paradigm	has	great	heuristic	value,	as	it	emerges	in	cases	where	normal	governance	is	rendered	ineffective	and	thus	highlights	both	its	shortcoming	but	also	its	structural	elements	that	have	remained	silenced	and	unseen.	It	is	crucial	to	keep	in	mind	that	when	we	discuss	the	exception	to	the	rule,	we	do	not	necessary	transfer	ourselves	to	a	place	that	has	no	relation	to	the	rule.	Instead,	it	is	by	this	exclusion	that	the	excluded	is	maintained	within	the	realm	of	the	rule.	Butler	sees	the	suspension	of	the	law	as	a	performative	act,	“which	brings	a	contemporary	configuration	of	sovereignty	into	being	or,	more	precisely,	reanimates	a	spectral	sovereignty	within	the	field	of	governmentality”	(p.	61).	It	is	a	situation	produced	by	the	state	through	its	withdrawal.	This	withdrawal	is	not	complete	and	by	no	means	implies	a	giving	away	of	authority.	Instead,	it	is	more	of	a	transition	from	“the	operation	of	power	from	a	set	of	laws	(juridical)	to	a	set	of	rules	(governmental),	and	the	rules	reinstate	sovereign	power”	(p.62).		These	rules,	which	differ	from	ordinary	legislation	on	the	grounds	of	their	legitimation,	are	often	arbitrary,	and	are	based	on	an	augmented	discretion	of	their	enforcers,	namely	the	officials	who	are	called	to	implement	them,	the	“petty	sovereigns”.	In	this	context,	the	law	is	instrumental,	not	bound	by	the	“virtue”	of	governmentality	but	instead	by	a	means	to	an	end.	“Petty	sovereigns”	are	not	true	sovereigns,	as	they	do	not	fully	control	the	aims	of	their	operations,	but	are	also	a	means	to	an	end,	a	part	of	the	apparatus.	“They	are	acted	on,	but	they	also	
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act,	and	their	actions	are	not	subject	to	review	by	any	higher	judicial	authority”	(p62).	Butler’s	petty	sovereigns	can	be	traced	in	Salter’s	connection	between	the	state	of	exception	present	in	bordering	practices	and	the	augmented	“discretion	of	the	border	examination”	(Salter,	2008).	Administrative	decisions	that	are	left	to	the	discretion	of	actors	performing	bordering	practices	are	often	carried	out	at	the	threshold	of	the	law	(J.	McC.	Heyman,	2001).	The	increase	of	this	discretion	is	related	to	the	exception	as	“emergency	politics	occasion	the	creation	of	new	administrative	powers	and	the	redistribution	of	existing	powers	of	governance	from	procedural	processes	to	discretionary	decision,	from	the	more	proceduralized	domains	of	courts	to	the	more	discretionary	domains	of	administrative	agency”	(Honig,	2005,	p.	210).		As	I	shall	argue	and	show	in	chapter	8,	the	“migrant	crisis”	augmented	an	already	pre-existing	state	of	exception	in	the	border	and	migration	policies	of	the	EU,	and	the	Greek	state	acted	accordingly.		
2.4.	Theorizing	biopolitical	classification	techniques			 As	mentioned	in	the	introduction	to	this	chapter,	the	registration	process	of	irregularized	migrants	is	a	complex	process	involving	the	use	of	many	different	biopolitical	classification	techniques.	Registration	of	individuals	is	inseparable	from	a	certain	categorization	of	said	individuals.	The	categories	used	and	produced	by	the	registration	apparatus	are	often	discussed	and	presented	again	as	“naturalized”	pre-existing	entities	under	which	subjects	fall	in	a	harmonized	and	natural	manner.	The	use	of	“naturalizing”	here	pursues	the	thinking	of	Bowker	and	Star,	which	they	describe	as	“stripping	away	the	contingencies	of	an	object’s	creation	and	its	situated	nature”	(Bowker	&	Star,	1999,	p.	299),	which	means	silencing	and	rendering	invisible	the	material,	moral	and	ideological	work	at	play,	and	all	the	conflict	around	its	creation.	Furthermore,	as	Bowker	and	Star	(1999)	point	out,	“categories	come	from	action…Assigning	things,	people,	or	their	actions	to	categories	is	a	ubiquitous	part	of	work	in	the	modern,	bureaucratic	state.	In	this	sense,	categories	arise	from	work	and	from	other	kinds	of	organized	activity,	including	the	conflicts	over	meaning	that	occur	when	multiple	groups	fight	over	the	nature	of	a	classification	system	and	its	categories”	(Bowker	&	Star,	1999,	p.	295).	
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Throughout	2015-2018,	considerable	public	discourse	centered	on	the	“identity”	of	the	incoming	populations.	Very	little	of	this	discourse	attempted	to	view	the	categorization	implied	on	the	population	in	such	a	theoretical	light.	In	the	empirical	chapters,	I	discuss	the	work	of	border	officials,	precisely	as	an	organized	activity	of	production	of	performative	categories,	by	actors	working	under	the	state	of	exception	discussed	earlier.	The	aforementioned	work	happens	in	specific	institutional	settings,	which	are	often	socially	embedded	as	infrastructure.	This	notion	also	requires	critical	examination.	
2.5.	Hot	infrastructure		 The	registration	and	categorization	of	migrants,	presented	in	chapter	7,	took	place	in	a	specific	context,	that	of	the	“Hotspot”,	the	infrastructural	and	administrative	concept	discussed	in	chapter	6.	The	“Hotspot”	emerged	as	a	fix	for	the	breakdown	of	the	Greek	state’s	infrastructure	for	reception	and	registration	of	migrants,	embodying	ideals	of	European	solidarity	and	effectiveness.	The	contemporary	presence	of	infrastructure	carries	a	connotation	of	progress	conceptually	associated	with	the	Enlightenment	idea	of	a	world	in	movement	and	open	to	change,	and	in	a	constant	state	of	linear	progress	(Mattelart,	1996;	2000).		Critical	scholars	argue	that	a	definitive	definition	of	infrastructure	remains	unattained	and	“elusive”	(Harvey,	Jensen,	&	Morita,	2016).	Infrastructures	can	be	thought	of	as	a	“system	of	substrates”	(Star,	1999)	underlying	the	more	visible	constructions	of	the	world,	such	as	pipes	and	cables.	In	that	case,	however,	as	Larkin	(Larkin,	2013)	points	out,	one	is	faced	with	identifying	what	is	seen	as	“infra”	and	what	is	“structure”,	namely	what	will	be	considered	as	a	substrate	and	what	will	be	considered	part	of	the	“upper”	world.	Citing	Edwards	(1998),	Larkin	reminds	us	that	not	only	is	there	infrastructure	behind	every	infrastructure,	but	also,	that	many	infrastructures	are	at	play	when	we	try	to	discover	what	comprises	a	system.	Thus,	before	infrastructure	can	actually	be	discussed	at	all,	a	“categorical	act”	(Larkin,	2013,	p.	329)	is	required	to	define	what	we	see	as	infrastructure,	“a	moment	of	tearing	into	those	heterogeneous	networks	to	define	which	aspect	of	which	network	is	to	be	
		 29	
discussed	and	which	parts	will	be	ignored”	(page	number).	In	the	case	of	this	thesis,	the	Hotspot	can	be	seen	both	as	part	of	the	wider	reception	infrastructure,	but	also	as	an	infrastructural	system	itself.	Both	these	views	are	adopted	in	chapters	7	and	8,	respectively.	Infrastructures	have	been	conceptualized	by	Star	and	Ruhleder	(Star	&	Ruhleder,	1996)	as	being	invisible	by	definition	and	becoming	visible	only	upon	breakdown.	Larkin	doubted	whether	invisibility	is	a	definitive	element	for	a	system	to	be	infrastructural,	and	instead	argued	that	invisibility	is	at	one	extreme	of	the	spectrum	of	visibility	to	which	infrastructures	are	exposed.	He	based	this	argument	on	numerous	studies	of	infrastructures	where	visibility	was	not	only	high,	but	also	embedded	in	the	design	of	infrastructure,	with	the	desire	and	aim	of	evoking	admiration.	Thus,	while	the	operational	processes	of	an	infrastructure	may	remain	invisible	or	opaque,	the	infrastructure	itself	may	be	highly	visible.	I	will	return	to	this	discussion	when	examining	the	Hotspot,	in	chapters	6,	7	and	8.	Infrastructures	carry	connotations	of	embedded,	seamless	function	that	often	facilitate	flows.	They	are	seen	as	“matter	that	enable(s)	the	movement	of	other	matter”	(Larkin,	2013).	In	standard	narratives	of	infrastructure,	this	assumption	of	flow	holds	unless	the	infrastructure	is	obstructed	by	a	breakdown.	Scholars	have	challenged	this	linear	narrative,	attempting	an	inversion	that	avoids	“assuming	flow	as	the	basic	infrastructural	fact,	with	the	consequence	that	breaks	in	the	flow	appear	deviant,	and	thus	in	need	of	special	explanation,	the	question	can	be	reversed.	Infrastructural	studies	might	begin	with	gaps,	interstices,	and	zones	of	opacity	as	infrastructural	facts,	which	raise	questions	concerning	the	kinds	of	ordering	these	apparent	“flow-stoppers”	participate	in	and	how	they	do	so”	(Harvey	et	al.,	2016).	This	train	of	thought	suggests	that	infrastructures	are	not	solely	concerned	with	enabling	movement,	flow	and	progress,	but	that	they	also	“embody	the	uncertainties	that	are	intrinsic	to	the	bureaucratic	form	itself”	(Reeves,	2016).	This	view	of	infrastructure	as	enabling	“indeterminacy”	instead	of	administrative	closure	also	applies	in	the	examination	of	the	Hotspot,	as	I	show	in	chapter	7.	
		 30	
2.6.	Crisis		 A	range	of	the	research	that	provided	the	empirical	material	for	this	thesis	was	conducted	under	the	influence	of	the	notion	of	“crisis”,	and	more	specifically	the	“migrant	crisis”,	as	it	was	developed	in	the	EU,	through	the	years	2015	to	2017.	Thus,	it	is	necessary	to	theorize	the	concept	of	“crisis”,	in	the	final	section	of	this	theoretical	chapter.	Crisis	is	an	elusive	notion,	multi-layered	and	ambiguous,	used	by	a	number	of	actors	in	many	different	contexts,	acquiring	different	meanings,	and	frequently	used	in	public	debates.	Each	utterance	of	crisis	is	of	course	characterized	by	discipline-specific	boundaries	and	particularities;	however,	it	is	always	associated	with	a	pressure	for	judgment	and	decision.	The	word	itself	originates	from	the	Greek	word	“κρίσης”,	primarily	translated	as	judgment/to	judge	but	also	to	choose	and	decide	after	measuring	up	a	situation	and	acting	upon	it.		An	extended	presentation	of	the	many	different	ways	that	crisis	appears	in	history	and	throughout	different	cultures,	by	far	exceeds	the	scope	and	aim	of	this	thesis2.	It	is	worth	noting	however,	that	most,	if	not	all,	utterances	of	crisis	carry	connotations	from	one	or	more	of	two	origins	of	the	word,	namely	the	theological,	and	the	medical.	The	former,	coming	from	crisis	in	the	Old	and	New	Testament,	is	closely	associated	with	the	juridical	meaning	of	crisis	as	judgment	associated	with	connotations	of	justice,	and	has	strong	reference	to	a	promise	of	salvation,	through	overcoming	the	critical	situation.	The	latter,	first	appearing	in	Galen’s	work,	where	crisis	refers	both	to	the	observable	symptoms	of	illness,	and	the	judgment	about	the	course	of	it	(Koselleck,	2006,	p.	5).	These	two	stems	of	origin	are	critical	for	making	sense	of	the	seemingly	paradoxical	modes	of	existence	of	the	term	nowadays,	and	I	will	return	to	them	later	in	this	paragraph	(Koselleck,	2006,	p.	371).	Both	these	two	contrasting	accounts	of	crisis	share	a	demand	for	action	that	will	bring	some	sort	of	progress,	if	not	resolution,	nevertheless	action	that	is	transcendental,	action	after	which	things	will	not	be	the	same.	
																																																								2	But	see	(Koselleck,	2006)	for	an	influential	attempt	to	map	the	term’s	genealogy,	which	is	also	the	reference	for	this	paragraph.	
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On	the	one	hand,	each	occurrence	of	crisis	is	perceived	as	historically	unique	(Koselleck,	2006,	p.	370).	On	the	other	hand,	the	temporality	of	crisis	has	been	challenged	due	to	its	constant	reoccurrence	in	“almost	all	forms	of	narrative	today”,	to	the	extent	that	it	is	ultimately	“mobilized	as	the	defining	category	of	our	contemporary	situation”(Roitman,	n.d.)	and	“a	part	of	normality	in	any	segment	of	social	life”.		
2.6.1.	Exploring	the	ontological	status	and	performative	agency	of	“crisis”		In	public	administration	literature,	defining	crisis	is	a	task	that,	despite	its	challenges,	seems	to	follow	reason	and	objective	criteria.	A	crisis	is	“a	unique	negative	event	for	which	there	is	no	suitable	prearranged	response”	(Leonard,	2009).	Crisis	emergencies	are	distinct	from	routine	emergencies,	as	the	latter	are	not	based	on	criteria	of	difficulty	or	complexity,	but	of	predictability.	Routine	emergencies	are	in	principle	more	predictable,	and	thus	agencies	can	utilize	previous	experience	and	be	prepared	with	standard	procedures	that	are	available	for	implementation.	On	the	other	hand,	crisis	emergencies	are	characterized	by	novelty,	namely	an	event	of	a	nature	that	has	not	been	encountered	before,	or	a	familiar	event	happening	at	an	unprecedented	scale.	In	the	face	of	this	novelty,	“response	leaders	must	recognize	that	the	situation	is	not	routine	and	that	improvisation	is	required”	(Leonard,	2009,	p.	279).	This	kind	of	approach	is	arguably	essentialist,	as	it	presupposes	an	ontological	difference	between	critical	and	non-critical	situations	that	actors	must	detect	in	accordance	with	their	training.	In	other	words,	a	crisis	exists	as	such	“out	there”,	rooted	in	the	conditions	of	a	situation.	The	trained	eye	of	the	expert	may	or	may	not	detect	it,	and	subsequently	proclaim	it,	and	each	of	the	two	outcomes	corresponds	to	a	successful	or	unsuccessful	assessment.	Challenging	such	essentialist	views,	Roitman	designates	an	anti-crisis,	a	disbelief	in	an	essence	of	crisis	as	empirically	observable	phenomena	that	constitute	crisis	in	comparison	to	another	set	of	similarly	observable	phenomena	that	counterpart	as	non-crisis.	For	Roitman,	proclamations	of	crisis	do	not	allow	space	for	allocation	of	truth	values	in	the	existence	or	absence	of	a	crisis.	There	is	little	(if	any)	heuristic	value	in	discussing	whether	or	not	a	situation	is	“indeed”	a	crisis.	Instead,	Roitman	focuses	on	the	narrative	constructions	that	accompany	
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and	enable	crises,	and	points	them	out	as	moments	of	truth,	when	the	hidden	real	is	laid	bare.	Crises	bring	forward	a	truth	that	is	not	secured	but	rather	performed	within	the	discourse	that	is	enabled	by	the	context	that	they	(crises)	shape.		Similarly,	for	Redfield,	who	draws	his	argument	from	a	long-time	engagement	in	various	projects	with	Medicins	Sans	Frontiers	(MSF),	the	issue	“is	not	crisis	per	se	but	the	very	codification	of	crisis	into	a	state,	a	condition	of	action,	and	the	subsequent	limiting	of	emergency	to	within	these	borders”	(Redfield,	2005,	p.	347).	These	accounts	of	crises	appear	to	contrast	with	the	view	that	Leonard,	as	one	example	of	an	essentialist,	offers	in	his	manual	for	responders.	However,	this	contrast	is	not	as	strong	as	it	may	seem.	When	response	leaders	“recognize”	a	crisis,	their	actions	can	be	seen	to	constitute	a	performative	moment.	By	posing	a	situation	as	crisis,	they	bring	into	reality	what	they	have	set	out	to	describe.	In	this	process,	there	is	an	important,	and	often	silenced,	selection	of	what	is	left	out	and	what	is	seen	as	important,	meaningful	and	constitutive	of	crisis.	In	this	context,	Roitman’s	advice	to	put	less	faith	in	crisis,	does	not	entail	doubting	the	existence	of	a	critical	situation,	but	entails	focusing	on	what	is	at	stake	after	the	crisis	has	been	proclaimed,	as	well	as	what	has	been	deemed	critical.		The	seemingly	banal	question	that	Roitman	reposes	“crisis	compared	to	what?”	must	be	reiterated	in	the	context	of	each	specific	utterance	of	“crisis”.	This	question	is	not	so	much	a	methodological	exhortation,	but	more	a	theoretical	presupposition	on	the	performative	nature	of	crisis.	The	latter	is	rendered	more	visible	when	one	considers	that	the	term	“crisis”	only	acquires	meaning	in	reference	and	juxtaposition	to	a	state	of	affairs	that	is	considered	normal,	or	at	least	non-critical.	This	task	is	addressed	in	chapter	5	of	this	thesis,	where	I	engage	with	the	“migrant	crisis”	specifically	and	explore	the	ways	in	which	it	can	be	related	to	the	pre-existing	status	quo	of	the	migration	and	border	regime	of	the	EU,	as	well	as	its	codifications	in	the	public	and	political	debate.	
2.6.2.	Crisis,	legitimization	and	exception		 Moving	on	from	this	brief	engagement	with	ontological	concerns,	it	is	equally	important	to	present	theorizations	of	what	effects	the	term	“crisis”	and	its	proclamations	bring	to	life.	Crisis	directly	affects	the	concept	of	historical	
		 33	
time,	and	renders	itself	as	an	“immediate	present”	(A.	Mbembe	&	Roitman,	1995).	Viewed	as	an	intimate	condition,	its	causes	and	origins	are	obscured.	Often	these	are	rooted	in	prolonged	conflicts,	political	choices	and	structural	injustice.	The	“crisis”	is	presented	as	a	surprise,	which	could	not	have	been	predicted	and	demands	immediate	responses	(Calhoun,	2010).	It	necesitates	a	reconstruction	of	pre-existing	moral	codes,	and	calls	for	action	conducted	outside	previous	frameworks	(Strasser,	2016).	“Crisis”	re-shapes	ethical	codes	and	behaviors	and	intensifies	control	(Strasser,	2014).	As	such,	it	becomes	an	instrument	of	rule	(Agamben,	2013),	since	once	it	has	been	established,	actions	and	measures	that	were	previously	beyond	legitimization,	acquire	a	new	status.	Consequently,	under	the	effect	of	crisis,	failure	to	engage	in	the	actions	and	measures	is	seen	as	moral	inefficiency.	In	many	ways,	the	condition	of	crisis	follows	trajectories	that	are	parallel	with	that	of	the	state	of	exception	(Butler	&	Athanasiou,	2013)	in	that	it	creates	an	extra-political	domain	of	state	action.	It	must	be	noted	however,	that	especially	security	and	migration	policies	rarely	function	exclusively	under	the	crisis	effect.	Instead,	the	mindset	that	drives	them	is	a	mixture	of	routine	procedures	and	approaches,	infected	by	the	potency	of	crisis	(Jeandesboz	&	Pallister-Wilkins,	2016).	Despite	the	fact	that	utterances	of	crisis	maintain	a	rhetorical	connection	to	a	need	for	change	that	touches	upon	existential	issues,	and	calls	for	radical	transformation	of	foundational	principles,	ultimately	it	often	reaffirms	the	status	quo.	
2.6.3.	Persistence	of	crisis		 Crisis	has	been	seen	as	a	moment	in	history	with	decisive	character	–	a	rupture	in	the	status	quo	that	both	demands	and	enables	radical	interventions	after	which	things	are	never	the	same	(Koselleck,	2006).	Crises	legitimate	new	schemes	of	distributing	power,	bringing	new	actors	into	the	foreground	on	many	levels	(Strasser,	2016).	However,	in	many	cases,	“crisis”	loses	both	its	temporal,	and	its	extraordinary	character.	Large	bodies	of	the	world	populations	meet	basic	needs	through	mechanisms	and	schemes	designed	as	crisis	response	mechanisms.	Overall,	an	increasing	set	of	social	administration	and	government	measures	are	carried	out	under	the	context	of	crisis	(Redfield,	2005).	For	such	
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populations,	subjected	to	structural	poverty	and	marginalization,	“the	word	crisis	is	endemic	rather	than	episodic”	(Vigh,	2008,	p.	1),	rather	than	a	specific	and	isolated	moment	or	period.	This	gives	rise	to	global	scale	organizations,	such	as	Medicins	Sans	Frontiers	(MSF),	the	scope	of	which,	in	theory,	is	supposed	to	be	short-term	and	crisis	responsive,	that	remain	in	their	operation	fields	for	long	periods	of	time,	and	operate	solely	under	crisis	situations	(Redfield,	2013).		This	reality	calls	for	an	analytical	and	theoretical	shift.	Instead	of	understanding	crisis	as	something	that	happens	momentarily	and	is	particular	in	nature,	we	must	“move	toward	an	understanding	of	critical	states	as	pervasive	contexts	rather	than	singular	events”,	where	crisis	is	more	a	condition	than	a	moment	of	decisive	change	(Vigh,	2008).		In	accordance	with	Roitman’s	disbelief	in	an	essence	of	crisis,	crisis	can	be	seen	as	a	gradual	result	of	slower	processes	of	negative	change	(Vigh,	2008,	p.	8).	Such	an	understanding	of	crisis	is	not	aligned	with	the	idea	of	crisis	reflecting	rupture,	even	if	the	discourse	surrounding	it	often	enables	ruptures	in	many	policy	domains,	as	revealed	and	discussed	in	the	empirical	chapters	of	this	thesis.	Furthermore,	this	persistence	of	crisis	concerns	not	only	populations	that	are	highly	marginalized.	It	has	also	become	an	integral	element	of	policymaking	concerning	subjects	who	may	or	may	not	enjoy	full	citizenship	status.	Instead	of	considering	crisis	as	an	exceptional	state,	scholars	have	argued	that	it	is	periods	of	stability	that	should	be	seen	as	historical	anomalies,	not	only	because	they	exist	for	shorter	time	spans,	but	also	because	they	concern	specific	and	relatively	small	parts	of	the	world’s	population(Narotzky	&	Besnier,	2014;	Redfield,	2013;	Roitman,	2014;	Vigh,	2008).	In	our	times,	crisis	is	“a	motto	of	modern	politics,	and	for	a	long	time	it	has	been	part	of	normality	in	any	segment	of	social	life”	(Agamben,	2013).		A	persisting	crisis	sounds	like	an	oxymoron	when	viewed	in	relation	to	e.g.	the	operational	directives	of	first	responders.	However,	in	critical	anthropology,	persisting	crises	have	long	been	theorized	to	be	the	norm.					
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Chapter	3.	Methodological	choices	and	access		
3.1.	Introduction			 This	chapter	presents	and	discusses	the	methods	used	during	my	research.	It	describes	the	methodological	choices	that	I	made	early	during	the	design	of	my	project,	but	also	outlines	certain	tactics	and	approaches	that	had	to	be	fine-tuned	and	decided	along	the	way	and	sometimes	in	the	field,	as	the	research	was	ongoing.	My	research	project	is	based	on	two	main	bodies	of	work.	The	first	from	a	chronological	perspective	involves	desk	research	on	the	legislation	and	policy	papers	regulating	the	function	of	EURODAC,	from	the	beginning	of	the	delebration	around	the	need	for	such	a	system	in	the	early	90s	until	the	completion	of	its	first	recast	in	2013.	This	is	combined	with	an	examination	of	relevant	news	articles,	secondary	literature	and	reports	from	relevant	organizations.	The	second	main	body	of	work	consists	of	two	research	trips	to	Greece,	one	in	March	2016,	and	one	in	the	summer	of	2017.	During	those	trips,	I	conducted	interviews	and	non-participant	observation	with	border	guards,	police	officers,	and	persons	working	with	NGOs	in	the	Hotspots	on	the	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios,	as	well	as	administrative	personnel	at	the	Hotspots.	The	second	research	trip	also	included	interviews	with	Greek	Police	officers	and	UNHCR	employees	in	Athens,	as	a	follow	up	examination	of	data	generated	at	the	Hotspots.		 Before	proceeding	to	discuss	the	methods	in	themselves,	I	will	first	discuss	epistemological	issues	relevant	to	the	time	conjecture	of	my	research,	which	in	turn	relate	to	issues	of	planning,	access	and	ethics.	
3.2.	Crisis	and	research			 In	the	previous	chapter,	I	hinted	at	the	importance	of	the	notion	of	“crisis”	in	the	present	text	and	the	chapters	that	will	follow.	“Crisis”	and	more	specifically	the	“migrant	crisis”	shaped	the	realities	of	thousands	of	people,	and	its	impact	calls	for	a	critical	analytical	examination,	which	is	present	throughout	this	thesis,	and	is	the	focus	of	Chapter	5.	In	this	section,	I	will	briefly	discuss	the	ways	in	which	the	condition	of	“crisis”	affected	my	research	venues	and	informants	as	such.	“Crisis”	has	been	a	buzzword	that	has	concentrated	the	
		 36	
research	interests	of	social	scientists	working	in	many	disciplines	over	the	past	decade	(Brekke,	Dalakoglou,	Filippidis,	&	Vradis,	2014;	Koselleck,	2006;	Narotzky	&	Besnier,	2014).	Strasser,	inspired	by	Andersson’s	Illegality.Inc	and	Comaroffs’	Ethnicity.Inc	talks	of	Crisis.Inc	with	regard	to	“how	incalculable	futures	and	uncertainties	have	become	an	attractive	commodity	for	social	scientists,	as	well	as	for	lawyers,	managers,	state	institutions	and	inter/national	NGOs.”(Strasser,	2016).	Indeed,	the	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios,	but	also	mainland	Greece	have	received	an	abundance	of	researchers	studying,	documenting	and	analyzing	the	“migrant	crisis”.		 In	my	experience,	this	increased	academic	interest	focusing	on	countries	that	were	already	at	the	center	of	international	attention	in	terms	of	the	“economic	crisis”.	It	appeared	to	affect	individual	informants	and	the	relevant	agencies	in	a	non-linear	manner	that	was	also	subject	to	change	as	time	passed.	Agencies	such	as	the	Ministry	of	Migration,	seemed	to	be	overwhelmed	by	the	amount	of	applications	for	research	involving	access	to	actors	and	venues,	and	responded	with	a	mixture	of	reserve	and	willingness.	Progressively,	the	earlier	would	prevail	over	the	latter,	as	the	number	of	research	requests	subsequently	increased.	For	example,	as	I	describe	later,	during	my	first	visit	in	2016,	my	access	to	the	Moria	and	VIAL	Hotspots	was	flexible	and	left	to	the	discretion	of	the	commanding	officers	appointed	by	the	Ministry	in	the	first	instance,	and	to	the	local	Police	Chief	in	the	second	instance.	One	year	later,	during	my	second	trip,	the	situation	had	changed.	A	specific	protocol	had	been	introduced	allowing	a	90-minute	slot	for	each	researcher,	which	though	not	as	rigid	as	it	may	sound,	was	indicative	of	a	certain	strictness.	This	was	for	a	good	part	due	to	administration	changes	that	the	Greek	state	underwent	during	the	period.	The	levels	of	these	changes	ranged	from	founding	an	independent	Ministry	of	Migration,	to	various	organizational	schemes	for	the	Hotspots.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	aforementioned	Ministry	of	Migration,	founded	by	the	SYRIZA-ANEL	administration	in	November	2016,	had	at	the	time	of	writing	(July	2019),	recently	been	abolished	and	the	relevant	services	are	now	under	the	Ministry	of	Public	Order	and	Citizen	Protection.		 Other	agencies,	such	as	the	Greek	Police,	would	repeatedly	respond	negatively	to	access	requests	by	reference	to	issues	of	security,	a	notion	used	in	a	
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transcendental	manner	that	left	no	margin	for	renegotiation.	The	transcendental	aspect	of	these	responses	is	that	security	reasons	are	mentioned	as	a	factor	that	blocks	every	search	for	alternatives,	including	limited	access,	but	would	instead	be	presented	as	a	value	in	itself,	which	ends	all	discussion.	However,	as	shown	later	in	this	chapter,	it	was	possible	in	practice	to	work	through	this	negation	with	a	little	luck,	in	some	circumstances,	highlighting	that	the	methodological	“superiority”	of	physical	presence	over	communication	by	email	or	telephone.		 When	it	came	to	the	actors	as	individuals,	the	situation	was	slightly	different.	Throughout	my	interviews,	I	had	the	intense	impression	that	many	border	guards	felt	their	work	at	the	time	exceeded	all	previous	boundaries	and	any	kind	of	routine.	Instead,	they	appeared	to	view	themselves	as	being	at	the	heart	of	a	series	of	events	of	global	importance	and	attention.	Most	seemed	eager	to	share	their	perception	of	what	was	happening,	what	they	were	doing,	and	how	they	saw	themselves	in	the	bigger	picture	of	events.	Motivations	and	attitudes	would	differ,	as	would	their	perception	of	me	as	a	researcher	employed	by	a	European	IT	university.	Their	view	of	my	identity	often	shaped	specific	expectations,	which	were	expressed	with	quotes	such	as	“when	you	go	back	to	Brussels	(sic),	tell	them	what	we	go	through	here”.		 As	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	for	some	time	now,	bordering	practices	have	been	carried	out	by	a	wide	range	of	actors	who	exceed	the	narrow	frame	of	border	guards.	Under	the	impact	of	the	“migrant	crisis”,	the	plethora	of	actors	involved	was	extended	even	further.	From	the	Greek	Army,	involved	in	infrastructural	and	administrative	support	of	the	Hotspots,	to	local	and	international	initiatives	organized	around	first	reception	of	incoming	migrants,	and	large-scale	NGOs	and	international	organizations	such	as	the	IOM	and	the	UNHCR.	These	actors,	acting	under	highly	differentiated	and	often	conflicting	agendas,	would	recruit	personnel	from	various	social	backgrounds.	As	could	only	be	expected,	these	individuals	had	different	worldviews,	ideologies	and	presuppositions	concerning	the	incoming	populations.	Again,	as	expected,	these	different	worlds	that	these	actors	would	inhibit,	shaped	their	accounts	of	what	was	actually	happening,	and	how.		My	research	was	conducted	in	the	territory	of	a	crisis-ridden	Greek	state,	which	at	the	time,	was	at	the	center	of	international	attention	with	regard	to	its	character	as	a	main	entrance	point	for	thousands	of	
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migrants	reaching	the	EU.	Terms	such	as	“messy”	and	“complicated”	barely	do	this	situation	justice.		 Research	projects,	especially	PhDs,	seem	prone	to	changing	between	the	phases	of	initial	conception	and	their	completion.	Throughout	the	process,	even	the	topic	of	the	research	itself	can	be	evasive	to	the	very	researchers	who	have	designed	and	are	conducting	the	research	(Law	2005,	p5).	While	such	an	outcome	may	seem	reasonable	and	perhaps	even	expected	with	regard	to	re-configuring	the	research	focus	due	to	unanticipated	events,	Law	makes	a	different	argument.	It	is	not	a	matter	of	adapting	to	a	stable	and	unitary	reality	that	is	subject	to	change,	while	retaining	its	concreteness,	but	instead	it	is	about	the	admission	that	the	real	is	neither	definite	nor	singular	(Law	2005,	p11).	Instead,	it	is	shape	shifting,	slippery	and	fuzzy	(p5).	This	is	not	an	epistemological	argument,	as	Law	makes	clear,	as	it	is	not	about	the	ways	that	we	can	have	knowledgeable	access	to	a	given	(singular)	reality.	Instead,	it	is	an	ontological	argument,	concerning	what	there	is,	not	what	we	can	know	about	it.			 “As	we	seek	to	know	the	world	not	everything	can	be	brought	
to	presence.	However	much	we	want	to	be	comprehensive,	to	know	
something	fully,	to	document	or	represent	it,	we	will	fail.	This	is	not	a	
matter	of	technical	inadequacy.	(There	are	always,	of	course,	
technical	inadequacies).	Rather	it	is	because	bringing	to	presence	is	
necessarily	incomplete	because	if	things	are	made	present	(for	
instance	representations)	then	at	the	same	time	things	are	also	
being	made	absent.	Necessarily.	The	two	go	together.	It	cannot	be	
otherwise.	Presence	implies	absence.”	(Law	2005,	p7)		To	me,	this	is	in	line	with	and	perhaps	supplements	the	localized	and	situated	nature	of	my	research	project.	No	matter	how	hard	I	tried,	I	could	only	encapsulate	a	glimpse	of	the	processes	that	were	at	play	both	in	the	field,	but	also	in	the	wider	political	and	media	debate.	With	this	somewhat	liberating	admission	in	mind,	I	decided	to	approach	the	issue	of	registration	of	irregular	migrants	using	three	basic	levels,	or	conceptual	frameworks,	that	were	in	conceptual	interplay	and	constantly	shaped	each	other,	as	well	as	the	methods	necessary.	One	was	a	historical	review	of	the	EURODAC	system,	based	on	a	review	of	the	relevant	policy	papers	and	some	of	the	secondary	literature	relating	to	it.	The	second	was	an	investigation	of	the	debate	concerning	the	identification	and	registration	of	incoming	migrants	in	the	period	2015-2017	in	
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the	media	and	mainstream	politics,	under	the	effect	of	the	“migration	crisis”.	The	third	conceptual	framework	involved	the	actual	practices	of	border	guards	and	other	actors	that	consisted	“identification	and	registration”	in	the	field.	Each	of	these	levels	called	for	the	utilization	of	various	methods	that	are	discussed	in	further	detail	in	section	3.x	of	this	chapter.		Through	this	three	dimensional	approach,	I	encapsulate	the	correspondent	aspects	of	the	issue	of	registration	that	are	present	in	my	research	questions,	namely	policy	making,	representation	in	the	public	debate	under	the	“crisis	effect”	and	practices	in	the	field.		
3.3.	Choosing	research	locations		 Choosing	research	locations	seems	to	contradict	the	diffusion	of	bordering	in	many	spaces	other	than	along	the	actual	borderline,	which	is	a	reoccurring	theme	in	contemporary	border	studies	(Balibar,	2002;	Galli,	2010;	Vaughan-Williams,	2010).	Despite	the	undoubted	validity	of	the	above	conclusion,	the	importance	of	the	materiality	and	locale	of	the	site	of	the	traditional	borderline	appears	to	merge	and	remerge	in	a	non-linear	fashion	throughout	the	years.	As	Salter	(Salter,	2008)	points	out,	the	discussion	on	the	displacement	of	bordering	practices,	namely	the	fact	that	the	“border	is	everywhere”	(Lyon	2002),	should	not	obscure	the	fact	that	some	specificities	about	“the	border”	should	be	retained.	And	that	something,	is	the	“kind	of	decision	that	occurs	at	the	border”(Salter,	2008,	p.	372).		With	regard	to	the	decisions	that	are	part	of	the	registration	process,	the	islands	of	the	Aegean	Sea,	and	the	corresponding	border	venues	are	an	example	of	this.	As	the	point	of	entry	for	hundreds	of	thousands	of	migrants	throughout	2015-2016	(IOM,	2016b),	a	site	of	death	for	thousands	of	them,	one	of	the	busiest	parts	of	the	“Balkan	route”	(Hernandez,	2016),	they	became	the	center	of	international	attention.	To	a	large	extent,	they	were	among	the	symbolic	spaces	where	the	EU	“responded”	in	a	variety	of	ways	in	the	face	of	migration	flows.			 The	registration	process	conducted	on	the	Greek	islands	became	an	issue	of	controversy	and	criticism,	early	in	the	“crisis”	(REF).	Greek	government	officials	have	come	to	admit	that	fingerprinting	of	all	incoming	migrants	was	for	a	certain	period	impossible	(REF).	The	criticism	and	tension	of	the	discussion	would	peak	in	periods	following	jihadist	attacks	on	European	soil,	as	the	
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migrating	population	has	been	to	some	extent	associated	with	such	acts	by	a	part	of	the	media	and	the	far-right	political	scene	of	Europe	(REF).	Thus,	the	islands	of	the	Aegean	Sea,	the	borders	of	Europe	with	the	Eastern	world,	concentrated	by	far	the	majority	of	the	dynamics	and	controversies	related	to	bordering	practices	deployed	by	the	EU.	As	I	am	a	Greek	citizen,	my	wide-ranging	cultural,	political	and	linguistic	familiarity	removed	any	dilemmas	in	choosing	between	Greek	and	Italian	borders,	which	is	what	led	me	to	visit	Chios	and	Lesvos.	Athens	was	the	secondary	research	field	since,	as	the	capital	of	the	Greek	state,	it	hosts	the	headquarters	of	the	Greek	Police,	and	also	the	head	offices	of	many	organizations.	In	that	manner,	issues	that	had	come	up	during	my	visits	to	the	islands	could	be	further	examined	here.	While	this	part	of	the	research	lacked	the	immediacy	of	the	research	trips	to	the	islands,	it	offered	a	view	of	the	way	that	the	“migration	machine”	functioned	at	a	more	central	level.  
3.4.	Negotiating	access		 Greece	has	been	through	a	brow-raising	five	national	elections	since	2007,	a	definite	sign	of	social	unrest.	It	is	somewhat	of	a	tradition	for	each	governing	party	or	parties	to	transform	the	structure	of	the	government	by	annulling	existing	ministries,	adding	new	ones,	merging	others	into	sub	ministries	etc.	This	is	usually	conducted	at	the	beginning	of	each	incumbency,	however	it	is	not	an	uncommon	occurrence	mid-way	through	the	term	in	office. Traditionally,	migration	issues	have	been	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Ministry	of	Public	Order,	and	the	Ministry	of	Interior.	The	first	administration	by	the	Coalition	of	the	parties	of	the	Radical	Left	(SYRIZA)	and	Independent	Greeks	(ANEL),	took	the	seemingly	innovative	step	of	appointing	a	Vice	Minister	responsible	for	issues	of	Migration	Policy,	and	subsequently	establishing	an	exclusive	Ministry	of	Migration	Policy.		It	must	be	noted	for	better	understanding	the	Greek	political	reality	at	the	time	that	SYRIZA,	being	a	traditionally	small,	left-wing	party,	has	cultivated	a	humanitarian	pro-rights	profile	regarding	migrants	and	asylum	seekers,	participating	actively	in	solidarity	with	migrants	at	demonstrations	and	other	actions,	subsequently	with	high-profile	members	of	the	government	providing	legal	assistance	to	migrants	etc.	Thus,	the	persons	that	comprised	the	political	
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personnel	of	the	Ministry	of	Migration	Policy	would	carry	the	experience	of	involvement	in	migrant	struggles	from	within.	Nevertheless,	the	background	of	the	other	party	participating	in	the	coalition	government,	ANEL,	was	clearly	more	conservative.	Members	of	ANEL	have	expressed	far-right	and	even	anti-Semitic	views	(iefimerida.gr,	2015).	What	kept	the	coalition	together	was	the	fact	that	both	parties	had	been	opposing	to	the	first	two	memorandums	that	presented	at	parliament	by	previous	governments. 	 The	leader	of	ANEL,	Panos	Kammenos,	was	appointed	Minister	of	Defense.	Kammenos	has	been	an	elected	MP	for	many	years	with	the	liberal-conservative	party	of	New	Democracy.	Kammenos	often	resorts	to	aggressive	public	speaking	e.g.	causing	tensions	in	diplomatic	relations	with	neighboring	Turkey,	and	generally	maintains	a	militant,	nationalist	profile	(Στέφου,	2019).	On	the	other	hand,	the	position	of	Vice	Minister	(later	Minister)	of	Migration	Policy	was	given	to	a	respected	gynecologist	with	no	previous	professional	political	experience,	Giannis	Mouzalas.	Mouzalas	is	a	member	of	Medicins	Sans	Frontier,	has	taken	part	in	missions	in	Asia	and	Africa,	and	maintains	an	“activist”	profile	that	was	considered	suitable	for	the	position. 	 The	above	information	is	all	relevant	in	the	context	that,	while	under	heavy	criticism	(REF	from	press	missing)	regarding	the	reception,	registration	and	accommodation	of	migrants	from	the	EU,	in	February	2016,	the	Greek	government	announced	(REF)	that	the	Armed	Forces	would	contribute	to	the	construction,	maintenance	and	administration	and	function	of	the	reception	centers,	which	had	recently	been	re-launched	as	Hotspots.	Thus,	the	relevance	of	the	Ministry	of	Defense	to	migration	was	upgraded. 	 At	this	conjuncture,	applying	for	admittance	to	Hotspots	to	conduct	research	entailed	asking	to	examine	a	specific	point	in	the	political	life,	which	placed	the	country	in	an	international	spotlight.	It	also	entailed	doing	so	via	two	separate	administrative	entities,	with	arguably	different	political	cultures	pre-dominating	at	each	one.	Initially,	I	sent	emails	to	all	relevant	ministers,	and	their	collaborators.	This	method	did	not	take	me	far.	I	received	a	few	letters	in	return	stating	that	the	office	I	had	contacted	was	not	responsible	for	access.	These	replies	were	sent	more	than	a	week	after	I	first	made	contact.	The	first	substantial	response	arrived	in	the	third	week	of	my	enquiries,	from	the	press	
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office	of	the	Ministry	of	Protection	of	the	Citizen	(ex-Ministry	of	Public	Order),	to	which	the	then	sub-Ministry	of	Migration	Policy	belonged.	It	was	a	flat	rejection,	stating	that	“after	the	response	of	the	competent	service	of	the	Greek	Police,	we	are	not	able	to	fulfil	your	request	for	access	to	the	registration	venues	of	category	2	foreign	nationals,	first	due	to	security	reasons	regarding	the	registration	procedures,	and	secondly,	due	to	the	large	workload	of	the	personnel	conducting	the	registration”. 	 Rather	than	accepting	the	rejection,	I	persevered	with	my	plan	and	traveled	to	Greece	in	the	hope	of	attempting	to	negotiate	access	in	person.	The	newly	appointed	personnel	of	the	sub	Ministry,	also	significantly	younger	than	expected,	were	very	helpful	and	willing	to	“help	and	support	research”.	However,	as	they	informed	me,	due	to	the	upcoming	EU-Turkey	agreement,	the	Hotspots	were	in	“code	orange”,	and	all	access	to	researchers	and	journalists	was	suspended.	It	was	never	clear	what	“code	orange”	was.	Also,	I	never	met	this	term	in	any	official	document	or	statement.	After	a	few	days	of	visiting	the	office	of	the	sub	Ministry,	and	finally	being	recognized	as	a	young	scholar	from	a	European	university	(again	a	certain	“prestige”	was	involved),	and	stating	that	I	would	visit	the	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios	anyway	for	interviews	with	other	actors,	I	was	given	the	phone	number	of	the	person	in	charge	of	the	political	personnel	at	the	Moria	camp	in	Lesvos.	This,	the	main	camp	on	the	island,	was	of	the	busiest	at	the	time	in	Greece.	By	political	personnel,	I	do	not	mean	the	police.	It	was	never	clear	whether	the	“code	orange”	was	suspended	or	what	happened	to	it.	After	phone	contact	with	the	person	managing	the	Hotspot,	I	was	granted	(limited)	access,	for	three	days,	during	which	I	had	the	opportunity	to	come	into	contact	with	several	officers,	working	both	for	the	Greek	Police,	and	FRONTEX. 	 Another,	even	more	controversial	case	of	access	being	denied,	though	ultimately	this	proved	not	to	be	the	case,	occurred	in	the	same	research	trip,	but	this	time	on	the	island	of	Chios.	Before	leaving	Lesvos	to	proceed	to	Chios,	I	contacted	the	respective	person	in	charge	of	the	political	personnel	of	the	VIAL	Hotspot.	However,	this	person,	whom	I	never	met	in	person,	informed	me	that	she	was	not	the	person	responsible	for	issues	of	access.	She	suggested	I	should	contact	the	local	police	station.	This	divergence	between	two	venues	set	up	for	
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the	same	purpose	is	indicative	of	the	managerial	state	into	which	migration	issue	had	fallen	at	that	time.	 	 On	arriving	at	Chios,	I	hastened	to	the	police	station	to	meet	the	officers	I	had	contacted	earlier	by	phone.	There,	the	younger	officer	who	was	in	charge	of	the	registration	process	in	the	Hotspot	examined	my	letter	of	support	from	the	head	of	the	PhD	school	(because	“you	know,	so	many	people	show	up	asking	for	access,	you	can	never	know,	no	offence”).	He	then	proceeded	to	give	some	basic	information,	before	leading	me	to	the	Head	of	the	Station,	Giorgos	Kevopoulos.	He	asked	whether	I	was	interested	in	taking	photos	of	the	process.	I	declined,	not	only	because	I	actually	did	not	intend	to,	but	also	because	I	recognized	the	mistrust	that	such	a	statement	would	most	likely	trigger.	He	also	asked	if	I	had	authorization	from	the	Headquarters	in	Athens.	I	was	unsure	whether	by	“Headquarters”,	he	meant	the	Ministry	of	Citizen	Protection	(which	had	actually	already	rejected	my	application	by	email).	Not	wanting	to	shoot	myself	in	the	foot,	I	mentioned	my	communication	with	the	sub	Ministry	of	Migration	Policy,	and	the	fact	that	I	had	already	visited	Moria	Hotspot	in	Lesvos,	hoping	to	mobilize	some	sort	of	positive	inertia.	He	replied	positively,	but	insisted	on	me	sending	an	email,	this	time	to	the	press	office	of	the	police,	which	of	course,	was	under	the	political	command	of	the	Ministry	of	Protection	of	the	Citizen.	The	date	was	Saturday	12	March.	The	next	day	was	a	big	Carnival	celebration,	and	the	Monday	after	that	was	a	national	holiday,	known	as	Clean	Monday.	I	am	not	sure	what	role	this	played	in	the	delay,	but	I	received	a	reply	four	days	later.	Once	again	it	was	a	rejection,	for	the	same	reasons	of	workload	and	security.	However,	our	“agreement”	with	the	local	police	chief	was	to	call	every	morning,	and	they	would	decide	on	a	daily	basis,	whether	I	could	visit	the	Hotspot.	So,	by	the	time	I	received	the	rejection,	which	was	obviously	the	day	I	stopped	calling,	I	had	already	conducted	four	full	days	of	participant	observations	and	interviews	at	the	Hotspot,	which	also	happened	to	be	some	of	the	most	fruitful	days	of	my	research. 
3.5.	Identifying	and	choosing	actors	and	informants		 As	popular	awareness	of	the	“migrant	crisis”	was	spread	throughout	Europe,	through	media	representation	and	political	debate,	more	and	more	
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organizations	initiated	or	augmented	their	presence	in	Greece	and	engaged	with	different	aspects	of	the	“crisis”.		Some	of	these	organizations	were	heavily	based	on	voluntary	participation.	However,	some	were	in	a	position	to	hire	individuals	for	certain	positions.	Long-term	unemployed	people,	young	social	scientists	in	need	of	work,	people	who	had	been	involved	in	migrant	support	voluntarily	over	the	years,	were	now	among	those	who	were	payroll	personnel	manning	this	new	form	of	“solidarity”	with	terms	reminiscent	of	business	and	corporations	rather	than	activism.			 The	above	is	not	meant	to	downplay	the	efforts	of	countless	activists	who	spent	not	only	the	summer	of	2015,	but	also	the	subsequent	months,	were	arrested	and	harassed	by	local	police,	invested	time	and	personal	money	on	the	Greek	coastline,	nor	the	people	in	Central	and	Northern	Europe	who	backed	up	this	effort	financially,	and	otherwise	materially.	The	role	that	NGOs	will	play	in	the	future	as	state-next-to-the-State,	private	administrative	entities	is	yet	to	be	deployed	and	examined. 	 In	the	Greek	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios,	where	I	conducted	my	fieldwork	in	March	2016,	a	large	number	of	NGOs	were	active.	Some	of	them	were	active	literally	on	the	coastline,	alongside	non-enrolled	volunteers	setting	bonfires,	signaling	incoming	vessels	to	show	them	the	right	direction,	helping	people	off	the	boats,	providing	care	items	and	support,	helping	them	get	dry	and	past	the	shock	of	a	night-trip	between	countries	in	a	more	often	than	not,	badly	conditioned,	heavily	overcrowded	rubber	boat.	Others,	usually	bigger,	international	NGOs,	were	present	inside	the	reception	centers/Hotspots.	As	mentioned	previously,	some	people,	already	busy	with	human	rights	and	migrant	support,	were	incorporated	among	the	human	resources	of	NGOs.	Aware	of	this	fact,	I	mobilized	my	personal	network	in	order	to	get	in	touch	with	persons	who	had	been	present	long	enough	and	close	enough	to	provide	an	image	of	how	registration	at	the	Hotspots	affected	the	mobility	of	the	migrants,	how	the	situation	and	practices	had	changed	during	the	“crisis”	and	the	code	of	conduct	of	border	officials. 	 More	specifically,	I	conducted	open-end	interviews	with	the	following	individuals:	Anthi	Karageli	Director	of	the	Moria	Hotspot		(March	2016)	
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Theofilos	Tsigalagis,	Directors	of	the	VIAL	Hotspot	(August	2017)	Francisco	Ramos	(Paco)	Operational	Coordinator	of	FRONTEX	mission	(March	2016)	Xrysh	Xatzh,	of	the	Greek	Ombudsman	office	(August	2017)	Spiros	Rizakos,	chief	of	NGO	“Aitima”	(December	2017)	Danai	Kampani,	IOM,	Moria,	Lesvos	(August	2017)	Eleni	Petraki,	Greek	Asylum	Service	(GAS),	Athens	(May	2018)	Giorgos	Zontiros,	head	of	Department	of	Informatics	of	GAS,	Athens	(May	2018)	Anonymous	Greek	Police	officer,	Department	of	Informatics	of	the	Greek	Police	(June	2018)		Anonymous	Greek	Police	officer,	Department	of	Forensic	Investigations	(June	2018)		Anonymous	Dutch	Royal	Police	officer,	head	of	the	Dutch	Task	Fore,	Chios	(March	2016)		Anonymous	Dutch	Royal	Police	officer,	document	expert,	member	of	the	Dutch	Task	Force,	Chios	(March	2016)		Anonymous	Greek	Police	officer,	screener	(August	2017)		Anonymous	Greek	police	officer,	Desktop	operator	in	registration	container,	Chios	(March	2016)		Anonymous	Greek	Police	officer,	Desktop	operator	in	registration	container,	Chios	(March	2016)				 In	addition,	I	had	a	number	of	informal	or	less	formal	discussions	with	persons	present	in	the	islands,	from	various	organizations.	These	discussion,	did	not	find	their	way	into	this	text	as	structured	material,	however	they	were	crucial	for	the	overall	understanding	of	the	situation	and	the	planning	of	the	research.	All	of	those	informants	wished	to	remain	anonymous,	as	they	were	not	official	spokespersons	for	the	organizations	they	worked	for,	and	thus	were	hesitant	to	talk	about	their	work	eponymously.	At	this	point,	having	a	network	of	personal	acquaintances	among	circles	of	activists	proved	a	critically	useful	tool,	as	it	provided	a	level	of	trust	and	also	a	code	of	communication	that	would	not	easily	have	been	achieved	(if	at	all)	in	the	absence	of	those	acquaintances.	The	interviews	were	open-ended,	as	at	this	point,	I	was	also	gathering	more	general	
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information	on	the	EU	asylum	system,	and	informed	people’s	testimonies	were	very	valuable..		 I	did	not	contact	these	interviewees	due	to	claims	of	representation	or	objectivity.	It	was	their	lengthy	experience	in	the	field	that	rendered	them	valuable	informants.	The	information	I	obtained	was	not	taken	at	face	value,	but	it	would	initially	provide	a	basis	and	(subjective)	picture	of	the	situation.	Equally	importantly,	it	could	guide	my	questions	when	I	subsequently	interviewed	state	and	police	officials.	Once	at	the	Hotspots,	and	for	the	duration	of	my	stay	there,	I	was	practically	free	to	observe	the	registration	site	and	contact	the	people	working	there.	I	had	made	the	decision	in	advance	not	to	engage	in	research	related	to	interaction	with	the	migrants	themselves.	Migrants’	voices	and	their	experience	throughout	their	journey	and	interaction	with	state	bureaucracy	and	societies	of	the	receiving	states	are	among	the	most	powerful	testimonies.	However,	I	intentionally	opted	not	to	record	them	for	two	specific	reasons.		Firstly,	I	aimed	to	focus	on	the	institutional/state	side	of	the	registration.	My	research	examines	registration	as	a	biopolitical	act	on	behalf	of	the	state	and	its	institutions,	towards	a	population.	Expanding	the	study	towards	the	population	itself	and	the	way	people	experience	the	registration	would	broaden	the	scope	and	thus	the	workload	to	the	degree	of	rendering	it	impossible.	Secondly,	even	if	I	decided	to	include	testimonies	of	the	individuals	registered,	this	hardly	seemed	the	appropriate	time	or	place	for	that.	These	people	had	just	crossed	the	sea	borders	between	Greece	and	Turkey,	were	stranded	in	a	place	where	they	did	not	wish	to	be,	and	their	minds	were	understandably	fixed	on	ways	to	continue	their	journey.	Any	effort	to	discuss	the	issue	of	registration	was	likely	to	be	overshadowed	by	descriptions	of	their	agony	and	aims,	and	the	obstacles	they	faced,	which	became	clear	from	every	conversation	that	I	initiated,	at	an	informal	level,	when	I	was	waiting	to	enter	a	certain	area,	or	during	breaks,	for	example.		
3.6.	Methods			 This	section	describes	in	further	detail	the	research	methods	used	during	my	research.	
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3.6.1.	Desk	research	and	analysis	of	material		 Texts	are	constitutive	elements	of	organizations	and	institutions.	They	are	essential	to	the	way	that	the	latter	exist,	are	objectified	in	time,	and	how	they	enable,	restrict	and	regulate	people’s	activities	(Smith,	2001).	While	the	authorities	of	each	Member	State	carry	out	the	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	respectively,	it	is	legislated	by	the	wider	set	of	administrative	and	governing	bodies	that	constitutes	the	EU.	Thus,	my	first	move	with	regard	to	methods	was	to	explore	the	policy	papers,	communications	and	reports	published	by	institutions	such	as	the	European	Commission,	the	European	Council,	the	European	Parliament,	but	also	the	Fundamental	Right	Agency	(FRA),	the	EU’s	Agency	for	the	Operational	Management	of	Large-Scale	IT	Systems	(EU-Lisa),	the	EURODAC	Supervision	Group	and	others.	Chronologically,	the	desk	research	comprised	the	first	stage	of	my	research,	when	both	my	research	questions	and	the	general	planning	of	the	research	were	still	being	shaped.	Thus,	when	reviewing	the	policy	papers	of	administering	bodies	such	as	the	European	Commission,	the	European	Council	and	the	European	Parliament,	but	also	of	more	specialized	agencies	such	as	the	EU-Lisa,	my	initial	interest	was	quite	broad	and	somewhat	unspecified.	I	intended	to	maintain	a	general	overview	of	the	rationale	of	function	of	EURODAC,	the	data	that	it	stores,	and	the	way	they	are	shared	among	authorities	etc.	Before	long	I	realized	that	EURODAC	as	a	system	was	not	a	stable,	fixed	entity	that	has	carried	out	the	same	function	over	the	years.	Not	only	was	it	prone	to	administrative	and	legal	changes,	but	its	design	with	connection	to	the	Dublin	Regulation,	rendered	it	a	constant	point	of	controversy	among	EU	Member	states.	In	addition,	its	legislative	framework	would	shift	in	response	to	events	involving	migration	and	the	reception	and	registration	of	migrants.			 This	realization	changed	both	the	focus	of	my	research,	but	also	my	methods,	as	I	subsequently	decided	to	examine	the	policy	papers	in	combination	with	news	articles	related	to	these	events,	as	well	as	reports	and	communications	from	other	organizations	that	were	active	with	issues	regarding	migration	at	the	time.	In	this	way,	I	can	say	that	I	conducted	(at	least	methodologically)	a	small-scale	genealogy	of	the	EURDOAC	system.	Though	this	cannot	be	claimed	to	be	exhaustive,	it	does	contribute	to	a	better	historical	
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understanding	of	the	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	in	the	EU,	and	the	controversies	that	have	developed	around	it.	While	genealogy	has	been	argued	to	not	be	a	method	per	se	to	the	point	of	it	being	described	even	as	an	anti-method	(Shiner,	1982),	it	is	generally	associated	with	the	examination	of	the	relationships	between	power,	knowledge	and	the	human	subject.		Ιn	Foucault’s	work,	it	marks	a	shift	from	the	primacy	of	the	human	subject	as	an	a-historical	entity	to	the	examination	of	its	formation	through	the	process	of	subjectification,	without	taking	it	for	granted	outside	the	discourse	that	enables	its	emergence.	However,	it	is	a	viable	tactic	to	“apply”	genealogy	as	method,	maintaining	certain	analogies,	and	adopting	some	admissions	on	history,	truth	and	power	(Ofarrell,	2005).	More	specifically	and	importantly	in	my	opinion,	that	truth	is	a	historical	category	that	does	not	exist	outside	its	historical	context,	just	as	knowledge	is	tightly	associated	and	construed	by	political,	social	and	historical	factors	(Ofarrell,	2005).	More	specifically,	and	regarding	the	truth,	Foucault	discusses	the	notion	of	the	“regime	of	truth”,	namely	the	“type	of	discourse	which	it	accepts	and	makes	function	as	true”	(Foucault,	1980,	p.	131),		and	the	means	by	which	this	truth	is	sanctioned.	This	truth	is	based	not	only	on	scientific	discourse,	but	also	on	the	institutions	that	produce	it,	and	is	widely	circulated	by	the	political	and	economic	apparatus.	Genealogy	as	method	deconstructs	the	reign	of	the	“regime	of	truth”,	and	offers	an	“intrinsic	critique	of	the	present”(Crowley,	2009).		 In	my	case,	the	“application”	of	genealogy	with	regards	to	EURODAC,	other	than	being	a	stand-alone	method	of	desk	research,	was	a	valuable	add-on	that	expanded	my	capabilities	of	conducting	the	non-participant	observation	part	of	my	research,	as	well	as	preparing	my	questions	for	the	interviews.	Bearing	in	mind	Walby’s	note	that	without	the	application	of	some	sort	of	ethnography,	the	analysis	of	text	leaves	us	“with	a	monolithic	notion	of	discourse	determining	the	bounds	of	agency”	(Walby,	2002,	p.	164),	I	proceeded	to	plan	my	fieldwork	on	the	Greek	islands.	
3.6.2.	Field	research			 For	the	second	part	of	my	research,	namely	the	field	trips	to	Greece,	I	chose	to	utilize	the	ethnographic	method	of	nonparticipant	observation,	
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alongside	semi-structured	and	open-ended	interviews.	Both	are	very	common	qualitative	research	methods	and	are	discussed	in	the	following	sections.	Kvale	(Kvale,	1996)	graphically	presents	two	contrasting	metaphors	of	the	researcher/interviewer.	On	the	one	hand,	he	talks	of	the	miner	researcher,	as	an	individual	who,	equipped	with	intellectual	mining	tools	seeks	the	valuable	ore	of	knowledge,	which	lies	inactive	and	hidden	in	the	depth	of	the	subject/informant’s	interior.	The	miner	then	purifies	the	mixed	product	of	their	labor,	through	transcription,	and	thus	is	left	with	pure,	objective,	shiny	knowledge/truth.	On	the	other	hand,	the	traveler	researcher	“wanders	through	the	landscape	and	enters	into	conversation	with	the	people	encountered”	(Kvale,	1996,	p.	4).	More	of	a	story	seeker,	than	a	truth-digger,	the	traveler	researcher	gathers	stories	and	narratives,	only	to	re-construct	them	later,	upon	returning	to	the	point	of	departure.	The	meanings	of	the	original	stories	are	largely	affected	by	the	researcher’s	interpretation,	and	“are	validated	through	their	impact	upon	the	listeners”	(p4).	This	clearly	constructivist	approach	is	a	largely	accurate	approach	of	how	I	positioned	myself,	especially	during	field	work	in	the	Hotspots	and	the	islands	in	general.	As	discussed	later,	on	arriving	on	the	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios,	the	only	fixed	meeting	I	was	due	to	attend	was	with	the	administrator	of	the	Moria	camp.	All	other	meetings	were	to	be	scheduled	as	research	proceeded.		 However,	I	found	myself	interchanging	between	the	two	archetypes	that	Kvale	describes,	in	the	different	stages	of	my	research.	After	completing	the	fieldwork	trip	to	the	islands,	certain	aspects	required	clarification	by	actors	that	were	active	in	Athens,	at	different	agencies	of	the	Greek	Police.	In	these	cases,	while	the	open-ended,	semi-structured	character	of	the	interviews	was	maintained,	both	my	expectations	but	also	my	focus	had	shifted.	This	time,	I	was	much	more	specific	in	my	questions,	but	new	challenges	arose.	First	of	all,	identifying	which	agency	and,	moreover,	which	specific	individual	within	the	agency	could	provide	answers,	was	a	challenge,	as	overlap	of	responsibilities	between	different	officials	was	a	problem.	However,	to	a	larger	extent,	researching	in	Athens	left	much	less	space	for	improvisation,	and	the	“snowball	effect”	had	lost	its	beneficial	potency.	Being	referred	to	other	individuals	and	agencies	did	not	mean	being	escorted	or	directed	to	a	different	container,	but	
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instead	initiating	a	new	chain	of	emails	back	and	forth,	which	very	often	resulted	in	dead	ends.		In	addition,	police	officers	in	Athens	lacked	the	sense	of	being	involved	in	a	historical	event,	which	was	common	among	their	colleagues	working	in	the	islands.	They	were	less	subject	to	improvisation	themselves,	and	overall	were	much	more	formal	and	chary	in	providing	information.	At	this	stage,	my	appeals	for	meetings	were	very	often	countered	with	being	asked	to	send	my	questions	via	email.	Frequently,	the	replies	I	received	lacked	content,	to	the	extent	of	receiving	emails	that	would	plainly	contain	links	to	relevant	regulations	and	directives,	and	rejecting	a	person-to-person	contact,	which	basically	annulled	all	research	potential.		While	that	was	mainly	the	case	with	Police	agencies,	other	agencies,	such	as	the	UNHCR,	were	more	open	to	live	meetings.	Here	however,	I	was	met	with	other	issues,	which	I	had	also	faced	during	the	research	trips	to	the	islands.	Individuals	working	in	key	positions	for	organization,	would	consent	to	talk	to	me,	however	they	lacked	the	formal	positions	of	being	the	official	spokesperson	of	their	organization.	While	this	does	little	harm	to	the	substance	of	the	knowledge	they	provided	me	with,	it	would	be	enough	motivation	for	them	to	ask	to	be	anonymized	in	the	final	text,	a	request	that	I,	of	course,	accepted	without	second	thoughts.	Before	the	interviews,	all	informants	were	informed	of	my	position	as	an	employed	researcher.	Some	seemed	to	find	some	sort	of	comfort	and	reassurance	in	the	fact	that	my	thesis	would	not	be	published	for	at	least	a	couple	of	years	after	the	interview,	as	this	suggested	that	by	then	they	would	not	be	employed	in	the	same	position,	and	thus	could	not	be	held	accountable	for	the	information	they	had	provided.	
3.6.2.1.	Non-participant	observation		 The	institutional	nature	of	the	Hotspot,	and	the	attitude	of	the	Greek	Police	and	the	Greek	government,	towards	long-term	research	render	a	full	ethnography	of	the	registration	process	impossible.	However,	as	other	researchers	have	chosen	to	do	in	the	specific	period	(Antonakaki,	Kasparek,	&	Maniatis,	2016;	Hess	&	Kasparek,	2017;	Painter,	Papoutsi,	Papada,	&	Vradis,	
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2016a;	V.	S.	Tsianos	&	Kuster,	2016),	I	used	ethnographic	methods	such	as	non-participant	observation	to	the	extent	that	this	was	possible	considering	the	access	limitations.	Non-participant	observation	offers	a	researcher	the	chance	to	approach	and	examine	a	set	of	practices	outside	their	framing	and	portrayal	by	e.g.	media	or	other	researcher’s	accounts.	By	placing	themselves	in	a	position	to	observe	and	interact	with	living	individuals,	actors	at	work	in	their	environment,	a	researcher	can	form	an	assessment	of	the	agency	of	the	actors	at	play,	as	this	agency	is	deployed	and	exercised	through	their	actions.	This	sheds	light	on	the	influence	of	such	individual	actors,	“constrained	as	it	is	by	structural	factors”	(Bayard	de	Volo	&	Schatz,	2004,	p.	268).			 During	my	time	at	the	Hotspots,	there	appeared	to	be	a	certain	correlation	between	the	choice	of	research	method	and	the	hierarchical	ranking	of	the	individual	I	approached.	In	this	case,	higher-ranked	officials	served	as	informants	through	interviews,	as	their	role	was	in	any	case	more	administrative	and	less	hands	on.	Additionally,	they	were	usually	situated	in	offices	that	provided	the	necessary	space,	and	in	some	cases,	their	work	tasks	included	serving	as	a	representative	of	the	agency	that	employed	them	in	relation	to	the	press	and	researchers.	When	it	came	to	police	officers	who	were	actually	carrying	out	the	registration	process,	the	situation	was	slightly	different.	Even	among	this	set	of	informants,	choices	had	to	be	made	and	methods	had	to	be	fine-tuned.	Most	border	guards	were	too	busy	to	be	able	to	engage	in	a	person-to-person	interview	that	would	require	their	full	focus	and	withdraw	them	from	their	duties.	Thus,	non-participant	observation	was	a	necessary	addition	to	the	methodological	mix,	as	at	times	it	was	the	only	possible	way	to	obtain	information	regarding	the	different	stages	of	the	registration	process.			Limited	access	to	a	certain	group	of	actors	is	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	non-participant	observation	is	a	prevalent	method,	and	my	case	was	no	different.	Non-participant	observation	is	a	very	useful	tool	for	both	bypassing	and	supplementing	the	subjectivity	that	mediates	any	kind	of	input	an	informant	will	give	as	an	answer	to	an	interview	question.	It	can	give	access	to	reified	patterns	that	emerge	from	their	actions	(Williams,	2008,	p.	561).		
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	 However,	non-participant	observation	is	more	often	than	not	(or	perhaps	always),	accompanied	by	the	issue	of	researcher	reactivity,	namely	the	extent	to	which	the	presence	of	the	researcher,	even	as	a	non-participant	observer	affects	and	changes	the	setting	and	the	actions	taken	within	it.	As	Walby	(Walby,	2002,	p.	164)	puts	it,	“Institutional	ethnographers	are	aware	that	their	own	subjectivity	has	effectivity	in	research	situations,	and	are	therefore	constantly	reflexively	monitoring	at	all	times	their	own	position	as	subject	in	relation	to	the	presence	of	the	interviewee.”	With	regard	to	the	validity	of	the	data	to	which	I	was	exposed	throughout	my	observation	periods,	I	felt	that	the	border	guards,	especially	those	working	for	the	Greek	Police,	did	little	to	hold	back	any	kind	of	information.	Actually,	I	was	surprised	by	how	open	they	were	in	allowing	me	to	be	aware	of	a	few	practices	that	they	would	perform	that	seemed	to	be	far	from	what	a	“handbook	for	border	guards”	would	dictate.	There	is	little	doubt	that	my	status	as	a	white,	young,	male	scholar,	who	was	also	Greek	had	a	very	positive	impact	on	how	they	perceived	me	and	their	subsequent	openness.		 This	identity	was	also	bolstered	by	my	position	as	a	researcher	employed	by	a	university	of	Northern	Europe,	particularly	an	IT	University.	While	I	was	never	insincere	about	my	education	and	the	subject	of	research,	both	my	background	in	Mathematics	and	the	utterance	of	“IT	University”	seemed	to	carry	a	mystifying/technical	aura,	which	I	had	no	interest	in	abolishing.	However,	at	no	point	did	I	feel	like	I	was	wondering	on	the	paths	of	covert	observation.	Even	though	I	answered	all	questions	posed	to	me	in	an	honest	manner,	I	did	not	go	into	detail,	and	I	did	not	clarify	that	I	consider	myself	a	social	scientist	unless	directly	asked.	Thus,	all	officers	working	in	the	container	where	I	spend	most	of	my	time,	to	the	extent	that	they	cared,	seemed	to	believe	that	I	was	conducting	research	for	the	EU	(as	vague	as	that),	in	order	to	maximize	and	simplify	the	functionality	of	the	system	they	were	working	with.	This	was	more	than	clear	in	the	way	one	of	them	said	goodbye	to	me	in	our	final	session:	“Now,	that	you	are	going	to	Brussels	(sic)	I	hope	you	can	tell	them	what	you	saw	and	what	we	go	through,	and	make	things	better	for	us”.		 In	order	to	further	“merge”	into	the	registration	process,	I	always	made	sure	to	arrive	in	the	Hotspot	of	Chios	(where	I	was	allowed	to	actually	observe	the	process),	about	half	an	hour	before	the	time	I	knew	the	shifts	changed.	As	the	
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registration	container/desk/line	was	open	24	hours	a	day,	the	day	was	divided	in	three	8-hour	shifts,	from	14.00	to	22.00,	22.00	to	06.00	and	06.00	to	14.00.	I	believed,	that	introducing	by	myself	to	the	final	shift,	and	being	already	present	when	the	next	shift	slowly	gathered	and	took	over	the	equipment,	I	would	naturalize	my	presence	in	their	eyes,	as	it	would	also	be	their	colleagues	who	would	talk	to	them	about	me	and	introduce	me.	Also,	by	spending	the	full	8-hour	shift	there,	I	was	aiming	for	a	sense	of	community	to	be	developed.	Inevitably,	this	community	would	necessarily	include	our	common	ground	of	ethnical	background,	and	the	Othering	of	all	the	individuals	around	us	that	did	not	share	that.		 While	these	micro-practices	of	social	engineering	were	the	best	I	could	manage	with	regard	to	the	validity	of	my	observational	data,	researcher	reactivity	does	not	end	there,	but	entails	ethical	aspects	as	well.	All	the	data	I	collected	from	the	border	guards	were	anonymized	in	practice,	and	they	were	from	the	beginning	aware	of	my	presence	and	informed	of	my	research	(as	I	described	earlier).	Be	that	as	it	may,	I	was	clearly	still	involved	in	a	sensitive	and	highly	charged	process.	While	the	border	guards	did	not	seem	to	care	too	much	about	my	presence,	I	could	not	stop	thinking	that	my	presence	there	might	lead	them	to	more	strict	practices	in	order	to	avoid	being	exposed	as	neglectful.	In	one	very	telling	case,	an	immigrant	from	Iraq	in	his	mid-40s	was	found,	during	the	cross-check	of	his	data	with	the	SIS	system,	to	have	crossed	the	Greek	borders	a	few	months	earlier,	and	was	also	registered	in	Belgium	a	few	weeks	later.	The	Belgian	authorities	had	issued	an	order	of	voluntary	departure	from	the	country,	which	in	practice	meant	that	he	had	to	be	out	of	Belgium	in	a	month	or	so.	He	then	had	returned	to	Iraq,	for	a	new	attempt,	this	time	accompanied	by	his	wife	and	three	kids,	who	were	now	clearly	anxious,	waiting	for	the	border	officials	to	deal	with	his	case.	However,	the	border	guards	seem	unsure,	not	knowing	exactly	how	to	handle	the	situation	and	asking	for	advice	by	phone	from	the	Alien	Agency	of	the	Greek	Police	in	Athens.	It	was	clear	to	me	that	they	were	inclined	to	be	flexible	towards	his	case,	mostly	due	to	the	fact	that	he	was	accompanying	his	family,	which	included	two	young	children.		I	decided	to	leave	the	container	for	half	an	hour,	so	that	my	status	as	an	observer	would	not	contribute	to	the	officers	acting	by	the	book	and	being	strict	
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on	the	family.	Later,	when	I	asked	what	had	happened	to	them,	they	told	me	that	they	had	let	them	proceed,	and	that	even	if	they	had	detained	them,	they	would	be	away	for	a	few	days,	and	the	only	difference	would	be	that	they	would	have	to	put	up	with	a	few	days	in	detention.	The	truth	is	that	I	am	in	no	position	to	know	if	my	withdrawal	had	any	impact	on	how	the	Greek	border	guards	dealt	with	this	person	and	his	family.	However,	it	illustrates	where	I	draw	the	line	of	observation.	Even	if	a	situation	could	be	informative,	if	there	is	a	chance	a	person’s	situation	could	be	worsened	by	my	agency	as	an	observer,	I	think	there	should	be	no	second	thoughts	before	withdrawing	myself	from	the	scene.		 For	the	majority	if	my	nonparticipant	observation,	I	did	not	make	use	of	a	recorder,	as	it	seemed	to	put	people	off	and	assume	a	more	“buttoned	up”	mode.	In	some	cases,	I	was	specifically	asked	not	to	use	one.	Thus,	most	of	this	part	of	the	research	was	based	on	field	notes	instead	of	transcriptions.	However,	I	did	put	some	effort	into	writing	down	exact	quotes	while	still	in	the	Hotspot.	
3.6.2.2.	Interviews			 Interviewing	is	a	very	common	and	potent	research	method	that	provides	the	researcher	with	direct	access	to	processes	that	are	either	controversial	or	straightforward.	Interviewers	can	both	formulate	and	pose	questions,	but	are	also	alert	and	note	reactions,	come	back	to	questions	for	further	clarification	in	the	light	of	subsequent	answers	and	so	on	(Undheim,	2003).	In	that	way,	interviews	can	explore	the	interviewee’s	personal	and	private	understanding	of	the	research	subject.	However,	as	a	research	method,	interviews	are	not	a	singular	method	but	instead	“a	family	of	research	approaches	that	have	one	thing	in	common	–	conversation	between	people	in	which	one	person	has	the	role	of	researcher”(Arksey	&	Knight,	1999,	p.	2).	In	addition,	it	is	widely	accepted	that	qualitative	interview	research	is	less	a	procedure	strictly	guided	by	exact	rules,	and	more	of	a	craft,	which	calls	for	decisions	to	be	made	on	the	spot,	even	during	the	development	of	the	interview	(Kvale,	1996).		My	approach	to	obtaining	data	in	the	field,	(in	the	Hotspots)	was	simply	to	explore	and	talk	to	as	many	informants	as	possible.	Such	methods	are	generally	considered	to	leave	little	space	for	generalization	of	conclusions,	(Arksev	and	Knight,	p4),	which	is	anyway	in	alliance	with	the	situated	nature	of	my	project,	as	
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discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	However,	they	do	tend	to	enable	a	very	significant	“snowball	effect”,	namely	the	nomination	and	recommendation	by	interviewees	of	other	actors	whose	testimonies	are	often	useful,	an	effect	that	I	encountered	many	times.	The	snowball	effect	does	not	necessarily	move	the	researcher	between	like-minded	or	similarly	institutionally	positioned	actors	but	can	divert	the	direction	of	the	research.	However,	by	applying	a	little	intuition,	and	with	the	ever	present	risk	of	lost	time,	a	diversity	of	actors	approached	allows	for	the	gathering	of	data	that	in	turn	leads	to	the	interception	of	“meaningful	relations”	(Kvale,	1996,	p.	10),	among	the	actors,	their	actions,	and	their	accounts.	The	overall	conditions	of	the	Hotspot	to	a	large	extent	dictated	my	approach	to	choosing	informants.	The	border	guards’	and	other	actor’s	workload,	as	well	as	the	significant	time	and	access	constraints,	created	a	situation	where	a	day	in	the	field	basically	meant	being	constantly	aware	of	“openings”	where	I	could	approach	individuals,	state	my	identity	and	purposes,	and	hope	for	the	best.	In	many	cases,	willingness	to	engage	was	declared,	but	actual	discussion	was	practically	impossible,	as	tasks	were	pressuring,	people	were	constantly	coming	up	with	requests	whose	significance	by	far	exceeded	my	research	in	everyone’s	eyes	(mine	included),	and	fatigue	after	long	shifts	was	kicking	in.	In	my	study,	I	used	interviews	in	two	distinct	ways.	In	some	cases,	mostly	in	the	part	of	the	research	that	was	conducted	in	Athens,	and	in	fewer	cases	on	the	islands,	interviews	were	the	sole	means	of	access	to	information	and	people’s	testimonies.	In	these	cases,	interviewing	functioned	as	a	form	of	triangulation	of	previous	accounts,	as	shown	in	chapter	8.	At	the	Hotspots	however,	where	conditions	were	more	chaotic,	it	was	challenging	to	keep	even	semi-structured	interviews	running,	as	they	were	more	often	than	not	embodied	in	constant	remarks,	discussions,	and	point-and-tell	communication.	That	was	not	the	case	in	the	interviews	of	the	higher-ranked	administrative	personnel	who	had	the	capacity	to	accept	me	in	their	personal	offices.	In	theory,	a	research	interview	is	characterized	by	a	lack	of	inequality	between	the	involved	parties,	as	the	researcher	is	supposed	to	be	in	control	of	the	situation	(Kvale,	1996).	However,	in	many	cases,	I	felt	that	the	institutional	
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role	of	police	officers	annulled	this	presupposition,	as	their	conception	of	me	as	a	researcher	would	easily	shift	from	that	of	a	neutral	scientist	who	was	potentially	beneficial	for	their	agency	to	a	potential	threat	of	their	personal	or	institutional	image.	In	one	case,	I	was	even	asked,	not	without	a	significant	amount	of	suspicion	on	behalf	of	a	FRONTEX	officer	that	I	had	approached,	why	I	was	shaking	and	so	nervous.	
3.6.2.3.	Analysis	of	fieldwork	material	
	 			 During	my	fieldwork,	I	tried	to	remain	in	a	constant	state	of	alertness,	not	only	in	order	to	absorb,	understand	and	note	the	data	coming	from	my	informants’	actions	and	their	responses	to	my	questions,	but	also	to	refer	to	information	that	I	had	been	exposed	to	during	my	desk	research,	which,	in	principle,	I	should	be	able	to	compare	to	the	“reality”	of	the	field.	This	proved	to	be	even	harder	than	anticipated,	even	more	as	my	informants	themselves,	active	actors	of	the	process	that	I	was	studying,	and	sometimes	proclaimed	experts	in	their	fields,	seemed	to	be	less	than	positive	about	what	constituted	the	status	quo	concerning	e.g.	the	function	of	EURODAC	at	the	time	in	question.	The	field	proved	to	be	a	tricky	place,	as	new	things	constantly	cropped	up,	not	only	in	the	form	of	new	information	on	issues	relevant	to	my	research	questions,	but	also	as	new	questions	themselves.	Especially	my	first	research	trip	to	the	Hotspots,	re-shaped	my	research	questions,	rendered	things	that	I	had	previously	considered	central	to	my	research	as	irrelevant,	and	completely	changed	the	scope	of	my	project.	“It	is	always	hard	to	say	where	data	gathering	stops	and	data	analysis	begins”(M.	S.	Feldman,	2000,	p.	731),	as	it	is	impossible	to	“shut	down”	the	effect	of	the	theory	that	is	already	active	in	the	context	of	a	research	project,	and	to	try	and	function	purely	as	a	collector	of	data	when	in	the	field.	Instead,	a	good	deal	of	the	input	coming	from	non-participant	observation	and	interviews	seemed	to	be	instantly	processed	and	analyzed,	almost	effortlessly	and	automatically.	Of	course,	the	process	continued	after	the	trip	ended,	when	the	field	notes	and	interview	transcriptions	would	be	available.	It	would	be	then	that	the	empirical	material	and	the	theoretical	framework	would	be	joined	together,	and	further	developed.	The	choice	of	theoretical	tools	proved	to	be	in	a	constant	dialogue	
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with	the	incoming	empirical	material,	as	some	references	and	bodies	of	knowledge	would	be	scrapped	as	irrelevant,	and	others,	initially	not	included,	would	have	to	be	explored.	For	example,	after	my	first	contact	with	screeners	in	the	2016	visit,	the	concept	of	performativity	was	a	necessary	addition	to	the	theoretical	framework	in	order	to	analyze	the	screening	process.	This	theoretical	enrichment	would	then,	in	turn,	find	its	way	into	guiding	the	next	rounds	of	research,	and	the	observation	would	now	look	for	information	that	would	fit	the	theory	and	exploit	its	analytical	capacities	and	possibilities.	As	Berner	notes,	in	the	fieldwork,	researchers	cannot	only	test	assumptions	but	can	also	provide	further	empirical	foundations	for	the	theoretical	models	that	they	are	using	(Berner,	2007).	It	was	not	only	theoretical	influences	that	were	discarded	as	the	fieldwork	proceeded	but	also	material	gathered	from	the	desk	research.	As	the	focus	of	my	research	shifted	from	the	biometric	aspect	of	the	registration	and	EURODAC,	to	registration	as	a	whole,	and	as	an	issue	in	the	media	and	political	debate,	documents	that	I	have	read	and	notes	that	were	produced	from	them,	could	no	longer	be	included	in	the	thesis	text.	While	transcribing	the	material	from	the	interviews,	I	attempted	to	cross-check	the	testimonies	of	my	informants	with	material	from	the	press	and	policy	papers.	At	the	same	time,	I	was	looking	for	ways	to	connect	this	material	to	theory	and	to	organize	the	data	that	could	be	used	in	relation	to	the	emerging	form	of	my	thesis.	This	organization	emerged	quite	naturally,	as	the	central	concepts	of	each	theoretical	body,	such	as	“crisis”,	“exception”	and	so	on	seemed	to	fit	in	the	relevant	body	of	data.	A	short	note	is	needed	at	this	point.	During	the	field	visits,	even	though	the	time	spent	at	the	Hotspots	was	limited	and	set,	the	time	spent	on	the	islands,	even	outside	the	time	allocated	specifically	for	interviews	and	meetings,	was	often	dense	with	content.	Some	of	my	informants	belonged	to	my	social	environment,	thus	the	discussions	would	often	drift	away	from	the	limits	of	my	research	project	to	the	general	condition	of	migration	on	the	islands,	or	the	mainland.	Information	circulation	was	dense,	as	were	people’s	accounts,	concerns,	experiences	and	conclusions	on	what	was	happening	and	how.	The	interpretations	from	informants	are	included	in	the	researcher’s	account	of	
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events	(M.	S.	Feldman,	2000,	p.	615).	In	some	cases,	these	discussions,	which	are	practically	impossible	to	transcribe,	were	inspiration	and	guidance	for	subsequent	rounds	of	desk	research.																											
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Chapter	4.	A	history	of	EURODAC	
4.1.	Introduction		 This	chapter	will	present	and	discuss	the	main	Information	Communication	Technology	(ICT)	tool	that	EU	border	and	asylum	authorities	have	used	in	the	registration	of	irregular	migrants	and	asylum	seekers:	the	EURODAC.	While	other	systems	and	databases	are	at	play,	such	as	the	Schengen	Information	System	II	(SIS	II),	and	the	Visa	Information	System,	they	will	only	be	addressed	partially,	in	cases	where	instances	of	their	development	are	relevant	to	this	thesis.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	even	though	as	databases	they	are	definitely	a	part	of	the	EU’s	“border	machine”,	their	scope	extends	beyond	the	area	of	“irregular	migration”.	SIS	II	was	developed	as	part	of	a	set	of	measures	that	would	compensate	for	the	abolition	of	border	controls	within	the	Schengen	area.	VIS	was	also	introduced	in	relation	to	security	concerns	(but	also	EU’s	return	policy),	mostly	in	the	aftermath	of	the	intensification	of	such	concerns	in	the	aftermath	of	the	9/11	attacks	(Brouwer,	2008).	In	addition,	registration	in	the	systems	happens	at	more	sites	than	the	registration	centers	where	my	fieldwork	was	conducted,	and	any	attempt	to	encapsulate	their	operation	would	by	far	exceed	the	scope	of	my	work.		 EURODAC	will	be	selectively	discussed	as	part	of	the	Asylum	system	and	more	specifically	the	Dublin	system,	and	as	a	biometric	database	with	a	scope	and	purpose	that	is	prone	to	reconfigurations	in	accordance	with	political	developments	in	the	EU	and	globally.	The	corresponding	bodies	of	literature	employed	thus	are	at	the	intersection	of	STS,	Border	and	Migration	Studies,	and	Surveillance	Studies.	A	complete	history	of	EURODAC	includes	hundreds	of	policy	papers,	press	releases,	legal	assessments	and	evaluation	reports.	For	the	purpose	of	this	chapter,	I	will	selectively	refer	to	such	documents	in	the	cases	where	they	are	helpful	in	developing	an	argument	or	capturing	specific	instances	in	the	history	of	EURODAC.		 In	the	overall	context	of	the	thesis,	this	chapter	is	at	the	policymaking	deimension,	discussing	identification	and	registration	of	migrants,	mainly	through	the	critical	reading	of	relevant	policy	makers.	Its	purpose	is	to	examine	
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the	debate	around	identification	and	registration,	building	up	for	the	different	accounts	that	will	be	presented	in	chapters	6	and	8.		
4.2.	The	Dublin	Regulation			 EURODAC	was	initially	conceived	as	a	tool	for	the	implementation	of	the	Dublin	Regulation.	Thus,	in	order	to	get	a	better	understanding	of	its	trajectory,	some	context	to	support	the	latter	is	necessary.	The	long	story	of	harmonizing	the	European	asylum	policy	has	been	relatively	successful	in	producing	a	framework	for	externalization	of	asylum-related	procedures,	deterrence	of	irregular	migration,	and	returns	of	irregular	migrants,	through	acts	like	the	Return	Directive	(Council	Directive	2008/115/EC).	However,	it	has	been	less	successful	in	actually	unifying	an	asylum	policy	across	Member	states	(Martin,	setting	the	context).	To	a	large	extent,	asylum-related	practices	have	been	left	to	domestic	legislations,	leaving	asylum	seekers	as	“objects	of	state	acts”(Guild,	2006).		 A	cornerstone	of	the	European	Asylum	system	has	been	the	Dublin	system,	regulated	by	the	three	Dublin	Regulations.	In	this	chapter,	the	Dublin	system	will	be	presented	as	a	historical	entity,	with	little	focus	on	the	changes	that	the	different	Regulations	brought	forward,	as	the	argument	is	that	it	is	based	on	characteristics	that	have	remained	stable	in	all	three	Regulations.		 The	first	Dublin	Regulation	(European	Community,	1990)	was		signed	in	1990	and	came	into	force	in	1997.	As	a	step	towards	a	common	European	asylum	system,	it	fulfilled	a	need	that	was	fundamentally	related	to	the	abolition	of	border	controls	under	the	Schengen	Agreement.	Its	role,	alongside	other	legislative	acts	that	shaped	asylum	procedures,	definition	of	refugee	status,	and	reception	conditions	was	to	set	criteria	determining	which	Member	State	would	be	responsible	for	the	examination	of	the	asylum	application	of	to-be-recognized	refugees.	The	Dublin	system	applies	to	all	Member	States,	including	the	UK,	Ireland	and	Denmark,	but	also	to	the	non-EU	States	included	in	Schengen,	namely	Norway,	Iceland	Switzerland	and	Lichtenstein.	In	addition,	Dublin	aims	at	combating	“secondary	movements”	of	irregular	migrants	and	asylum	seekers,	and	the	subsequent	practice	of	“asylum	shopping”.	The	latter	practice	entails	migrants	filing	multiple	applications	in	
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different	countries,	maybe	under	different	identities,	and	refugees	in	orbit,	which	involves	the	continuous	transfer	of	asylum	seekers	with	no	country	accepting	responsibility.	The	criteria	for	allocation	of	responsibility	were	hierarchically	structured	in	the	order	of	appearance	in	the	text	of	the	Regulation.	They	included	the	protection	of	unaccompanied	minors,	reunification	with	family	members	in	a	particular	country,	possession	of	a	visa	or	residence	permit	for	a	particular	country,	illegal	entry	to	or	stay	in	a	particular	country,	and	the	country	of	first	application.	The	Regulation	contained	no	provision	for	mutual	recognition	of	decisions	on	recognition	of	status.	The	most	dominant	criterion,	and	perhaps	the	most	controversial,	has	been	the	so-called	“first	country	of	asylum”	principle	which	states	that	the	first	country	through	which	an	asylum	seeker	enters	the	EU	is	responsible	for	examining	the	asylum	application.	The	fundamental	presumption	of	the	Dublin	system	is	that	the	European	asylum	systems	function	in	a	uniform	way	across	Member	states.	The	“principle	of	mutual	confidence”	among	Member	States	specifies	that	they	will	respect	fundamental	principles	such	as	that	of	non-refoulement.	As	the	European	Commissioner	for	Home	Affairs,	Cecilia	Malmström	has	said	“It	should	not	matter	which	country	you	flee	to”	(Malmström,	2012).	This	underlying	“misconception”	has	produced	results	that	have	further	undermined	such	harmonization,	as	well	as	the	Dublin	Regulation	itself.	It	has	created	an	unequal	distribution	of	the	“burden”	of	reception	of	asylum	seekers	and	the	administration	of	their	asylum	applications	for	the	“frontline	states”,	namely	Greece	and	Italy.	In	its	recently	announced	“European	Agenda	on	Migration”,	the	European	Commission	acknowledged	that	the	“Dublin	system”	is	not	working	as	it	should.	In	2014,	five	Member	States	dealt	with	72%	of	all	asylum	applications	EU-wide.	(Council	of	Europe,	2015).	This	critique	is	based	on	the	conceptualization	of	asylum	and	solidarity	as	a	“burden”	and	even	as	a	punishment	for	Member	States	(Guild,	2006),	which	is	the	dominant	conceptualization	of	asylum	throughout	the	European	asylum	system.	This	basis	securitizes	the	asylum	discourse	and	depicts	asylum	seekers	in	a	negative	way	(G.	Noll,	2003).	It	subsequently	allows	only	for	state-centered	solidarity	that	
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focuses	on	the	interests	of	the	state	instead	of	those	of	the	asylum	seeker	(Mitsilegas,	2014).		Under	this	paradigm,	European	states	have	engaged	in	what	den	Heijer	et	al	(den	Heijer,	Rijpma,	&	Spijkerboer,	2016)	have	referred	to	as	the	“race	to	the	bottom”.	This	is	the	practice	of	Member	States	deliberately	undermining	the	quality	and	functionality	of	their	asylum	systems	in	order	to	avoid	being	popular	destinations	among	asylum	seekers.	This	practice	has	been	particularly	fruitful	for	Greece,	for	example.	In	2011,	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(ECtHR)	issued	a	decision	on	the	case	M.S.S	v	Belgium	and	Greece,	concerning	the	case	of	an	Afghan	asylum	seeker	who	fled	his	country	in	2008,	entered	the	EU	through	Greece	and	went	on	to	Belgium	where	he	applied	for	asylum.	In	accordance	with	the	Dublin	Regulation,	the	Belgian	authorities	transferred	him	to	Greece	where	he	“faced	detention	in	insalubrious	conditions	before	living	on	the	streets	without	any	material	support”	(EDAL,	n.d.).	ECtHR	decided	that	decided	that	Belgium	and	Greece	had	violated	M.S.S.’s	human	rights,	on	account	of	the	deteriorated	state	of	the	asylum	system	of	Greece.	Following	the	ruling,	a	number	of	Member	states	announced	that	they	would	cease	returning	people	to	Greece	(Brothers,	2011).	In	addition	to	the	“race	to	the	bottom”,	over	the	years,	both	states	have	at	times	avoided	registration	of	incoming	migrants.	An	extreme	example	comes	from	Italy	in	2011,	when	Italy	was	issuing	Schengen	visas	to	all	Tunisian	migrants	who	had	arrived	before	a	set	date	(Hess	&	Kasparek,	2017,	p.	56).	This	caused	a	diplomatic	episode	with	neighboring	France.	On	the	other	hand,	states	that	are	neither	“frontline”	states,	nor	part	of	the	popular	migrant	routes,	have	created	a	sense	of	historic	entitlement	to	have	no	share	of	the	“burden”	(den	Heijer	et	al.,	2016).	This	view	emerged	dynamically	in	the	discussions	on	new	distribution	keys	during	the	“migrant	crisis”.	Apart	from	being	unfair	among	Member	States,	the	Dublin	system	has	been	widely	considered	to	be	inefficient	in	its	implementation	(Garcés-Mascareñas,	2015;	Marx,	2001)	(Council	of	Europe,	2015).	In	practice,	it	has	failed	to	deter	“secondary	movements”	of	migrants,	as	many	wish	to	avoid	encountering	the	asylum	system	of	the	countries	at	their	point	of	arrival.	Instead,	they	go	“deeper	underground”,	trying	to	irregularly	continue	to	their	desired	
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destinations,	giving	rise	to	a	category	of	people	trying	to	evade	the	system,	known	as	the	“Dubliners”.	In	that	way,	the	Dublin	system	would	work	against	its	own	declared	goal	of	battling	irregular	“secondary	movement”.	It	augments	inequalities	among	asylum	seekers,	as	luck	and	resources	would	be	critical	to	determine	who	would	make	it	to	their	destination	and	who	would	not.		The	transfer	system	within	the	Dublin	system	has	also	been	less	than	successful	in	its	implementation.	For	example,	in	2013,	there	were	76,358	requests	for	transfers	of	migrants	or	taking	charge	of	their	asylum	claim.	Of	these	cases,	56,466	were	accepted	by	the	receiving	Member	State.	Of	the	accepted,	15,938	actually	materialized	(Fratzke,	2015).	The	reasons	the	transfers	take	so	long	are	due	partly	to	the	complicated	nature	of	the	bureaucratic	procedures	embedded	in	the	Dublin	system.	Dublin	procedures	have	been	notoriously	slow	and	have	repeatedly	trapped	thousands	of	asylum	seekers	in	limbo.	They	are	blocked	from	access	to	integration	support	and	the	labor	market	(Council	of	Europe,	2015).	In	this	way,	Dublin	has	legitimized	long-term	detention	of	individuals	who	have	not	violated	the	laws	of	European	States.	As	shown,	therefore,	the	Dublin	system	creates	dynamics	between	Member	States.	However,	more	importantly,	it	has	had	a	huge	impact	on	the	lives	of	thousands	of	migrants.	The	Dublin	system	prevents	asylum	seekers	from	choosing	where	they	want	to	apply	for	asylum.	With	the	exception	of	family	reunification,	it	does	so	without	addressing	the	factors	on	which	this	choice	may	be	made	(Collyer,	2004).	The	assumption	under	the	notion	of	“asylum	shopping”,	is	that	asylum	seekers	are	knowledgeable	of	the	asylum	system	of	different	European	countries,	and	their	economical	capacities	and	opportunities	and	make	their	choices	accordingly.	Referring	to	asylum	seekers’	choices	with	regards	to	their	mobility	as	“asylum	shopping”,	implies	that	a	migrant	subject	who	instrumentally	tries	to	navigate	through	the	asylum	system	is	abusing	it,	specifically	based	on	a	rational,	strictly	economically	motivated	thought	path	(Mouzourakis,	2014).	This	fundamental	presupposition	at	a	high	political	level,	could	only	find	its	way	to	the	lower	level	of	administration	as	a	“culture	of	disbelief”	(Anderson,	Hollaus,	&	Williamson,	2014;	Jubany,	2011)	among	asylum	case	handlers,	enabling	“arbitrary,	inconsistent	decision-making,	insensitivity	
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and	bias”	in	the	examination	of	asylum	claims.	There	is	no	doubt	that	such	motives	do	to	some	extent	shape	the	decisions	of	migrants	and	asylum	seekers.	However,	the	whole	concept	reduces	the	complexity	of	such	decisions,	based	on	the	overemphasis	of	economic	“pull”	factors	linked	to	public	policies	(James	&	Mayblin,	n.d.).	Other	factors,	such	as	social	networks	and	colonial	ties,	are	overlooked	(Neumayer,	2004).		The	Dublin	system	adopts	an	asymmetrical	condition	for	asylum	seekers	since	a	rejected	asylum	claim	by	a	Member	State	is	recognized	as	final	by	the	rest	of	the	Member	States.	One	the	other	hand,	a	positive	decision	has	limited	territorial	application	to	the	Member	State	that	approved	it	(Guild	et	al.,	2014)	The	EU’s	Schengen	project	of	abolishing	internal	border	controls	retained	an	exception	for	asylum	seekers,	not	only	in	excluding	them	from	free	movement,	but	also	excluding	asylum	as	a	whole	from	an	integrated	approach,	by	leaving	it	to	each	Member	State’s	practices	under	the	aforementioned	assumption	of	a	harmonized	asylum	system.	At	the	same	time,	Member	States	on	a	domestic	level	were	busy	raising	legal	borders	that	would,	to	the	greatest	extent	possible,	keep	the	“burden:	of	asylum	seekers	away	from	their	territory	and	administrative	apparatus	(Bouteillet-Paquet,	2003).		Even	with	the	3	reformations	and	the	3	subsequent	regulations	that	have	been	at	play,	overall,	the	Dublin	system	has	been	a	highly	problematic,	repressive	system	that	has	jeopardized	migrant’s	rights	(Garcés-Mascareñas,	2015).	In	the	next	chapters,	I	will	argue	it	has	played	a	significant	role	in	the	establishment	of	the	“normalized	crisis”	that	the	asylum	and	border	control	regime	of	the	EU	has	experienced	throughout	recent	decades.	It	is	hard	to	account	for	the	persistence	of	Dublin	in	the	face	of	its	long	history	of	insufficiency,	and	such	a	project	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	However,	a	few	notes	are	worth	mentioning	that,	while	they	do	not	provide	the	aforementioned	account,	offer	an	interesting	perspective.	Firstly,	despite	its	proclamations	for	protecting	migrants	and	ensuring	their	protection	and	access	to	asylum,	the	Dublin	system	had	little	to	do,	and	actually	functions	in	the	opposite	direction.	Its	proclamations	of	trust	and	solidarity	among	Member	States	are	equally	void	of	meaning,	and	it	only	makes	sense	to	see	it	as	an	imprint	of	the	power	balance	among	Member	States.	The	Member	States	that	are	“faulted”	by	the	Dublin	system	simply	do	not	have	
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the	leverage	to	change	things	to	their	benefit	(Garcés-Mascareñas,	2015),	and	thus	resort	to	practices	like	the	“race	to	the	bottom”,	or	avoiding	their	obligations	altogether.	This	viewing,	combined	with	the	conceptualizing	of	asylum	seekers	as	a	“burden”	and/or	a	potential	threat,	enables	an	understanding	of	Dublin	also	as	a	disciplining	measure	(Guild,	Costello,	Garlick,	Moreno	Lax,	&	Carrera,	2015)	that	punishes	Member	States	who	allow	irregular	crossings	with	the	obligation	of	handling	asylum	applications	and	the	management	of	the	subsequent	populations.	The	above	supports	the	claim	that	the	Dublin	system’s	“primary	purpose	is	not	to	be	functional”	as	a	fair	distribution	mechanism,	but	instead,	in	addition	to	the	discipline	function	mentioned	earlier,	aims	to	enable	deportability	as	a	permanent	condition,	reassuring	the	Member	States’	“citizenry	that	their	‘national	prerogatives’	to	determine	entry	and	granting	of	protection	have	not	been	compromised,	even	in	the	face	of	a	Common	European	Asylum	System”.	This	more	functional	purpose	is	supported	at	the	expense	of	asylum	seekers	through	very	“real”	practices	such	as	long-term	detention.	That	would	explain,	for	example,	why	the	Regulations	maintain	a	very	potent	and	drastic	character	regarding	issues	such	as	restriction	of	movement,	while	they	do	not	present	the	same	determination	when	it	comes	to	standardization	of	asylum	procedures	and	criteria	(Crepeau,	2015).	
4.3.	EURODAC		 For	the	purposes	of	the	Dublin	system,	EURODAC	was	the	first	Automated	Fingerprint	Identification	(AFIS)	System	to	be	discussed,	designed	and	implemented	at	EU	level.	The	EURODAC	first	became	operational	on	15	January	2003,	and	its	function	was	legislated	by	Regulation	(EC)	No.	2725/2000	
concerning	the	establishment	of	‘Eurodac’	for	the	comparison	of	fingerprints	for	
the	effective	application	of	the	Dublin	Convention	of	11	December	2000	(European	Council,	2000).	Most	Western	European	countries	had	already	installed	AFIS	systems	and	national	databases	not	only	for	the	purpose	of	registering	people	who	were	charged	with	breaking	the	law	and/or	convicted	for	it,	but	also	to	register	asylum	seekers	and	“illegal”	immigrants.	
4.3.1.	First	debates		
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EURODAC	was	conceived	as	a	necessity	no	more	than	a	year	after	the	Dublin	Regulation	was	signed	on	June	1990.	Apparently,	it	didn't	take	long	for	Member	States	to	realize	that	the	“first	entry”	principle	of	the	Regulation	would	be	hard	to	implement	without	a	mechanism	that	would	identify	asylum	seekers	and	their	previous	presence	in	the	EU.	In	December	of	1992,	at	a	meeting	of	Immigration	Ministers	at	the	Hague,	it	was	decided	for	a	study	to	be	conducted	that	would	determine	whether	the	development	of	a	European	system	to	store	and	compare	fingerprint	data	of	asylum	seekers	in	order	to	assist	in	the	operation	of	the	Dublin	Convention	was	feasible.		The	study	was	undertaken	by	fingerprint	experts	from	the	Netherlands,	Portugal	and	the	UK.	The	study	appears	to	have	lasted	almost	a	full	year,	as	in	November	1992,	again	at	a	meeting	of	Immigration	Ministers,	a	confidential	progress	report	was	presented.	It	was	not	“the	subject	of	consensus	between	the	Member	States”	but	it	allowed	the	identification	of	some	“main	issues	and	options”	(European	Council,	1997).	With	regards	to	“feasibility”,	the	report	noted	(among	other,	such	as	that	financial	considerations	may	have	an	impact	on	the	choice	of	option	regarding	the	conversions	of	existing	records	of	fingerprints)	that	the	technology	was	“already	in	existence	capable	of	meeting	in	principle	the	technical	requirements	for	EURODAC”	and	“that	there	are	no	technical	barriers	to	the	storage	and	transmission	of	fingerprint	images”.	It	also	observed	the	need	for	a	choice	to	be	made	regarding	the	architecture	of	the	system	and	the	degree	of	centralization	that	would	characterize	it.		In	addition,	the	report	briefly	touched	on	certain	legal	issues.	No	actual	recommendation	is	uttered,	rather	a	list	of	issues	that	need	to	be	addressed,	such	as	the	kind	of	data	that	may	be	recorded	in	addition	to	the	fingerprints.	The	most	important	is	the	question	of	whether	or	not	the	system	can	be	legally	based	on	article	15	of	the	Dublin	Convention	or	if	“there	is	a	need	for	additional	legal	bases”.	The	nature	of	the	legal	instrument	that	will	lead	to	the	establishment	of	the	system	as	well	as	the	need	to	develop	data	protection	measures	to	accompany	the	system	are	also	mentioned.	The	response	of	the	Legal	Service	came	soon	after,	in	March	1993.	It	stated	that	Article	15	of	the	Dublin	Convention	was	sufficient	basis	for	the	establishment	of	EURODAC.	However,	the	Legal	
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Service	was	explicit	about	the	specific	purposes	for	which	EURODAC	was	to	be	used,	and	specifically	excludes	the	use	of	EURODAC	and	its	data	for	“starting	criminal	investigations	against	asylum	seekers”	or	“the	functioning	of	other	international	instruments”.	Both	restrictions	were	later	annulled.	The	consultants	who	carried	out	the	report	included	a	survey	among	Member	States	regarding	the	current	use	of	police	and	asylum	fingerprint	systems.	Based	on	that	survey,	the	minimum	age	for	a	person	to	be	fingerprinted	was	decided.	While	most	of	the	States	surveyed	did	not	respond,	France	stated	16	as	their	limit,	Belgium	and	Italy	18,	and	Germany,	Austria	and	Denmark	used	or	favored	14	years,	which	was	the	adopted	option,	despite	being	the	lowest	common	denominator,	and	thus	a	somewhat	counterintuitive	choice.	It	took	5	years	from	the	beginning	of	the	discussion	around	EURODAC,	until	the	regulation	was	adopted.	This	delay	is	partially	attributed	to	the	fact	that	not	all	Member	States	would	support	a	system	that	would	augment	the	Dublin	system.	The	composition	of	the	supporting	and	non-supporting	groups	naturally	followed	the	distinctions	that	the	Dublin	system	had	already	set.	A	South	and	North	division,	with	states	like	Greece	and	Italy	opposing,	while	Germany,	the	Netherlands	and	Austria	pushed	ahead	(Aus,	2006).	
4.3.2.1997	expansion	of	scope				 In	the	second	half	of	1997	and	beginning	of	1998,	over	2,500	Kurds	fleeing	from	war-torn	regions	of	Turkey	and	Iraq	arrived	in	Italy.	The	subsequent	situation	caused	commotion	both	in	EU	media	and	the	discussion	around	asylum	policy.	Italy	was	accused	by	Member	States	such	as	Austria,	Belgium	and	France,	of	one-sidedly	opening	the	borders	of	the	EU	to	incoming	undocumented	migrants	(Boudreaux,	1998).	Indeed,	at	the	time,	Italy’s	policy	was	to	register	all	incoming	migrants,	and	then	give	them	a	15-day	margin	to	leave	Italy	by	themselves.	In	December	1997,	a	Task	Force	was	created	to	coordinate	practical	measures	to	restrict	“illegal	migration”.	Reportedly,	the	meetings	were	characterized	by	exertion	of	“massive	pressure	on	Greece	and	Italy”	by	the	German	government,	and	a	highly	differentiated	viewing	of	the	situation.	While	the	Greek	and	Italian	sides	would	see	it	as	an	asylum	and	refugee	protection	issue,	the	German,	French	and	Dutch	sides	would	portray	it	as	
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“a	problem	of	‘illegal	migration’	and	human	trafficking	connected	with	organized	crime	syndicates”.	Shortly	after,	the	Council	of	the	EU	via	the	Justice	and	Home	Affairs	(JHA)	created	a	special	Multi-Disciplinary	Group	(MGP)	for	the	purpose	of	examining	the	issue	of	increased	immigration	from	Iraq	and	neighboring	regions.	The	work	of	the	MGP	resulted	in	the	adoption	of	an	Action	Plan	in	the	General	Affairs	Council	on	26-27	January	1998.	In	the	next	meeting	of	JHA	that	took	place	in	Brussels	in	May	1998,	the	Council	“took	note	of	progress	achieved	on	the	implementation	of	the	Action	Plan	on	the	influx	of	migrants”,	while	“several	ministers	stressed	the	importance	of	extending	the	Eurodac	system	of	taking	fingerprints	to	illegal	immigrants	with	a	view	of	improving	the	operation	of	the	Dublin	Regulation”.	At	the	same	meeting,	and	during	the	same	period,	there	was	an	open	dialogue	with	Turkey	very	similar	to	the	one	conducted	during	2016	that	produced	the	EU-Turkey	agreement	of	March	2016).	Even	though	“several”	ministers	stressed	this	point,	in	the	press	release	after	the	Council	meeting,	under	the	conclusion	stating	that	the	Council	“will	draw	up	a	Protocol	to	the	Eurodac	Convention	extending	the	Eurodac	system	to	include	the	fingerprints	of	‘illegal	immigrants’	for	adoption	by	the	end	of	1998,”	a	footnote	reads	that	“the	precise	definition	of	what	constitutes	an	illegal	immigrant	is	still	to	be	determined”	(European	Council,	1998a,	p.	17).			 As	is	evident	from	the	press	release	of	the	next	JHA	meeting	in	September	the	same	year,	when	the	Council	“concentrated	on	the	definition	of	the	category	of	‘illegal	immigrants’”,	there	was	an	argument	between	Member	States	regarding	whether	or	not	the	definition	should	refer	to	“only	persons	who	are	apprehended	in	areas	close	to	borders”	or	to	include	“all	persons	who	had	crossed	the	borders	illegally	and	were	caught	in	a	Member	State”(European	Council,	1998b,	p.	12).	According	to	Aus,	the	latter,	more	wide	definition	raised	practical	problems	as	it	would	be	“very	hard	to	establish	for	national	police	forces	dealing	with	so-called	sans-papiers	or	illegally	resident	third-country	nationals	lacking	any	sort	of	documentation”	(Aus,	2006,	p.	9).		However,	and	perhaps	more	importantly,	as	the	same	author	notes,	this	extension	of	scope	of	EURODAC	would	signal	“a	departure	from	article	63	(1)(a)	of	the	forthcoming	EC	Treaty,	EURODAC’s	envisioned	legal	basis”.	
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	 While,	according	to	the	press	release	regarding	the	Council’s	meeting,	the	president	noted	“that	there	was	in	principle	general	agreement	on	fingerprinting	illegal	immigrants	and	that	the	legal	and	technical	implications	of	such	fingerprinting	had	to	be	examined	in	order	to	allow	for	a	decision	to	be	taken	at	the	forthcoming	session	in	May”	(European	Council,	1999).	However,	it	appears	that	consensus	was	not	as	simple	as	implied.	Apparently,	and	still	according	to	the	same	press	release,	delegations	that	considered	the	issue	to	be	“of	great	importance	for	improving	the	operation	of	the	Dublin	Convention,	maintained	a	general	reservation	on	the	EURODAC	Convention,	pending	concrete	progress	on	this	issue”(European	Council,	1999,	p.	9).	The	said	delegations	are	those	of	Germany,	the	Netherlands,	France	and	Austria.	The	German	delegation	went	on	to	enter	the	reservation,	which	can	be	read	as	a	direct	threat	to	veto	EURODAC	(Aus,	2006,	p.	8),	unless	the	specific	demand	was	met.	
4.3.3	Further	deliberation		 On	15	January	1998,	the	Parliament	rejected	the	idea	of	a	“headquarter	state”,	meaning	“the	Member	State	in	which	the	Central	Unit	is	situated”	and	made	it	clear	that	the	operation	of	the	system	would	be	carried	out	by	the	Commission	(European	Parliament,	1998,	p.	17).	In	the	same	text,	the	Parliament,	in	turn	also	stressed	that	EURODAC	“must	be	regarded	as	subject	to	very	strict	limits”	and	that	its	use	“must	on	no	account	be	extended	to	cover	wide	areas	or	purposes”,	and	proposed	certain	human	rights	additional	provisions	as	well	as	suggesting	that	the	fingerprints	of	recognized	refugees	are	deleted	(p16).			For	the	set-up	of	the	Central	Unit,	the	Commission	published	a	Restricted	Call	for	Tender	(DG	JAI	A2/2000/A2)	which	resulted	in	a	contract	with	a	tenderer	in	March	2001.	The	call	required	for	the	system	to	be	able	to	handle	7,500	transactions	per	day,	500	transactions	per	hour	with	an	availability	of	99.9%	(COMMISSION	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	COMMUNITIES,	2004).	It	should	also	have	the	capacity	to	store	up	to	800,000	sets	of	fingerprints	per	year.	In	terms	of	
accuracy,	>99.9%	certainty	for	all	returned	submissions	was	a	requirement	with	a	
probability	of	<0.5%	of	missing	a	match	where	a	match	should	happen.	In	order	for	the	activities	of	the	personnel	of	the	Central	Unit	to	be	monitored,	a	Monitoring	
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System,	including	a	logging	system,	was	also	required.	To	prevent	the	system	from	going	down	in	case	of	unavailability	of	the	Central	Unit,	a	Business	Continuity	System	(BCS)	was	set	up.	
4.3.4.	Beginning	of	operation		 On	11	December	2000,	the	final	version	of	the	EURODAC	Regulation	came	into	force.		The	system	itself	began	operation	on	15	January	2003.	Roughly	speaking,	the	period	2000-2013	can	be	generally	described	as	the	“normal	functioning”	period	of	EURODAC,	as	even	though	changes	were	discussed,	a	recast	did	not	take	place	until	2013.	After	the	expansion	of	scope	described	in	the	previous	paragraph,	EURODAC	entries	consist	of	three	categories:	“applicants	for	international	protection”	(Category	1),	persons	“apprehended	in	connection	with	the	irregular	crossing	of	an	external	border”	(Category	2)	and	“people	found	illegally	staying”	in	the	EU	(Category	3).	The	data	of	the	first	category	are	to	be	recorded	and	then	compared	to	the	database	when	an	application	is	being	filled	in	order	to	determine	whether	the	applicant	has	already	filled	another	application	in	a	different	member	state.	The	data	of	category	2	are	stored	for	subsequent	comparison	with	future	asylum	applications,	while	the	category	is	not	stored	but	only	used	for	comparison.	In	its	first	year	of	activities,	from	15	January	2003	to	15	January	2004,	the	Central	Unit	received	271,573	transactions.	As	is	evident,	the	database	started	off	empty,	thus	most	of	these	transactions	were	not	comparisons,	but	constituted	personal	data	being	fed	into	the	system.	246,902	asylum	seekers’	data	were	recorded,	7,857	“illegal”	border	crossers	and	16,814	of	people	found	“illegally”	present	on	Member	States	territory.		 The	number	of	7,857	“illegal”	crossers	was	considered	by	the	Commission	as	very	low	compared	to	the	400,000	yearly	capacity	requested	in	the	original	tender	for	the	system.	However,	at	that	point	there	was	no	other	dataset	against	which	to	compare	those	numbers,	as	this	entire	category	of	data	did	not	exist	as	such	at	an	EU	level	before.	Between	2007	and	2012,	the	size	of	the	database	more	than	doubled	(from	1,086,246	to	2,296,670	entries).	In	a	way,	a	new	
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statistical	category	was	created.	The	launch	of	EURODAC	affected	EU-wide	statistics	with	regards	to	migration	in	(at	least)	one	more	way.	Until	then,	Eurostat,	the	EU’s	statistical	service	provided	statistical	data	based	on	monthly	data	from	the	Ministries	of	Justice	and	of	the	Interior.	These	data	included	asylum	applicants	of	all	ages	(while	EURODAC	did	not	include	people	under	14	years	of	age).	These	data	also	did	not	distinguish	between	first	and	repeat	applications.	Also,	their	form	and	content	depended	on	how	Member	States	accounted	for	dependents	of	asylum	seekers	in	their	data,	and	how	they	accounted	for	repeat	applications.	The	evaluation	of	the	entire	Dublin	system	was	also	now	possible	with	a	new	level	of	accuracy.	It	is	also	plausible	that	there	were	different	interpretations	of	article	8	of	the	Regulation,	which	requests	the	storage	of	fingerprints	of	persons	“in	connection	with	the	irregular	crossing	by	land,	sea	or	air”.	This	eventuality	is	strengthened	by	the	fact	that	the	European	Council	issued	an	information	note	that	entered	in	the	Council	minutes	a	paragraph	declaring	that	the	connection	with	the	irregular	crossing		“is	not	limited	to	the	situation	where	an	alien	is	apprehended	at	or	close	to	the	external	border	itself”,	but	also	covers	cases	where	“there	is	no	doubt	that	he/she	crossed	the	external	border	irregularly”	(Council	of	the	EU,	2000,	p.	2).		 With	EURODAC	in	function,	Member	States	and	the	EU	as	a	whole	could	now	have	a	clearer	view	of	the	secondary	“irregular”	movement	of	migrants	from	country	to	country.	The	detection	of	this	would	now	be	translated	into	digital	“hits”	and	stored	for	future	reference.	The	results	of	the	first	year	showed	some	expected	results,	such	as	“hits”	between	neighboring	countries	(Austria	and	Germany,	Belgium	and	Netherlands,	Norway	and	Sweden),	but	also	not	so	anticipated	connections	such	as	Italy	and	Sweden.		 During	the	second	year	of	operation,	slightly	more	data	were	sent	to	the	Central	Unit	as	288,00	sets	of	fingerprints	were	transmitted	(COMMISSION	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	COMMUNITIES,	2005a).	This	rise	is	attributed	partially	to	the	mid-2004	expansion	of	the	EURODAC	activities	to	ten	new	Member	States	(Aus,	2006).	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	86%	of	the	fingerprints	transmitted	were	sent	by	the	five	principal	asylum	destination	countries,	namely	Germany,	France,	the	UK,	Sweden	and	Austria	(Aus,2006)	(UNHCR,	2005	p.5).	
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	 Aus	(Aus,	2006,	p.	12)	estimates	that	EURODAC	met	the	expectations	on	performance	in	regard	to	detecting	“asylum	shoppers”,	as	the	relevant	“hits”	registered	in	the	Central	Unit	by	the	end	of	2004	were	around	3100.	While	not	its	primary	purpose,	as	expected,	the	launching	of	EURODAC	was	a	source	of	information	not	only	of	qualitative	data	(where	had	a	person	been	registered	before?),	but	also	of	quantitative/statistical	data.	This	kind	of	information	was	not	available	before	on	an	intra-state	level.	For	example,	EURODAC’s	data	on	asylum	applications	at	that	time	were	not	comparable	with	those	produced	by	Eurostat,	which	were	based	on	monthly	statistical	data	returns	from	the	Ministries	of	Justice	and	of	the	Interior.	The	Eurostat	definitions	included	all	asylum	applicants	(of	whatever	age),	with	a	distinction	between	first	and	repeat	applications.	In	practice,	Member	States	differed	in	terms	of	whether	the	dependents	of	asylum	applicants	are	included	in	their	asylum	data.	There	were	also	differences	in	how	repeat	applications	are	accounted	for	in	the	statistics.	
4.3.5.	Regulation	recasts		 The	EURODAC	Regulation	has	been	subjected	to	two	recasts,	one	in	2013,	that	entered	into	force	on	20	July	2015,	and	one	on	May	2016.		 The	most	important	feature	of	the	first	recast	was	that	it	allowed	for	Law	Enforcement	Agencies	to	request	access	to	and	use	the	data	stored	in	the	database,	and	to	compare	them	with	fingerprints	linked	to	criminal	investigations	“for	the	purpose	of	preventing,	detecting	and	investigating	terrorist	and	criminal	offences”.	The	decision	to	open	up	EURODAC	for	forensic	use	and	law	enforcement	is	related	to	multiple	policy	areas,	and	its’	origins	can	be	traced	to	2004.	More	specifically,	it	dates	back	to	the	case	known	as	the	Madrid	train	bombings,	when	three	days	before	the	Spanish	national	elections	in	March	2004,	several	bombs	exploded	in	trains	and	train	stations	in	city’s	commuter	train	system,	leaving	192	people	dead	and	2,000	injured.		 The	attack,	initially	attributed	to	the	Basque	autonomist	organization	ETA,	was	portrayed	by	the	ruling	party	at	that	time,	as	the	European	9/11	(Canel,	2012).	It	was	a	point	of	reference	for	a	series	of	discussions	and	actions	on	behalf	of	the	EU,	to	counter	terrorism	and	strengthen	border	security.	Less	than	three	weeks	after	the	attack,	the	Council	of	the	EU	published	the	
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“Declaration	on	combating	terrorism”,	a	19-page	document	that	called	for	“enhanced	interoperability	between	European	databases	and	for	exploring	the	creation	of	synergies	between	existing	and	future	information	systems	(SIS	II,	VIS	and	EURODAC)	in	order	to	exploit	their	added	value	within	their	respective	legal	and	technical	frameworks	in	the	prevention	and	fight	against	terrorism.”	(Council	of	the	EU,	2004,	p.	8).	Also,	it	called	for	“provisions	to	enable	national	law	enforcements	to	have	access	to	the	EU	systems”.	More	or	less	the	same	was	stated	in	the	2005	Hague	Programme	issued	one	year	later	that	also	called	for	“a	coherent	approach	and	harmonized	solutions	in	the	EU	on	biometric	identifiers	and	data”,	more	specifically,	stating	that	“The	methods	of	exchange	of	information	should	make	full	use	of	new	technology	and	must	be	adapted	to	each	type	of	information,	where	appropriate,	through	reciprocal	access	to	or	interoperability	of	national	databases,	or	direct	(on-line)	access,	including	for	Europol,	to	existing	central	EU	databases	such	as	the	SIS.”	(European	Council,	2005,	p.	8)		Later	the	same	year,	in	November,	the	Commission	of	the	European	Communities	published	its	communication	“on	improved	effectiveness,	enhanced	interoperability	and	synergies	among	European	databases	in	the	area	of	Justice	and	Home	Affairs”.	The	Communication	examines	the	Systems	of	VIS,	SIS	II	and	EURODAC	with	the	stated	purpose	of	highlighting	“how,	beyond	their	present	purposes,	these	systems	can	more	effectively	support	the	policies	linked	to	the	free	movement	of	persons	and	serve	the	objective	of	combating	terrorism	and	serious	crime”	(p2).	This	statement	of	purpose	already	contains	a	political	decision	–	that	of	using	the	aforementioned	systems	beyond	their	“present	purposes”.	The	context	provided	in	the	text	for	this	important	shift	is	the	combatting	of	terrorism	and	improvement	of	internal	security.	The	Communication	seeks	to	identify	shortcomings	in	the	use	of	the	aforementioned	systems,	and	“other	issues	related	to	combating	terrorism	and	crime	are	also	discussed”.	The	shortcomings	identified	differ	and	are	not	limited	to	security	issues.	They	encompass	both	sides	of	the	twofold	function	of	bordering	practices,	and	one	of	them	concerns	“no	benefits	for	frequent	bona	fide	travellers”.		The	second	recast	is	part	of	a	legislative	package	presented	by	the	European	Commission	on	4	May	2016,	aimed	at	the	reform	of	the	Common	European	
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Asylum	Systems	(CEAS),	and	is	still	under	legislative	deliberation,	while	this	thesis	is	being	written.	Again,	EURODAC	is	deemed	to	be	“ideal”	to	do	the	work	it	was	once	not	originally	intended	for,	as	it	is	“limited”	to	identifying	multiple	asylum	applications	(European	Commission,	2016a).	The	proposal	calls	for	the	recording	of	additional	data	such	as	name,	date	of	birth,	and	nationality,	which	is	in	contrast	to	the	“anonymous”	data	of	EURODAC	so	far.	It	argues	that	the	data	should	be	used	for	identifying	migrants	for	return,	which	has	been	argued	by	law	scholars	as	“not	justified	on	the	basis	of	evidence	provided”	(ECRE,	2016a).	Finally,	the	new	proposal	advocates	a	reduction	in	the	age	limit	of	minors	that	can	be	fingerprinted	from	14	years	to	6	years.	
4.4.	Discussion			 The	history	of	EURODAC	presented	here	is	indicative	of	the	conceptualization	that	policy-making	bodies	like	the	European	Commission	work	under	in	the	context	of	debate,	design,	and	use/implementation	of	ICT	systems	in	governance.	As	it	is	argued,	the	course	of	events	“suggests	that	the	evaluation	of	the	technical	feasibility	of	EURODAC	preceded	a	political	assessment	of	the	project’s	desirability	and	appropriateness”	(Aus,	2006,	p.	7).	This	is	not	a	mere	fallacy	concerning	temporal	priorities.	The	technical	capacity	and	availability	of	a	system/project/function	has	an	important	impact	on	the	policymaking,	and	can	override	the	political	debate	and	its	moral,	ethical	and	political	elements.	As	Brouwer	(2008)	has	shown,	both	budgetary	and	technical	issues	are	often	prioritized	and	then	serve	as	the	basis	for	political	and	legal	decisions.	Specifically,	the	triad	of	the	EU’s	border	control	ICT	was	decided	upon	without	“a	fundamental	discussion	of	the	expected	efficiency	of	these	systems,	the	consequences	for	individual	rights,	or	the	balance	between	these	interests”.	This	point	is	significantly	reinforced	by	the	consultant’s	report.	The	latter	reportedly	“shows	no	understanding	of	the	issues	involved	and	has	no	references	or	bibliography”	(Statewatch,	1996,	p.	22).	It	concludes	by	including	in	“Key	Success	Factors”	that	“It	must	be	ensured	that	current	and	future	national	legislation	cannot	stop	the	EURODAC	system	from	operating”	and	that	“the	legal	problems	should	be	solved	quickly,	because	they	could	slow	down	the	whole	process”.	Again,	it	seems	that	(existing)	legislation	is	not	conceptualized	
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as	sets	of	rules	that	regulate	and	limit	a	system’s	function	but	as	potential	obstacles	standing	in	the	way	of	the	implementation	of	a	pre-fixed	political	will.	In	addition,	there	is	a	visible	lack	of	a	definition	for	a	notion	as	critical	and	well	used	as	“illegal	migrant”	in	the	deliberations	around	the	expansion	of	scope	of	1997.	Evidently,	ICT	systems,	conceptualized	as	“administrative	tools”,	have	an	active	role	in	the	shaping	of	new	fundamental	categories	that	conceptually	should	be	given	higher	priority	in	terms	of	their	ontological	role.		
4.5.	Conclusion		 The	Schengen	project	of	abolition	of	border	control	within	the	EU,	while	benefiting	trade,	and	the	mobility	of	bona	fide	citizens,	was	faced	with	the	question	of	dealing	with	non-citizens,	illegal	migrants	and	asylum	seekers,	as	exceptions	to	the	territorial	integration	of	the	EU.	In	the	domain	of	external	borders,	as	discussed	in	chapter	5,	the	EU	has	built	a	firewall	that	by	extending	its	border	to	other	countries,	hardened	irregular	travel	to	its	territory.	For	the	people	who	did	cross	the	border,	the	cornerstone	of	the	strategy	that	was	chosen,	namely	the	Dublin	system,	was	developed	in	a	way	that	saw	said	individuals	as	a	“burden”	for	the	administrative,	social	and	political	apparatus	of	the	Member	States.	A	complex,	dysfunctional	and	time-consuming	bureaucratic	system	was	developed	with	regards	to	distribution	of	the	“burden”,	under	the	conception	of	Member	States’	asylum	systems	as	a	“level	playing	field”(den	Heijer	et	al.,	2016),	while	very		little	was	done	for	the	substantial	“harmonization”	of	said	systems.	The	basis	of	“solidarity	and	trust”	among	Member	States	on	which	the	Dublin	system	is	allegedly	built,	has	been	proven	to	be	a	fallacy,	both	by	the	results	it	has	produced	with	regards	to	distribution	of	the	“burden”,	as	well	as	the	practices	that	Member	States	have	developed	within	it.	 The	Dublin	system	was	reinforced	with	a	large-scale	IT	system	based	on	fingerprint	identification,	namely	EURODAC,	trying	to	provide	a	technical	solution	to	a	political	problem.	By	deciding	to	design	and	use	a	large-scale	biometric	database	for	“asylum	administration”,	the	European	Commission	rendered	the	migrant	body	to	be	both	the	“medium”	of	the	information	that	a	specific	body	has	interacted	with	the	apparatus	of	a	Member	States,	and	the	
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“mediated”,	the	object	of	that	interaction	(Thacker,	2003).	The	use	of	biometrics	for	identification	poses	a	series	of	questions	as	they	challenge	classical	definitions	of	notions	such	as	“privacy”	and	“bodily	integrity”(Van	der	Ploeg,	2003),	and	reconfigure	the	limits	between	the	“body	itself”	and	“information	about	the	body”.	The	inscription	of	the	Dublin	Convention	related	information	to	the	fingertips	of	migrants,	“inscribes	the	border	to	the	body”	(Van	der	Ploeg,	2006),	and	more	specifically	the	threat	of	materialization	of	a	“digital	deportability”	(V.	Tsianos	&	Kuster,	2013).	By	doing	so,	it	inscribes	all	possibilities	of	resistance	to	the	“border”,	again	to	the	body.	Said	possibilities	of	resistance	soon	materialized	as	reports	of	migrants	mutilating	their	fingertips	with	chemicals	emerged.	Technologies	of	biometric	identification turn	to	the	body	as	“a	territory	to	be	mapped,	a	container	for	unknown	motives	and	secrets,	a	canvas	from	which	character	can	be	discerned”	(Amoore	&	Hall,	2009).	In	the	case	of	bordering	practices,	and	as	is	seen	in	the	case	of	EURODAC,	“digital	solutions”	utilizing	biometrics	are	introduced	as	a	solution	that	can	“underscore	the	continued	importance	of	borders”(Epstein,	2007),	as	database	searches	and	comparison	of	biometric	data	produced	are	seen	as	technical	solutions	to	complex	problems	of	governance,	and	power	balances.	A	EURODAC	“hit”	reduces	the	complexity	of	a	migrant’s	travel,	the	many	and	frequent	traumatic	events	that	shape	their	“identity”	into	a	“data	double”,	that	needs	to	fit	into	categories	that	allow	for	a	specific	mode	of	governance.	Some	of	the	next	chapters	of	this	thesis	will	explore	instances	of	precisely	this	complexity,	and	their	silencing	that	is	deemed	necessary	in	order	for	governance	to	prevail.		 	Another	issue	involving	EURODAC	as	a	biometric	database	of	large	size,	centers	on	the	system	attaining	a	political	life	on	its	own.	It	was	soon	seen	as	an	asset	for	other	domains	of	governance,	namely	law	enforcement	and	interoperability	with	other	databases,	which	were	explicitly	mentioned	as	being	outside	its	scope	in	its	early	stages.	The	“function	creep”	of	a	database	initially	designed	exclusively	for	“administration	of	asylum”,	is	enabled	by	viewing	its	data	as	an	asset	that	is	being	wasted	when	its	scope	is	limited,	and	specific	and	selective	conceptualizations	of	notions	like	“interoperability”.	As	seen	in	the	recasts	of	the	EURODAC	Regulations,	EURODAC	has	been	constantly	pushed	
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towards	new	directions	and	expansions	of	its	scope.	I	find	that	the	two	principal	and	most	problematic	instances	of	this	“pushing”	are	the	interoperability	of	EURODAC	with	other	European	databases,	and	the	availability	of	its	data	for	forensic	use.	In	the	Communication	published	by	the	European	Commission	(then	Commission	of	the	European	Communities),	in	2005	“on	improved	effectiveness,	enhanced	interoperability	and	synergies	among	European	databases	in	the	area	of	Justice	and	Home	Affairs”,	interoperability	is	defined	as	the	“ability	of	IT	systems	and	of	the	business	processes	they	support	to	exchange	data	and	to	enable	the	sharing	of	information	and	knowledge”.	It	is	also	mentioned	as	“a	technical	rather	than	a	legal	or	political	concept…disconnected	from	the	question	whether	the	data	exchange	is	legally	or	politically	possible	or	required”	(COMMISSION	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	COMMUNITIES,	2005b).	What	counts	as	technical,	and	what	agency	is	attributed	to	issues	that	are	or	are	not	“technical”,	appears	to	be	a	flexible	discursive	entity	carrying	different	meanings	between	different	utterances.	There	is	a	certain	degree	of	banality	in	this	statement,	as	every	word,	phrase	or	expression	obtains	its	meaning	in	the	context	of	its	utterance.	However,	policy	making	and	legal	language	are	supposed	to	leave	little	margin	for	creative	interpretation	especially	at	an	intra-state	and	international	level.	The	context	under	which	this	discussion	was	made	was	the	aftermath	of	the	train	bombings	in	Madrid	in	2004	(Sciolino,	2004),	and	the	absence	of	interoperability	is	seen	as	a	failure	to	meet	the	obligation	of	maximizing	security.	The	demand	for	securitization	has	the	agency	to	present	the	data,	as	simply	being	there,	and	not	using	them	is	just	short	of	allowing	more	events	like	the	train	attacks	to	happen.		Even	though	the	force	of	this	line	of	argument	has	been	proven	to	be	effective,	it	does	not	proceed	towards	a	head-on	collision	with	the	previous	mindset,	which	sets	the	principle	of	proportionality	high,	and	only	allowed	use	of	the	data	gathered	for	the	initial	purpose.	In	other	words,	though	what	is	suggested	is	a	full-on	transformation	of	migration-related	databases	of	forensic	tools,	this	is	not	stated	directly,	only	under	general	headlines	such	as	improved	effectiveness.	This	is	somewhat	misleading,	as	there	is	a	slightly	ontological	issue	here.	A	database	or	system	is	what	it	does.	An	interoperable	database	is	(or	can	
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be)	something	else.	Interoperability,	made	possible	by	law,	disrespects	the	importance	of	separated	domains	and	cuts	through	their	protective	walls.	Deliberately	or	not,	the	texts	examined	here	do	not	proceed	to	admit	that.	Instead,	they	discuss	interoperability	as	merely	technical,	and	tend	to	focus	on	issues	of	data	protection.	This	focus	“waters	down	safeguards	outside	the	regular	data	protection	framework	that	could	have	been	nevertheless	of	great	significance”(De	Hert	&	Gutwirth,	2006,	p.	34).	As	STS	scholars	point	out,	interoperability	“has	technical,	semantic,	social,	cultural,	economic,	organizational	and	legal	dimensions”	(De	Hert	&	Gutwirth,	2006)(De	Hert	&	Sprokkereef,	2007,	p.	48).	It	has	great	potential	and	agency,	which	needs	to	be	estimated.	What	we	see	instead	is	a	two-fold	fetishization	of	interoperability.	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	black	boxed,	discussed	as	something	almost	natural,	a	spontaneous	“tendency”	of	data	and	databases,	which	obscures	the	controversies	behind	it.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	“approaching	the	status	of	a	general	value	rather	than	a	specific	means	to	an	end”	(Ribes,	2017).	With	regards	to	forensic	use	of	its	data,	one	of	the	first	mentions	of	EURODAC	being	used	solely	for	the	purposes	it	was	originally	designed	for	as	a	“shortcoming”	or	“gap”	dates	back	to	2005.	In	a	Communication	from	the	Commission	of	the	European	Communities	to	the	European	Council	and	the	European	Parliament	it	is	stated	that	“This	is	now	considered	by	the	law	enforcement	community	to	be	a	serious	gap	in	the	identification	of	suspected	perpetrators	of	a	serious	crime”.	This	Communication	is	3	years	after	EURODAC,	and	just	a	few	months	after	the	initial	signing	of	the	Treaty	of	Prum	by	seven	states,	on	27	May	of	the	same	year.	The	same	text,	under	the	section	“Long-term	scenarios	and	further	developments”	(REF)	mentions	the	need	to	create	a	European	criminal	Automated	Fingerprint	Identification	System,	either	centralized	or	de-centralized,	as	well	as	the	establishment	of	an	agency.		The	criminalization	of	migrants	via	the	use	of	EURODAC’s	data	for	forensic	use	has	been	documented	and	criticized	by	many	scholars	(REF)	and	will	not	be	further	elaborated	in	this	thesis.	In	the	role	of	EURODAC	as	an	administrative	tool	for	implementing	a	system	as	contradictory	and	unfair	as	the	Dublin	system,	we	see	the	complexities	of	registration	and	identification.	These	procedures	are	meant	to	function	as	the	
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first	step	towards	entangling	migrant	bodies	in	an	administrative	bureaucratic	system	that	is	based	upon	dubious	declarations	of	trust	among	the	agents	that	enforce	them.	The	migrant	body	is	subject	to	the	border	regime	of	the	EU,	rendered	knowledgeable	and	thus	governable,	under	a	system	that	does	not	prioritize	the	interests	of	the	migrant,	but	instead	is	often	derailed	by	power	struggles	and	conflicting	agendas.	Therefore,	the	use	of	EURODAC	can	be	but	bound	by	the	structural	characteristics	of	the	Dublin	system.	In	the	next	chapters,	I	will	examine	how,	in	the	context	of	the	“migrant	crisis”,	identification	and	registration	of	migrants	in	EURODAC	was	developed	with	new	meanings	and	connotations.	I	will	change	“levels”,	offering	an	ethnographic	account	of	what	this	registration	process	actually	involves.	In	other	words,	I	will	provide	a	testimony	of	the	“black-box”	process	that	comprises	registration	and	identification.																															
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Chapter	5.	Crisis	
5.1.	Introduction		 Many	of	the	events	that	shaped	the	field	where	I	conducted	my	fieldwork,	as	well	as	the	empirical	work	that	did	not	necessarily	concern	the	field	per	se,	came	into	being	under	the	potent	influence	of	the	utterance	or	declaration	of	a	“migrant	crisis”.	The	latter	has	been,	if	not	the	most	occurring,	then	one	of	the	most	occurring	terms	in	international	political	discourse	throughout	the	years	2015	and	2016.	The	term	“crisis”	itself	has	been	widely	used,	most	recently	and	notably	in	the	context	of	the	global	“economic	crisis”	that	started	in	2008.	As	often	happens	with	catchphrases	and	buzzwords	used	in	media	and	political	debates,	both	“crisis”	and	“migrant	crisis”	are	attributed	different	meanings	when	uttered	by	different	actors.	They	are	conceptualized	in	different	ways	by	different	audiences	and	are	in	general	accompanied	by	an	interpretive	flexibility	(Pinch	&	Bijker,	1984)that	allows	them	to	be	utilized	for	the	purposes	of	a	variety	of	different	political	agendas.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	adopt	a	critical	approach	to	the	way	that	the	term	“migrant	crisis”	was	uttered,	conceptualized	and	circulated	in	the	European	media	and	political	debate.	This	will	serve	as	the	basis	for	the	following	chapters,	in	which	I	examine	how	the	“migrant	crisis”	enabled	specific	policy-making	moves	on	behalf	of	European	Member	States	and	legislative	bodies	such	as	the	European	Commission,	also	with	regards	to	registration	of	irregularized	migrants.	
5.1.1.	Tracing	the	paradox	of	“crisis”		 The	etymology	of	the	word	“crisis”	originates	from	the	Greek	“κρίση/κρίνω”,	primarily	translated	as	“judgment/to	judge”,	but	also	to	choose	and	decide	after	measuring	a	situation	and	act	upon	it.	The	term	has	had	a	rich	and	volatile	social	life,	as	it	has	fused	in	many	fields	of	human	activity,	leaving	“virtually	no	area	of	life	that	has	not	been	examined	and	interpreted	through	this	concept”	(Koselleck,	2006).	In	antiquity,	and	more	specifically,	in	Aristotle’s	thought,	“κρίσις”	“defines	the	ordering	of	the	civic	community”	(Koselleck,	2006,	p.	4),	and	it	is	already	here,	that	“crisis”	enters	the	realm	of	political	life,	closely	associated	with	the	cognitive	process	of	judging,	criticizing	and	deciding.	Its	
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journey	from	there	to	the	modern	usage(s)	of	the	word	is	via	the	use	of	crisis	in	the	Old	and	New	Testament,	associated	with	a	promise	of	salvation	for	some,	and	with	the	coming	of	true	justice	through	the	apocalypse.	It	also	appears	in	the	medical	field,	originating	from	Galen’s	work,	where	“crisis	refers	both	to	the	observable	condition	and	to	the	judgment	(judicium)	about	the	course	of	the	illness”	(Koselleck,	2006,	p.	5).	These	two	stems	of	origin	are	critical	for	making	sense	of	the	seemingly	paradoxical	modes	of	existence	of	the	term	in	today.	On	the	one	hand,	each	occurrence	of	crisis	is	perceived	as	historically	unique	(Koselleck,	2006,	p.	370).	On	the	other,	this	uniqueness,	as	well	as	the	temporality	of	crisis,	has	been	challenged	due	to	its	constant	reoccurrence	in	“almost	all	forms	of	narrative	today”,	ending	up	being	“mobilized	as	the	defining	category	of	our	contemporary	situation”	(Roitman,	n.d.)	and	“a	part	of	normality	in	any	segment	of	social	life”	(Koselleck,	2006,	p.	371).	What	unifies	these	two	controversial	accounts	of	crisis	is	a	demand	for	action	that	will	bring	some	sort	of	progress,	if	not	resolution,	no	less	action	that	is	transcendental,	action	after	which,	things	will	not	be	the	same.	In	the	history	of	the	EU,	“crisis	may	not	be	as	exceptional	as	economists	assume”	(Narotzky	&	Besnier,	2014),	as	its	history	can	be	seen	as	a	history	of	successive	“crises”,	from	the	“enlargement	crisis”	of	the	early	2000s,	to	the	“constitutional	crisis”	of	2005,	and	of	course	the	“financial	crisis”	that	began	in	2008	(Idriz,	2017).		Making	things	more	specific,	and	in	order	to	make	sense	of	what	has	been	coined	as	the	“migrant	crisis”,	in	this	chapter,	I	will	follow	Roitman,	who	invites	us	to	put	“less	faith	in	crisis,	which	means	asking	what	is	at	stake	with	crisis	in-and-of-itself”	(Roitman,	n.d.).	With	this	aim,	I	critically	examine	the	main	points	that	constituted	what	has	been	coined	as	the	“EU	migrant	crisis”,	in	a	discussion	that	later,	in	chapters	6	and	8,	will	be	related	to	specific	policy-making	decisions	taken	by	the	EU	and	the	practices	that	they	enabled.	I	will	refer	to	“migrant	crisis”,	rather	than	“refugee	crisis”,	not	only	because	the	debate	surrounding	the	“crisis”	expanded	well	beyond	issues	of	asylum	and	protection,	but	also	because	as	discussed	in	chapter	2,	the	use	of	the	migrant/refugee	dichotomy,	produces	demarcations	of	deservedness	(Holmes	&	CastañEda,	2016).	These	demarcations	fail	to	encapsulate	the	complexities	of	migration	experiences	(Crawley	&	Skleparis,	2017),	and	create	distinctions	between	the	wanted	or	“worthy”	
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refugee	and	the	unwanted,	“irregular”	migrant.	The	use	of	quote	marks	is	in	alignment	with	the	relevant	practice	of	critical	scholars	and	does	not	imply	any	doubt	of	the	existence	of	“crisis”	on	an	ontological	level.	On	the	contrary,	it	indicates	a	critical	approach	to	how	term	has	been	used	and	circulated,	and	the	focus	on	its	discursive,	fabricated	nature	(Rajaram,	2015).	The	material	used	and	discussed	in	this	chapter	are	policy	papers	published	by	the	EU’s	institutions,	reports	from	international	organizations,	media	reports	and	secondary	literature.	
5.2.	“Migrant	crisis”	and	its	utterances				 The	“migrant	crisis”	was	uttered	under	very	diverse	contexts	to	refer	to	situations	developing	in	various	European	countries.	A	large	body	of	academic	work	has	critically	engaged	with	the	“migrant	crisis”	(De	Genova,	2016;	Jeandesboz	&	Pallister-Wilkins,	2016;	Krzyżanowski,	Triandafyllidou,	&	Wodak,	2018;	Spijkerboer,	2016;	Triandafyllidou,	2018),	and	the	present	thesis	aims	to	subscribe	itself	to	this	body	of	work.	The	intensions	and	political	agendas	behind	those	utterances	would	also	significantly	differ,	presenting	the	“crisis”	invested	with	different	meanings,	ethical	and	moral	connotations	and	focal	points.	The	framing	of	what	exactly	has	been	at	crisis	point	during	the	“migrant	crisis”,	in	what	kind	of	crisis,	and	how	it	should	be	framed	is	admittedly	a	complex	task	(Jørgensen	&	Agustín,	2018).	Thus,	the	“migrant	crisis”	can	be	seen	as	an	umbrella	term	that	functioned	as	a	unifying	thread	encompassing	events	and	situations	that	ontologically	belong	to	completely	different	spheres	of	human	existence.	This	is	one	more	reason	why	it	should	be	critically	examined,	and	to	a	certain	extent	deconstructed	–	not	only	with	regard	to	what	constitutes	it	as	“crisis”,	but	also	on	account	of	what	kind	of	policies	it	enabled	and	legitimized.			 Utterances	of	the	“migrant	crisis	initiated	from	the	“humanitarian	crisis”	have	focused	on	the	loss	of	life	in	the	Mediterranean	and	the	suffering	of	migrants	in	various	borderland	and	makeshift	or	state-sanctioned	camps.	From	then	on,	different	narrations	emerged.	The	“crisis	of	the	EU”,	focused	on	the	political	conflict	among	Member	States	concerning	political	discourses,	measures	and	policies	adopted	in	the	face	of	the	populations	on	the	move.	The	“crisis	of	Dublin”	and	the	“Schengen	crisis”	would	conceptualize	these	populations	as	a	
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threat	to	the	functioning	of	the	border	regime	of	the	EU,	which	temporarily	collapsed	under	the	pressure	and	the	determination	of	the	migrants	on	the	move.	A	“security	crisis”	would	emerge	after	events	such	as	the	attacks	in	Paris	in	November	2015,	directly	implying	connections	between	the	migration	phenomenon	and	said	attacks,	and	portraying	the	migrant	populations	as	“potential	terrorists”.	Finally,	a	“crisis	of	European	values”	would	suggest	a	decline	of	moral	values	embedded	in	“European	identity”,	such	as	solidarity,	freedom	and	hospitality.	As	I	will	argue	in	chapters	6	and	8,	the	EU	maintained	a	selective	focus	on	constructing	a	narration	of	crisis,	and	subsequently	legislating	in	accordance	with	this.	In	the	sections	that	follow,	I	further	contextualize	and	discuss	this	narration.	
5.3.	Crisis	and	non-crisis			 The	entirety	of	the	“crisis”	discourse	is	traversed	by	a	presupposition	of	somewhat	ontological	nature.	Every	utterance	of	“crisis”	“entails	a	reference	to	a	norm,	in	that	it	requires	a	comparative	state	for	judgement.	Put	simply,	whenever	one	talks	of	“crisis”,	one	has	to	answer	the	seemingly	banal	question	asking	“crisis	compared	to	what?”	(Roitman,	2014).	“Crisis”	only	acquires	meaning	in	reference	and	in	juxtaposition	to	a	state	of	affairs	that	is	considered	normal,	or	at	least	non-critical.	Identifying	this	“normal”	state	of	things,	in	reality	shaped	by	the	EU	border,	migration	and	asylum	policies	is	complicated	due	to	two	main	points.	The	first	point	is	that	on	behalf	of	institutional	and	state	narratives,	there	is	no	history	of	scarcity	when	it	comes	to	declaring	a	situation	to	be	a	“crisis”.	The	arrival	of	a	few	thousand	Kurds	in	Italy	in	the	90s	was	perceived	as	one,	as	is	discussed	in	chapter	4,	and	it	initiated	conflict	among	Member	States.	When	ethnic	conflicts	broke	out	in	former	Yugoslavia,	out	of	almost	2	million	displaced	persons,	more	than	half	a	million	refugees	made	their	way	to	European	countries	in	1992	according	to	UNHCR	(Meznaric	&	Winter,	1993).	This	prompted	a	very	similar	debate	to	the	one	developed	in	the	previous	“migrant	crisis”	concerning	distribution	of	the	“burden”	of	migrants	(Travis,	Ward,	&	Traynor,	1999).	Numerous	crackdowns	and	emergencies	on	the	Italian	island	of	Lampedusa	in	2004,	in	various	parts	of	the	Spanish	territory	in	2005-6,	at	the	land	borders	
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between	Greece	and	Turkey	in	the	early	2010s,	and	then	again	close	to	Lambedusa	during	2011	(Andersson,	2016),	were	all	accompanied	by	proclamations	of	“border	crises”,	even	if	they	did	not	acquire	the	dominant	character	of	the	“migrant	crisis”.		These	proclamations	often	focused	on	the	impact	that	“irregular	migration”	has	on	the	border	and	migration	apparatus	of	the	EU,	rather	than	the	suffering	of	the	migrants	themselves.	Overall,	it	can	be	said	that	state	and	institutional	accounts	of	“crisis”	in	the	border	and	migration	context	of	the	EU	are	often	inflated,	and	their	circulation	in	the	political	debate	does	not	necessarily	correspond	with	the	intensity	of	the	“migration	flows”	or	other	quantifiable	variables,	but	acquires	a	political	existence	of	its	own.	This	political	life	focuses	on	issues	of	administration,	conflicts	of	interests	and	agendas	among	Member	States,	and	often	supports	a	xenophobic	discourse,	seeing	“irregular”	migration	as	a	burden	and	security	threat.		The	second	point	takes	us	in	the	opposite	direction.	While	“crisis”	is	declared	with	relative	ease,	the	status	quo	surrounding	illegalized	migration,	“normalizes”	situations	that	include	heavily	exploited	“black”	labor,	repeated	arbitrary	and	violent	practices	of	border	guards,	and	a	consistent	death	toll	at	the	external	borders	of	Europe.	Before	the	death	toll	peaked	in	2015,	independent	researchers	recorded	thousands	of	deaths	related	to	the	European	borders.	Estimations	from	the	project	“The	Migrant	Files”	count	30,000	deaths	since	the	year	2000	(themigrantfiles.com,	n.d.).	The	Calais	area	of	France	has	remained	in	constant	tension	since	1999	(Reinisch,	2015).	The	land	border	between	Greece	and	Turkey	has	claimed	migrant	lives,	and	migrants	have	been	left	crippled	from	landmines	in	the	early	2010s.	Between	1990	and	2013,	the	bodies	of	3,188	people	were	found	who	had	lost	their	lives	at	sea	and	at	the	land	borders	of	the	Mediterranean,	Adriatic	and	Aegean	(Last	et	al.,	2017).	This	estimation	is	based	on	evidence	provided	by	the	state.	An	estimated	22,000	individuals	were	classed	as	missing	persons	between	2000	and	2013(IOM,	Brian,	&	Laczko,	2014).	Illegalized	labor	of	migrants,	with	its	characteristic	precarity	(Lewis,	Dwyer,	Hodkinson,	&	Waite,	2015),	low	wages	and	often	non-existent	insurance	expenses	for	the	employers	have	been	valuable	assets	for	the	economies	of	many	European	states.	
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	While	all	of	the	above	arguably	vary	in	scale	compared	to	the	events	of	2015,	they	appear	to	form	a	resilient	situation	that	has	come	to	be	considered	the	norm	for	European	political	life.	The	border	and	illegalized	migration	regime	of	the	EU	has	thus	been	argued	to	be	in	a	constant	state	of	tension,	if	not	a	normalized	“crisis”	(De	Genova	et	al.,	2016).	This	reality	has	been	an	integral	part	of	the	normal	function	of	the	EU’s	border	regime,	naturalized	in	its	repetition,	and	reified	as	a	“border	spectacle”	(De	Genova,	2013).	It	is	thus	clear	that	the	definition	of	a	point	in	time	when	the	“migrant	crisis”	came	into	existence	as	a	persuasive	and	functional	narrative	can	only	be	seen	through	the	lens	of	a	“focus	event”,	that	“simply	cannot	be	ignored”	(Baumgartner	&	Jones,	1993),	and	that	can	disrupt	the	stability	of	the	status	quo.		Scholars	(Jørgensen	&	Agustín,	2018;	Mezzadra	&	Bojadžijev,	2015)	point	out	such	events	as	constitutive	moments	when	the	“migrant	crisis”	was	reified	in	the	European	media	debate.	The	first	is	the	capsizing	of	a	boat	transporting	over	800	migrants	from	Tripoli	(Libya)	to	Italy	that	resulted	in	the	death	of	almost	all	its	passengers	on	19	April	2015.	The	second	is	the	publishing	of	the	photo	of	the	dead	body	of	a	toddler	later	identified	as	a	Syrian	Kurdish	child,	Alan	Kurdi,	on	Bodrum	beach	in	Turkey	on	3	September	2015,	which	initiated	the	“humanitarian	emergency”	discourse.	Over	the	days	that	followed,	images	of	thousands	of	migrants	marching	from	Budapest	to	Vienna	circulated	in	European	media	and	“foregrounded	a	subjective	composition	of	the	movements	of	migrants	and	refugees	characterized	by	agency	and	obstinacy,	by	an	ability	to	articulate	their	demands	in	an	explicitly	political	way.”	(Mezzadra	&	Bojadžijev,	2015).	This	collective	march	of	migrants	was	seen	as	an	act	of	“debordering”	establishing	the	“migrant	crisis”,	as	a	“border	crisis”,	just	weeks	after	the	temporary	annulation	of	the	Dublin	system	on	behalf	of	the	German	state	(Kingsley	&	Oltermann,	2016).		
5.4.	The	unexpected	size	of	“flows”	and	unprecedented	loss	of	life		 Present	throughout	all	the	above	utterances	of	“migrant	crisis”	is	an	undertone	that	constantly	stresses	the	unexpected	size	of	the	“migration	flows”,	as	a	decisive	factor	for	the	loss	of	life,	the	inefficiency	of	the	reception	infrastructure	of	the	European	states,	and	the	general	suffering	of	the	
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populations	on	the	move.	Both	the	unexpected	character	of	the	size	of	the	population	on	the	move,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	the	direct	correlation	of	said	size	with	the	failure	of	the	reception	system,	should	not	be	taken	for	granted.	The	conflicts	in	Syria,	Afghanistan,	Somalia	and	Eritrea	and	the	subsequent	massive	exodus	of	populations	were	well	known	to	European	policy	makers	since	they	began	(Cockburn,	2015).	So	was	the	fact	that	none	were	bound	to	end	anytime	soon	and	that	neighboring	countries	in	conflict	zones	were	already	hosting	large	refugee	populations	and	were	not	capable	of	providing	long-term	perspectives	for	them.	In	addition,	migration	scholars	have	foreseen	the	intensification	of	migration	phenomena	in	the	area	of	the	Mediterranean	stemming	from	other,	not	necessarily	conflict-related	factors	such	as	poverty	conditions	and	population	growth	(Castles,	Haas,	&	Miller,	2013).	At	an	EU	institutional	level,	warnings	of	“greatest	refugee	crisis	since	the	Second	World	War”	were	already	present	and	voiced	not	only	by	humanitarian	actors	like	the	Refugee	Council	(BBC,	2014)	but	also	by	FRONTEX	itself.		As	early	as	in	2013,	FRONTEX’s	annual	risk	analysis	mentions	an	increase	in	crossings	of	the	Aegean	by	912%	(FRONTEX,	2013).	In	the	quarterly	risk	analysis	report	on	the	period	between	October	and	December	2014,	published	in	April	2015,	FRONTEX	notes	an	increase	of	160%	in	detections	at	external	borders	“compared	to	the	same	period	in	2013”,	making	the	winter	quarter	of	2014	“the	highest	out	of	all	fourth	quarters	since	FRAN	data	collection	began	in	2007”	(FRONTEX,	2015a).		The	quarterly	report	on	the	second	quarter	of	2015	reports	a	690%	rise	in	crossings	from	Turkey	to	Greece	and	Bulgaria.	The	discourse	surrounding	the	“unexpected”	does	not	hold	under	the	light	of	so	many	warnings	coming	from	so	many	different	actors.	Nevertheless,	I	find	Sassen’s	statement	that	“if	anything,	the	surprise	should	have	been	that	the	surge	in	refugees	did	not	happen	sooner”	(Sassen,	2016)	to	be	accurate.	I	would	stress	even	further	that	not	only	was	it	within	the	EU’s	grasp	to	have	a	better	estimation	of	the	upcoming	events,	but	also	to	be	more	reflective	regarding	the	role	that	its	policies	have	played	in	bringing	them	about.	The	debate	surrounding	the	size	of	the	“flows”	coming	across	the	Aegean	Sea	needs	to	be	examined	also	in	accordance	with	the	policy	choices	that	have	rendered	it	the	only	option	for	asylum	seekers	wishing	to	approach	Europe.	The	
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land	border	between	Turkey	and	Greece,	a	few	hundred	kilometers	to	the	north,	had	been	sealed	since	2012,	after	it	had	claimed	the	lives	and	bodily	integrities	of	many	migrant	bodies.	The	visa	and	carrier	sanctions,	part	of	the	Schengen	agreement	in	practice,	targeted	asylum	seekers	not	allowing	them	to	approach	Europe	in	any	other	way	than	through	smuggling	networks	(Guiraudon,	2018).	This	occurred	since	the	Regulation	of	2001,	539/2001,	later	replaced	by	Regulation	2018/1806,	dictated	the	countries	whose	nationals	would	be	obliged	to	have	a	visa	in	order	to	enter	the	EU.	Unsurprisingly,	most	countries	of	origin	of	asylum	seekers	are	included	on	the	list,	thus	leaving	them	with	no	legal	possibility	of	entering	the	EU.	Thus,	the	EU’s	action	plans	against	smugglers	(which	will	be	discussed	later),	and	the	callout	on	an	ethical	level	seem	to	be	an	inversion.	Instead,	visa	and	carrier	sanctions,	from	the	perspective	of	the	dependence	of	migrants	to	smugglers	they	have	created,	are	a	basic	element	of	a	border	regime	that	enables	a	migration	management	that	has	loss	of	migrant	life	so	incorporated	in	its	function	that	it	has	rightfully	been	described	as	Necropolitics	(Achille	Mbembe,	2008)	Focusing	on	the	Mediterranean,	once	again,	political	decisions	have	shaped	the	structure	of	the	EU’s	border	regime	that	can	be	seen	in	direct	causal	relationship	with	the	loss	of	life	at	sea.	As	scholars	and	organizations	have	shown,	funding	allocation	has	been	severely	focused	on	border	security	and	deportations	rather	than	reception	and	rescue,	at	least	since	2000	(Andersson,	2016)	(Amnesty	International,	2014).	The	case	of	Mare	Nostrum	is	telling,	as	it	was	developed	in	Italy	and	at	its	sea	borders	with	Libya.	Mare	Nostrum	was	an	operational	program	initiated	by	the	Italian	government	in	the	aftermath	of	two	huge	shipwrecks	close	to	the	island	of	Lampedusa	that	claimed	the	lives	of	more	than	600	migrants	during	the	fall	of	2013.	The	shipwrecks	were	an	unprecedented	tragedy	at	the	time	and	were	widely	covered	by	European	media.		Operation	Mare	Nostrum	lasted	for	about	a	year,	and	was	applauded	by	migrant	support	groups	on	the	grounds	of	saving	more	than	150,000	people	(ECRE,	2014).	After	a	year,	the	Italian	state	reached	out	to	the	EU	for	the	continuation	of	the	operation,	under	a	rationale	of	sharing	the	economic	burden	of	search	and	rescue,	which	reportedly	reached	9	million	euros	per	month,	ultimately	totaling	114	million	euros	for	the	year	2014,	to	which	the	EU	
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contributed	1.8	million	(Capasso,	2015).	The	EU	decided	to	replace	Mare	Nostrum	with	Triton,	coordinated	by	FRONTEX.		Mare	Nostrum	focused	on	search	and	rescue,	and	included	“sea	and	air	capabilities	deployed	in	the	Italian,	Maltese	and	Libyan	‘Search	and	Rescue’	(SAR)	zones,	under	the	authority	of	the	Italian	Navy”(European	Political	Strategy	Center,	2017).	Triton	on	the	other	hand,	concerned	exclusively	Italy’s	waters	and	was	much	more	focused	on	“sea	border	protection”.	The	then	Deputy	Prime	Minister	and	Minister	of	the	Interior,	Angelino	Afano	stated	“At	30	(nautical)	miles	from	the	Italian	coast,	Europe	ends.	We'll	be	there	up	to	that	point”	(Ide,	2014)	in	a	very	interesting	and	selective	spatial	definition	of	Europe.	The	rationale,	under	which	Mare	Nostrum	was	discontinued,	is	summed	up	in	the	UK	Minister	of	State,	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office,	Baroness	Anelay	of	St	Johns,	who	when	asked	about	the	subject	replied,	“We	do	not	support	planned	search	and	rescue	operations	in	the	Mediterranean.	We	believe	that	they	create	an	unintended	‘pull	factor’,	encouraging	more	migrants	to	attempt	the	dangerous	sea	crossing	and	thereby	leading	to	more	tragic	and	unnecessary	deaths”	(Euractiv	&	Reuters,	2014).	The	story	of	Mare	Nostrum,	which	was	“a	technical	success,	but	a	political	failure”	(Pastore,	2017)	indicates	that	the	EU	took	crucial	decisions	that	shaped	the	landscape	of	the	Mediterranean,	as	the	choice	of	letting	people	die	at	sea	prevailed	in	the	face	of	the	perspective	of	an	increase	in	the	“irregular”	migrant	population.		At	this	point,	it	should	be	mentioned	that	a	“linear	border	narrative”	(Tazzioli,	2016a)	juxtaposing	rescue	with	border	control	and	push	backs	has	been	rightfully	argued	to	fail	to	encapsulate	the	greater	image	of	migrants’	subjectivities	that	are	produced	through	the	EU’s	border	regime,	part	of	which	are	the	rescue	operations.	Such	a	narrative	depicts	“the	channeling	and	containment	of	migrant’s	movement	appears	as	the	only	way	to	make	migrants	safe”(Tazzioli,	2016a).	It	also	overlooks	the	fact	that	humanitarian	responses	are	increasingly	integrated	within	the	framework	of	border	security	(Andersson,	2016)(Aas	&	Gundhus,	2015)	and	often	serves	as	a	pretext	for	further	militarization	of	the	bordering	processes	(De	Genova,	2016).The	present	thesis	is	by	all	means	subscribed	to	discussing	precisely	this	channeling	and	the	process	of	subjectification	that	are	integral	parts	of	it.	However,	in	the	present	chapter,	
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even	this	linear	narrative	helps	to	emphasize	the	fact	that	the	EU	has	both	in	the	longer	run,	but	also	during	the	“crisis”	chosen	to	focus	on	deterring	irregular	migration,	at	the	expense	of	rescue	at	sea.	This	situation	escalated	in	2018,	with	the	penalization	of	rescue	by	volunteer	groups.	This	reality	is	often	obscured	by	narratives	of	the	“migrant	crisis”	as	a	more	or	less	natural	result	of	the	“size	of	the	flows”.	Moreover,	as	a	factor	that	could	not	be	foreseen,	even	if	humanitarian	groups	have	been	warning	about	it	since	2014.	This	is	not	unusual	for	crises,	as	the	latter	tend	to	be	“presented	as	an	unpredictable	surprise	demanding	an	immediate	response”	(Calhoun	2014:	31).	
5.4.1.	Numbers	of	“crisis”	and	their	politics			 Apart	from	being	unprecedented,	the	migration	“flows”	were	perceived	and	discussed	as	“saturating”	and	exceeding	the	capacities	of	the	EU’s	reception	apparatus,	due	to	their	mere	size.	This	“quantification”	of	migration	talks	in	the	language	of	migrants	and	asylum	seekers	as	a	“burden”	for	“host”	countries,	administratively,	economically	and	most	important,	politically.	This	has	been	presented	as	the	basis	on	which	the	Dublin	system	was	constructed,	see	chapter	4	of	this	thesis.	It	also	supports	the	discourse	of	“invasion”	(Forthomme,	2018),	as	well	as	the	existential	threat	(Fiuza,	2017)	(Ries	&	Culbertson,	2018)	that	the	sizes	of	the	populations	on	the	move	pose	towards	the	EU.	Finally,	it	is	an	integral	element	of	a	narrative	that	presents	Europe	as	unable	to	deal	with	the	incoming	populations	in	terms	of	resources	(Bennett	et	al.,	2015).	A	similar	discourse	is	present	in	the	debate	surrounding	legal	and	illegal	migrations	outside	the	asylum	context.	In	this	context,	the	limited	resources	that	the	EU	has	available	for	receiving	migrants	is	used	as	a	pretext	for	selective	criteria	that	exclude	unskilled	or	surplus	work	force	(Jørgensen,	2010).	Numbers	of	migrant	populations	themselves	are	not	in	themselves	“crisis”	factors.	They	only	become	such	under	specific	circumstances	and	framings	of	migration	(Yilmaz,	2016)	(Lucassen,	2018).	A	change	of	perspective,	widening	the	scope	beyond	the	narrow	lens	of	this	methodological	Eurocentrism	under	which	much	of	this	debate	is	carried	out,	has	been	proposed	and	offered	by	critical	scholars	(De	Genova	et	al.,	2016).	A	first	step	is	to	examine	the	realities	of	other	countries	outside	the	EU.	However,	
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past	situations	within	Europe	should	be	reviewed	as	well	as	some	comments	regarding	the	“numbers”	themselves.	In	terms	of	the	latter,	both	statistical	figures	and	absolute	numbers,	more	often	than	not,	are	communicative	actions	of	quantification	and	facilitate	the	perception	of	an	incomprehensible	and	overwhelming	number	of	migrants	saturating	the	EU’s	reception	and	asylum	systems	and	exceeding	their	capacities.	Often,	public	utterances	on	this	debate	do	not	even	bother	to	engage	with	specific	numbers,	and	instead	resort	to	vague	rhetoric.	This	is	reflected	by	statements	like	those	made	by	the	Prime	Minister	of	the	Netherlands,	who	stated	that	“We	cannot	cope	with	the	numbers	any	longer,”	(Byrne	&	Rachman,	2016).	Media	coverage	and	political	debate	also	reproduce	a	similar	discourse	(Deutsche	Welle,	2015a)	that	also	refers	to	populations	on	the	move	and	their	size,	using	terms	that	carry	connotations	of	natural	phenomena,	such	as	“swarm”	(BBC,	2015)	and	“system	collapse”	(Sager	&	Öberg,	2017).	The	ways	in	which	numbers	articulated	in	this	discourse	can	be	misleading	are	numerous	and	often	involve	basic	misconceptions.	Misconceptions	such	as	what	it	means	to	be	registered	in	a	database	of	persons	that	have	expressed	interest	in	applying	for	asylum	and	actually	being	a	registered	asylum	seeker,	as	was	the	case	with	the	German	system.	Or	even	the	definition	of	migration	itself	(Singleton,	2016).	A	more	telling	example	of	the	fragility	of	numbers	was	captured	by	Nando	Sigona,	a	researcher	from	the	University	of	Birmingham,	who	on	a	Twitter	exchange,	confronted	FRONTEX	regarding	one	of	their	reports,	which	stated	that	710,000	migrants	had	crossed	EU’s	external	borders	from	January	to	September	2015	(Frenzen,	2015).		Ultimately,	there	was	a	case	of	double	counting	at	play.	Migrants	who	would	cross	into	the	EU	through	Greece,	and	then	make	their	way	up	north	through	Northern	Macedonia	and	the	Balkans	would	then	re-enter	the	EU	in	Croatia	or	Hungary,	only	to	be	re-counted.	This	double	counting,	partially	enabled	by	an	unclear	working	definition	both	of	the	“EU	external	border”,	but	also	even	of	the	notion	of	“crossing”	in	itself,	was	casually	acknowledged	by	FRONTEX	in	the	form	of	a	disclaimer	(which	at	the	moment	of	writing	this	text	was	not	available	on	their	website).	This	disclaimer	attributed	the	error	to	the	
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fact	that	FRONTEX	produced	the	report	based	on	data	submitted	by	Member	States	authorities.		It	is	worth	noting	that	this	was	by	no	means	a	one-off	error.	In	fact,	it	seems	that	it	is	not	even	regarded	as	an	error	on	FRONTEX’s	account,	but	more	of	an	immanent	feature	of	their	data.	In	a	press	statement	on	14	September	the	same	year,	again	regarding	migrants	detected	at	the	EU’s	external	borders,	we	read:	“a	large	number	of	the	persons	detected	at	the	Hungarian	border	with	Serbia	had	already	been	counted	when	they	arrived	in	Greece	from	Turkey	a	few	weeks	earlier.”	(FRONTEX,	2015b).	Such	disclaimers,	however,	do	very	little	for	the	“political	life”	of	the	numbers	presented.	The	latter	are	circulated	in	public	discourse,	with	little	if	any	reservation,	by	top	level	institutions,	such	as	the	European	Commission	(European	Commission,	2015h).	This	“politics	of	numbers”	(De	Genova	et	al.,	2016),	both	reinforces	the	discourse	of	invasion	and	the	viewing	of	migrants	as	a	burden.	To	a	large	extent	the	concept	functions	as	the	seemingly	subjective	foundation	for	the	production	and	reproduction	of	the	
crisis	discourse.		Beyond	the	issue	of	validity	of	FRONTEX	or	other	actors’	head	counts,	we	need	to	study	the	discourse	of	a	Europe	“overwhelmed”	by	the	size	of	the	incoming	populations	in	relation	to	the	reality	of	other	countries.	A	widening	of	the	scope,	and	a	narration	built	upon	it,	would	not	for	example,	turn	a	blind	eye	to	the	fact	that	the	amount	of	people	that	have	migrated	“irregularly”	to	the	EU,	even	in	the	periods	of	“extraordinary	flows”,	are	dwarfed	by	those	migrating	to	and	residing	in	other	places,	sometimes	even	single	countries.	Looking	at	Syrian	refugee	populations	for	example,	we	see	at	the	end	of	2016	there	were	2.86	million	in	Turkey	(which	rose	to	four	by	the	end	of	2018),	one	million	in	Lebanon,	685,200	in	Iraq	and	213,900	in	Egypt	(UNHCR,	2017).	These	are	official	numbers	of	refugees	registered	with	the	UNHCR	and	should	be	taken	as	significantly	lower	figures	than	the	actual	populations.	Similarly,	they	concern	only	Syrians,	so	it	should	be	considered	that	previous	migrant	and	refugee	populations	were	already	present,	as	is	the	case	of	Lebanon	hosting	approximately	300,000	Iraqis	and	Palestinians.		During	the	same	period,	European	media	would	monotonously	repeat,	almost	daily,	how	the	influx	of	1.5	million	migrants	into	European	territory	was	
		 92	
threatening	European	administrative	order	and	sinking	the	continent	into	“chaos”.	Switching	from	absolute	numbers	to	a	percentage	of	migrants	compared	to	“local”	populations,	the	differences	are	even	more	telling.	Lebanon’s	population	is	6	million,	which	means	that	one	out	of	every	6	people	living	there	are	refugees,	which	corresponds	to	about	16%.	The	corresponding	percentage	for	EU	member	states,	with	approximately	512	million	inhabitants	is,	of	course,	not	even	close.	On	the	face	of	these	numbers,	one	can	but	wonder	why	there	is	very	little	(if	any)	discussion	on	e.g.	the	“refugee	crisis”	in	Lebanon,	at	least	in	the	public	and	media	discourse,	as	in	other	contexts,	of	course,	that	is	not	the	case	(Cherri,	Arcos	González,	&	Castro	Delgado,	2016).		Instead	of	viewing	infrastructures	and	policies	as	“naturalized”	phenomena	that	can	be	“saturated”,	we	should	acknowledge	the	fact	that	the	utterance	of	“migrant	crisis”	happens	and	gains	its	importance	and	agency	with	a	Eurocentric	perspective.	In	addition,	it	should	be	stressed	that	the	emphasis	on	numbers	often	serves	as	a	naturalizing	communicative	act	that	obscures	the	role	of	policy	making	in	the	emergence	of	“crisis”.	Many	(if	not	all)	of	the	images	circulated	in	media	that	were	the	visual	confirmation	of	“crisis”,	such	as	images	of	crowds	of	migrants	stranded	in	fields	in	front	of	wire	fences,	shipwrecks	etc.	are	a	direct	outcome	of	legal	and	political	thresholds	that	the	EU	and	European	states	set	for	themselves,	and	have	relatively	little	to	do	with	the	mere	existence	of	said	crowds.	As	Trilling	puts	it	“The	problem	is	one	of	resources	and	policy,	not	overwhelming	numbers”	(Trilling,	2018).	The	central	role	that	numbers	and	statistics	are	given	in	the	public	and	political	debate	surrounding	migration	obscures	the	banal,	but	often	underplayed	fact	that	policy	making	is	often	presented	as	a	scientific	method	that	is	led	by	evidence.	In	fact,	it	is	“neither	objective	not	neutral;	it	is	an	inherently	political	process”	(Sutcliffe	&	Court,	2015),	which	is	also	highly	“context-dependent”	(Baldwin-Edwards,	Blitz,	&	Crawley,	2018).		
5.5.	Crisis	of	control			 Throughout	the	summer	of	2015,	hundreds	of	thousands	of	migrants	passed	through	the	Greek	islands.	Every	stage	of	reception	of	migrants	on	behalf	of	the	Greek	state	was	not	unproblematic.	Migrants	had	to	walk	from	the	beaches	
		 93	
where	their	boats	landed	to	the	cities	on	the	islands.	Depending	on	the	island,	they	would	stay	in	overcrowded	camps,	in	tents	at	harbors,	in	abandoned	buildings	and	other	cramped	public	spaces,	while	waiting	to	be	registered	by	the	authorities	(Συνήγορος	του	Πολίτη,	2015).	The	registration	functioned	as	a	bottleneck,	as	the	Police	authorities	could	not	keep	pace,	often	taking	fingerprints	using	ink	and	paper.	In	cases	where	fingerprint	scanners	were	present,	insufficient	internet	access	meant	the	data	were	only	stored	in	the	national	databases	and	not	transmitted	to	the	EURODAC	database	(	Σουλιώτης,	2016).		As	a	result,	many	migrants	again	resorted	to	a	form	of	smuggling,	and	moved	irregularly	towards	the	mainland	(Σουλιώτης,	2015).	It	is	hard	to	estimate	the	numbers	of	migrants	who	left	the	islands	unregistered.	A	draft	report	by	the	Schengen	Evaluation	mechanism,	based	on	unannounced	site	visits	to	the	land	and	island	borders	between	Greece	and	Turkey,	remained	unpublished,	however	it	noted	“‘serious	deficiencies’	in	the	carrying	out	of	external	border	control	by	Greece”	(Council	of	the	European	Union,	2017).	Roughly	speaking,	after	the	summer	of	2015,	the	media	coverage	and	the	political	debate	had	shifted	from	the	sea	crossings	to	the	“secondary	movement”	of	migrants	along	the	West	Balkan	route	towards	states	such	as	Austria,	the	Netherlands,	Germany	and	Scandinavian	countries	(Collett	&	Coz,	2018).	“Secondary	movement”	is	used	as	a	term	referring	to	“irregular”	mobility	of	migrants	within	the	EU,	and	has	been	consistently	seen	as	a	problem	for	the	European	states	during	recent	decades.	The	unorganized,	yet	very	dynamic	manner	in	which	thousands	of	migrants	made	their	way	through	the	Balkans	during	2015	and	2016,	was	indeed	unforeseen.	The	size	and	determination	of	the	groups	of	migrants	brought	many	local	authorities	to	the	point	of	organizing	transport	in	an	effort	to	facilitate	the	movement.	When	this	was	not	the	case,	migrants	would	literally	march	for	kilometers	along	motorways	and	train	tracks.	These	populations	on	the	move	formed	a	temporarily	ungovernable	body,	not	prone	to	any	kind	of	bureaucratic	registration	or	administration.	Testimonies	from	German	border	guards	reveal	that	the	German	registration	system	was	also	unable	to	cope	(Deutsche	Welle,	2015a).	
		 94	
	 This	techno-political	breakdown	of	the	registration	system	for	incoming	migrants	fueled	the	xenophobic	discussion	surrounding	the	“invaders”	(AFP,	2015b;	A.	Taylor,	2015b)	of	Europe	with	the	element	of	the	unknown	which	associated	the	migrant	populations	with	terror	attacks	and	an	“extraordinary	threat”	(Crone,	Falkentoft,	Tammikko,	&	Danish	Institute	for	International	Studies,	2017).	The	breakdown	also	challenged	values	of	order	and	the	reign	of	law,	which	are	perceived	to	be	the	core	of	being	European.	In	chapter	6,	I	elaborate	on	this	issue	in	relation	to	the	Hotspot	approach.	
5.6.	Smuggling	networks	and	humanitarianism			 Throughout	the	“migrant	crisis”,	the	Mediterranean	has	been	presented	as	“a	space	of	humanitarian	intervention,	a	space	of	life	and	death”	(Perkowski,	2016).	I	have	already	referred	to	the	circulation	of	the	photos	of	the	body	of	Alan	Kurdi	and	their	importance	concerning	the	media	debate.	The	focus	on	violent	deaths	of	migrants,	the	suffering	of	crowds	cramped	or	facing	wire	fences,	and	the	lack	of	basic	provisions	in	migrant	camps	have	been	constitutive	elements	of	the	“migrant	crisis”.	A	good	deal	of	the	discussion	around	the	perilous	sea	travel	evolved	around	the	role	and	modus	operandi	of	“organized	criminal	smuggling	networks”	and	the	reportedly	unsafe	means	of	transport	that	they	used.		The	European	Agenda	on	Migration	(European	Commission,	2015b),	published	on	May	2015,	identified	the	fight	against	migrant	smuggling	as	a	priority.	This	prioritization	was	maintained	in	a	series	of	subsequent	policy	papers	(European	Commission,	2015d)	in	which	smuggling	is	discussed	as	one	of	the	root	causes	of	irregular	migration,	and	a	primary	cause	of	loss	of	human	lives	(European	Commission,	2015e).	Media	reports	and	policy	papers	alike	were	written	and	circulated	under	the	unproblematized	presupposition	of	the	existence	of	highly	organized,	criminal	(in	a	ruthless,	anti-social	sense)	smuggling	networks.	The	existence	of	such	centralized	and	highly	organized	networks	has	been	questioned	by	scholars	and	their	field	work	(Achilli,	2015)(Pastore,	Monzini,	&	Sciortino,	2006).	Apart	from	the	depiction	as	evil	smuggling	networks,	the	sea	itself	would	be	depicted	as	an	agent	that	would	claim	migrant	lives.	It	was	as	if	the	interaction	between	migrant	bodies,	said	dinghies	and	the	water	element	would	happen	in	some	sort	of	political	void,	even	
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to	the	extent	of	attributing	properties	to	the	water	element,	such	as	“treacherous”	(Deutsche	Welle,	2015b)”.		This	overbid	of	the	role	of	migrant	smuggling	networks	prompted	the	role	of	long-term	policies	of	the	EU	in	the	shaping	of	the	situation,	thus	liberating	Member	states	from	their	historical	responsibilities.	It	also	produced	and	reinforced	the	image	of	the	victimized	migrants,	deprived	of	any	agency,	and	therefore	in	need	of	“humanitarian	assistance”.	Victimization	and	deprivation	of	agency	of	the	migrants,	and	the	subsequent	need	for	salvation	by	European	order	reified	by	border	agencies,	are	essential	for	the	emergence	of	a	specific	type	of	humanitarianism	at	the	border	(Perkowski,	2016).	The	establishment	of	the	prohibition	of	approach	by	regular	means,	the	sealing	of	alternative	routes,	the	rendering	of	crossing	of	the	EU’s	external	borders	have	become	matters	of	life	and	death.	The	humanitarian	border	emerges,	not	necessarily	in	succession	of	the	militarized,	and	heavily	policed	border,	but	in	conjunction	and	co-existence	with	it	(Walters,	2011).			The	“humanitarian	reason”	(Fassin,	2012)	developed	on	behalf	of	EU	agencies	in	the	face	of	this	suffering	is	not	associated	with	notions	of	justice	and	injustice.	Instead,	it	initiates	a	sentimental	reaction	based	on	compassion	and	a	drive	for	assistance.	In	addition,	this	“humanitarian	reason”	(Fassin,	2012),	is	far	from	free	of	politics.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	an	integral	element	of	governance	of	populations	that	are	in	situations	of	precariousness,	such	as	the	migrant	populations.	It	allows	for	a	solidarity	and	co-existence	of	“the	humanitarian	world	(the	hand	that	cares)	and	the	police	and	military	ordering	(the	hand	that	strikes)”	(Agier,	2011).	It	impregnates	the	presentation	of	even	the	most	extreme	acts	of	militarization	and	further	securitization	of	bordering	practices,	as	was	the	case	with	the	military	operation	Naval	Force	Mediterranean	(EUNAVFoR	MED),	and	basically	every	FRONTEX	operation,	where	“saving	lives”	is	structurally	bonded	with	border	control	and	security	related	emergency	measures	legitimized	by	the	“crisis”.	
5.7.	Conclusion		 The	border	and	migration	regime	of	the	EU	has	by	no	means	been	unrelated	to	migrant	suffering	and	loss	of	life.	Quite	the	opposite,	it	has	for	years	
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included	in	its	normal	function	both	the	banality	of	migrant	deaths	in	the	sea	and	at	land	borders,	and	legislative	actions	that	constituently	created	and	maintained	the	conditions	for	these	deaths.	Yet,	the	narrative	of	a	European	“migrant	crisis”	has	been	constructed	and	has	dominated	the	political	debate,	not	taking	into	account	the	fact	that	most	migrants	do	not	head	for	Europe	initially.	Similarly,	migrant	populations	exist	in	single	countries	that	exceed	the	sum	of	the	populations	that	all	European	states	received	from	2015	to	2018.	Deeply	
Eurocentric,	this	narrative	also	misses	the	fact	that	different	European	states	experienced	different	turning	points	that	prompted	them	to	engage	with	the	“migrant	crisis”	at	a	domestic	level	(Triandafyllidou,	2018).			As	with	narratives	of	crisis,	“the	singularity	of	events	is	abstracted	by	a	generic	logic,	making	crisis	a	term	that	seems	self-explanatory”	(Roitman,	2014,	p.	5).	The	narrative	of	the	“migrant	crisis”	has	been	highly	selective	in	what	it	included	and	arbitrary	in	its	focus.	The	silencing	of	the	long	history	of	constructing	the	approach	prohibiting	forcing	populations	on	the	move	to	resort	to	smuggling	networks	gave	way	to	an	overbid	of	these	networks.	They	were	presented	as	the	primary	factor	causing	the	loss	of	migrant	lives.	I	see	in	this	case	a	potent	moment	of	de-politicization	and	deflection	of	responsibility.	Rendering	the	biopolitical	choices	of	the	past	invisible	and	focusing	on	the	agency	of	smuggling	networks	allows	for	specific	moral	obligations	to	emerge	for	Europe.	These	choices	are	mediated	by	the	construction	of	the	pitiful,	and	at	the	same	time	potentially	abusive	“other”,	whose	momentum	and	determination	threatens	“European	values”	–	such	as	order	and	the	reign	of	law.	Such	moral	obligations	find	their	fulfillment	through	a	humanitarianism	discourse	where	“saving	lives”	is	structurally	bonded	with	border	control	and	security.		To	argue	that	the	“migrant	crisis”	is	“fabricated”(Rajaram,	2015)	is	by	no	means	an	attempt	to	judge	whether	or	not	it	does	justice	to	a	situation	to	be	referred	to	as	“crisis”.	Instead,	it	is	more	an	attempt	to	look	at	"the	kinds	of	work	the	term	crisis	is	or	is	not	doing	in	the	construction	of	narrative	forms…	and	how	crisis	is	constituted	as	an	object	of	knowledge”	(Roitman,	n.d.).	Crisis	is	often	involved	in	narrative	schemes	that	at	some	point	tell	a	tale	of	revelation,	moments	of	truth	that	also	function	as	turning	points	in	history.	Reality	is	unmasked	by	“false”	indications	and	the	“truth”	is	left	bare	for	everyone	to	see	(J.	
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Roitman,	n.d.).	The	economic	crisis	for	example,	exposed	the	“falseness”	of	speculative	sectors	in	the	complex	capitalist	economy,	revealing	the	“true	value”	other	sectors	considered	to	be	more	fundamental	and	thus,	more	real.	In	this	case,	the	“truth”	presented	was	that	Europe	cannot	take	more	migrants,	and	that	the	technopolitical	breakdown	of	the	registration	system	constituted	a	security	threat	as	well	as	a	breach	of	values	that	could	not	be	allowed	to	continue.		The	staging	of	the	“migrant	crisis”	as	a	crisis	of	control,	a	crisis	of	constitutive	elements	of	the	EU,	such	as	Schengen	and	Dublin,	paved	the	way	for	specific	interventions	focused	on	deterring	migration,	and	border	security.	As	I	show	in	the	following	chapters,	this	was	the	focal	point	on	which	policy	was	determined	and	implemented.	This	presentation	of	truth	allows	for	exceptional	policy	making	that	aims	to	respond	to	the	crisis.	The	policy	is	implemented	in	an	extra-juridical	manner	and	re-shapes	practices,	while	at	the	same	time	other	structural	issues	remain	intact.	In	the	face	of	the	“migrant	crisis”,	the	EU	launched	action	plans,	agendas	and	programs,	which	are	discussed	in	the	chapters	that	follow.	In	chapters	6	and	8,	I	examine	some	of	these	measures	in	more	depth,	namely	the	Hotspot	approach	and	the	EU-Turkey	Statement.	The	communication	of	these	policy	measures	centered	on	a	need	for	reforming	a	failed	migration	and	asylum	system,	and	the	reinforcement	of	the	lost	“European	solidarity”.	The	latter	proved	to	be	a	concept	void	of	meaning,	as	the	measures	that	were	based	on	it,	such	as	the	relocation	program,	were	by	far	the	least	successful.		 This	outcome	can	be	seen	as	a	result	of	basic	misconceptions	in	the	shaping	of	the	EU’s	asylum,	border	and	migration	apparatus,	as	discussed	in	chapter	4.	In	the	following	chapters,	I	will	reveal	how	the	specific	framing	of	the	“migrant	crisis”	simultaneously	enabled	“responses”	legislated	in	an	extra-juridical	way.	This	was	the	case	with	the	EU-Turkey	Statement,	which	will	be	discussed	in	chapter	8.	Meanwhile,	the	rationale	of	deterrence	of	migration	was	maintained,	which	was	what	enabled	the	“crisis”	to	emerge	in	the	first	place.			
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Chapter	6.	Conceptualizing	registration	in	the	Hotspot		
6.1.	Introduction		 The	present	chapter	aims	to	lay	the	ground	for	presenting	the	ethnographic	material	that	I	collected	during	my	field	research	in	the	Hotspots	of	Moria	and	VIAL	in	the	Greek	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios,	respectively.	Some	context	is	useful,	regarding	both	the	geographical	setting	of	the	field,	as	well	as	the	general	political	and	legislative	context	in	which	the	specific	administrative	unit,	the	Hotspot,	was	introduced	and	implemented.	To	pursue	this	aim,	the	first	section	of	the	chapter	will	engage	with	a	short	historical	presentation	of	the	importance	of	the	specific	borderlands	that	are	the	islands	of	the	Aegean.	The	second	section	will	critically	present	the	“Hotspot	approach”,	which	was	conceived	and	presented	as	the	main	pillar	of	the	EU’s	response	to	the	“refugee	crisis”.	As	critically	discussed	in	chapter	5,	both	the	term	“crisis”	in	itself,	as	well	as	its	various	utterances	in	the	context	of	migration,	condense	a	variety	of	meanings	that	are	an	integral	part	of	the	discourse	that	enables	and	legitimizes	specific	directions	for	policymaking.	As	the	Hotspot	approach	was	introduced	in	close	temporal	and	conceptual	vicinity	to	other	EU	initiatives,	such	as	relocation	and	resettlement,	the	latter	are	also	briefly	described.	The	Hotspot	approach	itself	is	discussed	as	an	instance	of	policymaking,	as	well	as	an	infrastructure	of	biopolitical	control.	
6.2.	The	Aegean	borderlands		
6.2.1.	Lesvos	and	Chios	as	entry	points	to	Greece	and	the	EU		 Geographical	space	is	always	saturated	with	a	variety	of	meanings,	relations,	tensions	and	conflicts	(REF).	No	geographical	setting	remains	the	“same”	over	time,	as	new	power	relations	emerge,	technologies	of	production,	transportation	and	communication	are	developed,	and	populations	move.	In	the	case	of	border	venues,	as	Balibar	has	put	it,	a	border	is	always	“overdetermined	and,	in	that	sense,	sanctioned,	reduplicated	and	relativized	by	other	geopolitical	divisions”	(Balibar,	2002,	p.	79).	The	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios,	being	part	of	the	external	maritime	border	of	Greece,	and	therefore	the	EU,	with	Turkey,	have	been	the	focus	of	international	attention	during	the	years	2015-2017	in	many	
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ways.	The	border	has	been	attributed	with	diverse	meanings	that	in	a	matter	of	months	would	range	(often	simultaneously)	from	places	where	European	solidarity	is	materialized	(Popper,	2015)	and	where	Europe	takes	decisive	action	for	the	fortification	of	its	borders,	to	a	maritime	grave	for	thousands	of	people.	It	was	also	a	place	where	terms	like	solidarity	would	be	signified	in	sharp	contrast	and	often	with	conflicting	meanings.	This	is	evident	from	the	countless	instances	of	criminalization	of	grassroots	solidarity	initiatives	(REF)	that	did	not	fit	the	strict	definition	of	“official”	state	or	NGO-sanctioned	solidarity.		 While	the	size	of	the	migration	flows	during	the	period	2015-2017,	as	well	as	the	number	of	lives	lost	at	sea,	were	indeed	unprecedented,	the	islands	of	the	Aegean	were	already	acquainted	with	migration	and	the	lethal	consequences	of	the	European	border	regime.	A	great	amount	of	what	now	comprises	the	“local”	population	has	a	historically	recent	migratory	background.	In	1922,	after	a	conflict	between	the	Greek	and	Turkish	states,	about	1,500,000	Greeks	living	in	Turkey	were	violently	displaced	to	Greece,	of	which	around	13,000	settled	as	refugees	in	Lesvos	(Πασκώνη	&	Συκά,	2006).	This	heritage	and	its	memory	have	been	considered	a	factor	that	shaped	the	reactions	of	certain	locals	towards	migrants	in	recent	years	(REF).	In	more	recent	times,	the	role	of	the	Aegean	Sea	and	its	islands	as	migration	routes	has	been	in	close	interplay	with	other	border	zones	between	Greece	and	Turkey.	Seen	on	a	map,	at	first	sight,	the	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios	(and	Leros,	and	Kos	and	the	rest	of	the	Aegean	coastline)	are	not	the	simplest	way	to	cross	into	Europe	from	Turkey.	The	land	border	“line”	between	the	two	countries,	coinciding	for	a	good	part	of	its	length	with	the	river	Evros	running	about	400	km	to	the	North,	has	its	own	morbid	history,	as	testimonies	of	mass	graves	of	undocumented	migrants	have	shown	in	the	past	(tvxs,	2010).	Estimates	of	the	exact	death	toll	caused	by	the	cold,	rushing	river,	and	the	landmines	that	until	recently	(Ριζοσπάστης,	2005)	(in.gr,	2006)	remained	active,	are	unclear	and	hard	to	verify.	Any	number	proposed	will	always	lack	unreported	incidents	that	the	Turkish	authorities	dealt	with,	and	failed	to	be	included	in	EU	reports	and	statistics.	Some	estimations	talk	of	1,000	deaths	since	2000	(ThePressProject,	2019).	During	the	first	decade	of	the	century,	crossing	through	the	Evros	region	was	a	much	more	popular	route	among	migrants.	One	
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of	the	reasons	for	that	was	the	range	of	prices	in	the	outlaw	economy	that	flourishes	around	illegalized	migration.	Contrary	to	everything	that	has	been	written	about	the	crossing	the	Aegean	Sea	during	the	last	three	years,	the	specific	route	used	to	be	considered	safer	than	the	Evros	route.	Thus,	the	prices	differed	significantly,	as	crossing	the	river	on	an	inflatable	boat	was	reported	to	cost	300-400	euros,	while	a	journey	across	the	sea	could	be	three	or	four	time	as	expensive	(Βυθουλκας,	2010).	In	2010,	the	Greek	government	asked	for	support	from	the	EU,	and	FRONTEX	developed	the	so-called	RABITs	(Rapid	Border	Intervention	Teams)	in	the	area.	In	combination	with	the	building	of	a	10-kilometer-long	fence	that	cost	around	5.5	million	euros,	and	the	national	operation	under	the	name	“ξένιος	δίας”	(Xenios	Zeus),	the	Teams	reduced	the	number	of	border	crossings	by	94%	from	2011	to	2012,	with	a	simultaneous	rise	in	Aegean	crossings	(Infomobile,	2013).	During	2018,	after	political	developments	related	to	the	allegedly	attempted	coup	in	Turkey	in	July	2016,	and	with	the	maritime	crossing	limited	due	to	the	EU-Turkey	Statement,	the	Evros	route	partially	regained	its	popularity	among	migrants	and	smuggling	networks,	once	again	claiming	migrant	bodies	(Cicek,	2018).		State	authorities	cannot	be	unaware	of	this	direct	correlation	between	the	tightening	of	control	of	the	land	border,	and	the	rise	in	crossings	by	sea.	However,	more	often	than	not,	it	is	almost	entirely	absent	in	the	discourse	around	the	humanitarian	disaster	in	the	summer	of	2015	in	terms	of	lives	lost	at	sea.	Viewing	the	borderlands	of	the	Aegean	not	as	an	isolated	space,	but	as	a	route	for	crossing	borders	that	gets	“activated”	and	“shut	down”	as	a	consequence	of	political	decisions	concerning	other	routes,	challenges	the	“naturalizing”	discourse	that	often	refers	to	the	loss	of	life	at	sea	in	a	manner	that	resembles	natural	phenomena.	
6.2.2.	Registration	breakdown		 The	number	of	people	arriving	in	the	EU	“irregularly”	by	sea	rose	significantly	during	2014.	219,000	people	arrived	that	year,	compared	to	60,000	in	2013	(UNHCR,	2015).	In	the	first	six	months	of	2015,	more	migrants	arrived	in	Greece	from	Turkey	than	2014	as	a	whole.	The	monthly	rate	increased	from	less	than	6,000	in	January,	to	43,000	in	June.	Throughout	this	period,	and	peaking	in	
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the	summer	of	2015,	the	Greek	authorities	notoriously	could	not	keep	up	with	managing	the	incoming	populations,	not	only	in	terms	of	a	complete	registration,	but	also	in	means	of	transportation	to	the	mainland,	and	providing	for	basic	needs	such	as	shelter,	food	and	medical	care.	Soon,	makeshift	registration	venues	were	set	up	in	ports,	as	well	as	the	parking	lots	of	nightclubs	and	other	available	open	spaces	where	long	queues	of	migrants	would	wait	for	registration	under	the	blazing	sun,	often	for	days.	Many	of	those	makeshift	registration	venues	would	function	as	de	facto	accommodation	“camps”,	the	most	important	ones	being	the	beach	“Tsamakia”	“Kara-tepe”	and	Moria	in	Lesvos,	“Souda”	camp,	“Tampakika”,	and	later	VIAL	in	Chios.		As	thousands	of	people	arrived	every	day,	the	registration	apparatus	was	by	no	means	effective.	For	instance,	for	a	long	period,	fingerprints	were	taken	manually	using	ink,	and	stored	to	be	digitalized	later	(Παπαδόπουλος,	2016).	During	October	2016,	there	are	claims	of	6,000	people	passing	through	a	camp	in	a	single	24-hour	period	(Hernandez,	2016).			From	the	various	camps	that	were	active	during	this	period,	some	continued	and	evolved	into	centers	of	self-organized	or	grassroots	solidarity	(PIKPA,	Mytilini	beach	No	Border	Kitchen).	Others	were	discontinued	and	some	functioned	as	official	centers	of	Greek	and	European	“response”	hosting	screening	centers	operated	by	the	Greek	Police	and	FRONTEX.	Some	of	the	latter,	like	Moria	in	Lesvos	and	VIAL	in	Chios	went	on	to	be	named	“Hotspots”.		 While	nationality	screening	and	official	registration	of	incoming	migrants	was	never	carried	out	by	actors	other	than	the	Greek	Police	and	FRONTEX,	the	same	did	not	apply	for	a	series	of	other	reception-related	procedures.	For	months,	a	good	deal	of	the	actual	first	reception	was	basically	organized	and	carried	out	by	small	NGOs	and	grassroots	initiatives	of	locals	and	visiting	volunteers	who	helped	with	landing	of	boats,	organized	transport	from	the	beaches	to	reception	venues,	gathered	and	distributed	essential	goods,	and	provided	guidance	and	support	(Hernandez,	2016).	Initially	these	efforts	were	welcomed	by	state	authorities	and	incorporated	by	state	and	media	discourse	as	an	integral	part	of	“European	solidarity”.	However,	the	Greek	state	and	the	EU	drastically	changed	their	stance	towards	a	direction	that	evolved	into	open	hostility,	as	exemplified	by	the	law	implemented	by	the	Greek	state	that	
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illegalized	transport	of	migrants	by	individuals.	This	shift	in	the	state’s	dealing	with	grassroot	solidarity	is	the	first	act	of	a	long	play	that	went	on	to	incommode	to	the	point	of	illegalizing	rescue	at	sea,	in	Italy	and	Spain.	During	the	period	of	intense	solidarity,	activities	taking	place	outside	state	context	and	control,	
bordering,	were	performed	by	a	historically	perhaps	unique	composition	of	actors,	with	very	different	agendas	and	practices.		In	February	2016,	the	Greek	media	mention	a	classified	report	from	the	European	Commission	which	was	never	disproved	by	the	Greek	government.	According	to	the	media,	in	the	period	between	1	January	and	14	November	2015,	out	of	575,242	“irregular”	entries	counted	by	FRONTEX,	only	136,798	entries	were	made	in	the	EURODAC	database	by	the	Greek	Police.	More	reports	in	the	press	back	up	these	claims	(in.gr,	2006).	It	is	an	undeniable	fact	that	the	Greek	state	at	some	point	did	lose	control	of	who	was	coming	in	and	out	of	its	territory.	This	condition	came	to	the	point	of	completely	giving	up	the	registration	of	out-coming	migrants	through	the	Idomeni	crossing	point	in	the	Northern	border	between	Greece	and	Macedonia.	For	this	period,	the	only	available	data	are	those	shared	by	UNHCR	of	Macedonia	to	UNHCR	of	Greece	that	concerns	only	numbers	of	registered	individuals	with	no	other	data,	such	as	names,	being	present.		Significant	problems	arose	with	the	transportation	of	incoming	migrants	towards	the	mainland,	as	the	boat	transportation	infrastructure	was	by	no	means	sufficient.	Passenger	ferries	were	conscripted	with	extra	routes	for	that	purpose,	and	would	even	land	at	different	destinations	than	their	original	destinations	(Αντωνόπουλος,	2015).	Under	these	conditions,	the	registration	process	grew	into	a	massive	bottleneck	phenomenon.	There	are	reports	of	thousands	of	people	passing	through	the	islands	without	being	“properly	registered”,	namely	fingerprinted	(Ekathimerini,	2015)		 In	the	context	of	the	EU’s	asylum	system,	this	situation	was	an	important	breach	of	standard	procedure,	undermining	both	security	standards	and	the	Dublin	system.	As	a	result,	the	Greek	state	was	under	severe	criticism,	to	the	extent	of	discussions	around	a	possible,	temporary	“eviction”	from	the	Schengen	zone	(Capital.gr,	2018)(Robinson	&	Barker,	2015).	It	is	worth	noting	that	Greece	and	Italy,	being	considered	“frontline”	states,	their	national	borders	being	external	EU	borders,	have	been	at	intra-state	level	criticized	for	failing	to	fulfil	
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their	duties	concerning	registration	of	incoming	populations.	With	no	intention	of	engaging	in	a	discussion	of	“failed”	and	“competent”	states,	it	is	worth	noting	that	Germany,	being	considered	the	de	facto	“leader”	state	of	the	EU,	had	similar	problems	when	facing	large	“flows”	(Deutsche	Welle,	2015a).	
6.3.	The	emergence	of	the	Hotspot		
6.3.1.	The	Agenda	on	Migration		 In	the	face	of	the	situation	described	in	the	previous	section,	as	well	as	events	occurring	at	other	border	venues	across	the	continent,	on	the	13	May	2015,	the	European	Commission	published	a	22-page	text,	entitled	“A	European	Agenda	on	Migration”	(European	Commission,	2015b).	Without	referring	to	a	present	“crisis”,	but	with	a	view	to	“EU’s	reaction	to	future	crises”,	the	text	presents	a	set	of	diverse	measures	for	rescue	at	sea,	“targeting	criminal	smuggling	networks”,	relocation	and	resettlement	of	refugees,	“tackling	migration	upstream”	and	more.	These	measures	were	under	the	general	aim	of	Europe	remaining	“a	safe	haven	for	those	fleeing	persecution	as	well	as	an	attractive	destination	for	the	talent	and	entrepreneurship	of	students,	researchers	and	workers”.		In	anticipation	of	a	rise	of	the	number	of	arrivals	during	the	approaching	summer,	the	commission	proposed	“triggering	the	emergency	response	system	envisaged	under	Article	78(3)	TFEU	(Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union).	This	text	is	the	first	to	mention	a	“new	‘Hotspot’	approach”,	defined	as	“where	the	European	Asylum	Support	Office,	Frontex	and	Europol	will	work	on	the	ground	with	frontline	Member	States	to	swiftly	identify,	register	and	fingerprint	incoming	migrants”.		Many	of	the	developments	that	shaped	the	realities	of	migrants’	lives	in	the	following	years	are	outlined	in	the	Agenda	on	Migration.	The	text	hints	towards	the	EU-Turkey	Statement	that	followed	just	over	a	year	later	(which	is	discussed	in	chapter	8).	“Migrant	smuggling	networks”	are	discussed	as	clearly	set,	organized	systems	that	function	as	operations.	They	are	said	to	perform	clear-cut	risk	and	profit	assessments	and	must	be	turned	“from	‘low	risk,	high	return’	operations	for	criminal	into	‘high	risk,	low	return’	ones”.	Finally,	the	Common	European	Asylum	System	is	presented	as	a	resource	that	needs	to	be	in	
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some	way	safeguarded	against	the	very	subject	that	it	concerns,	namely	the	migrants.	The	mere	existence	of	a	large	number	of	asylum	applications	that	are	rejected,	is	seen	by	the	European	Commission	as	an	“abuse”	of	the	system,	as	it	“hampers	the	capacity	of	Member	States	to	provide	swift	protection	to	those	in	need”.	While	acknowledging	the	denial	of	many	Member	States	to	accept	refugees,	as	well	as	older,	basic	malfunctions	of	the	Dublin	system,	the	European	Commission	largely	decides	to	attribute	the	“blame”	for	the	condition	of	the	European	Asylum	System	to	the	people	who	apply	and	are	rejected.	This	approach	paves	the	way	for	the	radical	reconceptualization	of	the	notion	of	asylum	and	the	official	practices	associated	with	it	that	came	just	a	year	later,	with	the	EU-Turkey	Statement,	as	discussed	in	this	dissertation.	
6.3.2.	The	centrality	of	registration		 In	communications	and	press	releases	following	the	publication	of	the	Agenda	on	migration,	registration,	identification	and	fingerprinting,	are	three	terms	that	crop	up	very	frequently	with	regards	to	migration	flows	as	of	April	2015	(European	Council,	2015a)(European	Council,	2015b),	often	in	relation	to	terror	threats	facing	Europe	(European	Commission,	2015a).	After	the	initial	“shock”,	and	with	tensions	still	rising	at	numerous	border	venues	across	Europe,	and	while	political	conflicts	related	to	policies	of	relocation	and	reception	are	under	full	development,	it	seems	that	power	centers	at	the	core	of	the	EU	decided	to	place	“order”	in	the	center	of	a	discussion	that	was	previously	dominated	by	a	humanitarian	undertone,	where	the	focus	of	debate	was	that	of	“saving	lives”	in	the	Mediterranean,	and	grassroots	solidarity	by	citizens.	Characteristically,	European	Commission	First	Vice	President	Frans	Timmermans’s	statements	in	February	2016	mention:	“Getting	back	to	an	orderly	management	of	flows	is	the	most	pressing	priority	today”	(European	Commission,	2016e).	Official,	bureaucratic	and	institutionalized	“European	solidarity”	is	not	unconditional	and	can	only	be	manifested	under	a	rationalizing	frame	that	endorses	and	prioritizes	“order”	as	a	value,	and	a	specific	form	of	“responsibility”,	which	struggles	to	legitimatize	choices	and	actions	that	“as	both	true	to	the	European	values	of	humanitarianism,	solidarity,	and	asylum,	meanwhile,	taming	the	influx	of	newcomers	that	are	feared	to	drain	resources	
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and	destabilize	social	cohesion”	(Triandafyllidou,	2018).	Along	the	same	lines,	European	Commission	President	Jean-Claude	Juncker	after	convening	a	Leaders’	Meeting	on	25	October	to	address	refugee	flows	along	the	Western	Balkans	stated,	“The	only	way	to	restore	the	situation	is	to	slow	down	the	uncontrolled	flows	of	people.	The	policy	of	waving	through	people	to	neighboring	countries	has	to	stop.	I	want	to	be	clear:	people	must	be	registered.	No	registration,	no	rights.”(Juncker,	2015)	Again,	it	is	telling	that	in	his	official	statement,	Juncker	did	not	mention	the	issue	of	relocation	and	its	falling	short	in	all	expectations,	and	only	superficially	touched	on	the	issue	of	living	conditions	along	the	Western	Balkans	route.	However,	he	made	a	very	strong	point	regarding	the	importance	of	registration,	which	taken	at	face	value,	annuls	the	main	precondition	for	a	person	to	have	“rights”,	which	is	to	be	human.		Of	course,	Juncker	was	referring	to	specific	rights	under	the	EU’s	asylum	system.	However,	the	fact	remains	that	at	a	time	when	the	EU	was	facing	a	“humanitarian	crisis”,	such	a	high-ranking	official	opted	for	this	choice	of	words,	which	places	human	rights	in	a	specific	condition,	one	of	a	direct	and	even	causal	dependence	on	the	wellness	of	a	bureaucratic	apparatus.	Even	more,	Juncker	does	not	directly	mention	a	certain	practice	of	non-cooperating	on	behalf	of	disobedient	migrants,	even	though	that	is	somehow	implied	in	his	statement.	Instead,	he	reminds	us	of	the	power	of	EU	and	the	Member	States	to	withdraw	from	their	moral	and	ethical	responsibility	of	ensuring	human	rights	if	their	organizational	standards	are	not	met.	The	“inalienability”	of	human	rights	(Arendt,	1973)	is	once	again	debunked.	Instead,	what	prevails	are	the	modern	state	and	surpra-state	mechanisms’	fixation	with	rendering	populations	and	individuals	for	future	governance	in	the	context	of	which	their	removal	from	EU	territory	is	a	very	likely	scenario.	Another	context	under	which	registration	and	the	“identity”	of	the	incoming	migrants	would	be	often	discussed	evolved	around	the	association	of	migration	and	the	“terror	threat”	in	Europe.	The	most	notable	case	involves	the	Paris	attacks	on	November	2015,	where	shootings	and	suicide	bombings	in	the	States	de	France	during	a	football	match,	and	a	concert	in	the	Bataclan	theatre,	left	130	people	dead,	and	hundreds	injured,	in	the	second	deadliest	attack	in	Europe	since	the	Madrid	train	bombings	in	2004.	Responsibility	for	the	attack	
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was	claimed	by	the	ISIL	(Callimachi,	2018).	In	the	scene	of	the	shootings,	a	Syrian	passport	was	found,	which	in	latter	days	was	reported	to	have	been	used	by	a	person	that	had	entered	Europe,	through	Greece.	The	Greek	Minister	of	Migration,	Giannis	Mouzalas	later	confirmed	this	information,	stating	that	“the	owner	of	the	passport	(sic)	passed	through	Leros,	on	the	3/10/2015	where	he	was	identified	according	to	the	EU	rules,	as	those	were	decided	upon	in	the	EU	Summit	on	the	refugee	issue”(Ant1,	2015).	Some	voices	in	the	international	press,	kept	a	dispassionate	and	cautious	stance	towards	the	finding	of	the	said	passport	at	the	crime	scene.	Some,	for	example	mentioned	that	given	the	status	that	Syrian	passports	had	gained	in	the	specific	period,	they	were	in	high	demand	and	an	extensive	illegal	market	had	developed	with	them	as	a	subject	of	contraband	(Al	Jazeera,	2015),	with	networks	that	allegedly	involved	Syrian	embassy	officials	(Hawramy,	Dinic,	&	Kingsley,	2015).	Others	noted	that	the	passport	could	have	been	deliberately	left	in	order	to	be	found,	in	an	effort	to	provoke	tension	focused	on	refugees	fleeing	Syria	(Lichfield,	2015)(AFP,	2015a).	Overall,	however,	the	presence	of	the	passport	fueled	already	existing	associations	between	migration	and	“terror	threats”,	and	was	recruited	by	media	and	politicians	working	with	an	anti-migration	agenda	(Gallagher	&	Beckford,	2015).		The	Polish	Minister	of	European	affairs,	stated	in	the	aftermath	that	“Poland	must	retain	full	control	over	its	borders,	asylum	and	immigration,”	(Traynor,	2015).	The	Bavarian	Finance	Minister	stated,	“The	days	of	uncontrolled	immigration	and	illegal	entry	can’t	continue	just	like	that.	Paris	changes	everything.”	(Kingsley,	2015).	Even	in	the	more	remote	context	of	the	USA,	governors	from	31	states	based	their	argument	against	the	USA	refugee	resettlement	program	concerning	Syrians,	on	the	Paris	attack	(Healy	&	Bosman,	2018).	During	this	discourse,	the	EU’s	external	borders	between	Greece	and	Turkey	were	attributed	with	new,	safety-laden	meanings,	and	were	now	even	more	seen	as	becoming		“part	of	a	different	kind	of	front	line,	Europe’s	perimeter	defense	against	possible	infiltration	by	terrorists”	(Lyman,	2015).	
6.3.3.	The	Hotspot	approach		 What	is	surprisingly	in	stark	contrast	with	the	European	Commission’s	claim	for	a	“consistent	and	clear	policy”	(European	Commission,	2015b),	is	the	
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lack	of	a	clear	definition	of	what	a	Hotspot	actually	is	and	how	it	differs	from	the	reception	and	registration	centers	already	existing	and	functioning.	This	was	clear	in	almost	every	discussion/interview	that	I	conducted	during	my	research	trips	to	both	islands,	and	has	been	a	point	of	criticism	among	scholars	and	organizations	(D’Angelo,	2016)(Statewatch,	2015).		The	European	Commissioner	for	Migration	and	Home	Affairs	had	to	compose	an	“explanatory	note”	to	the	Home	and	Justice	Affairs	Ministers	of	the	EU,	in	an	effort	to	clarify	what	Hotspots	would	be	and	what	their	operational	framework	would	be	(Council	of	the	European	Union,	2015b).	Again,	a	strict	and	clear	definition	is	absent.	Instead,	a	definition	based	on	what	the	“Hotspots”	aim	at	says:	“to	provide	a	platform	for	the	agencies	to	intervene,	rapidly	and	in	an	
integrated	manner,	in	frontline	Member	States	when	there	is	a	crisis	due	to	specific	
and	disproportionate	migratory	pressure	at	their	external	borders,	consisting	of	
mixed	flows	and	the	Member	State	concerned	might	request	support	and	assistance	
to	better	cope	with	that	pressure”.	The	ad	hoc	definition	is	supplemented	by	an	apposition	of	the	actors	that	would	be	involved	in	the	Hotspot,	namely	the	aforementioned	agencies	that	constitute	the	EU	support	mechanism:	“the	European	Asylum	Support	Office,	Frontex	and	Europol	will	work	on	the	ground	with	frontline	Member	States	to	
swiftly	identify,	register	and	fingerprint	incoming	migrants.	The	work	of	the	agencies	will	be	complementary	to	one	another...	Those	claiming	asylum	will	be	immediately	channeled	into	an	asylum	procedure	where	EASO	(European	Asylum	Support	Office)	support	teams	will	help	to	process	asylum	cases	as	quickly	as	possible.	For	those	not	in	need	of	protection,	FRONTEX	(the	EU	agency	responsible	for	guarding	the	borders)	will	help	Member	States	by	coordinating	the	return	of	irregular	migrants.	Europol	(the	EU’s	law	enforcement	agency)	and	Eurojust	(the	EU’s	juridical	cooperation	unit)	will	assist	the	host	Member	State	with	investigations	to	dismantle	the	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks.”	(European	Commission,	2015c).	Those	functions	have	been	the	core	of	every	reception	center	in	Greece,	and	are,	in	themselves,	nothing	new.	In	that	way,	“in	one	sense,	the	hotspot	is,	then,	already	here”	(Painter,	Papoutsi,	Papada,	&	Vradis,	2016b).		
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At	face	value,	it	seems	there	is	not	much	in	the	“Hotspot	approach”	other	than	an	increase	of	the	involvement	of	EU	agencies	in	the	handling	of	the	incoming	populations.	In	the	context	of	intra-EU	tensions	and	antagonisms,	there	are	some	supplementary	readings.	The	Greek	and	Italian	states,	two	states	of	the	European	South,	both	under	intense	criticism	regarding	their	management	of	migration	throughout	the	past	two	decades,	were	now	to	have	EU	agencies	take	over	basic	functions	of	their	bureaucratic	apparatuses.	Therefore,	the	Hotspot	can	be	seen	as	a	dual	intensification	of	surveillance	regarding	migration.	On	the	one	hand,	it	signifies	an	enhanced	and	more	thorough	surveillance	of	migrant	bodies	who	are	now	to	be	“datafied”	and	enrolled	in	the	EU	database	assemblage.	On	the	other,	as	an	“enhanced	mechanism	of	intra-governmental	surveillance”	(Garelli	&	Tazzioli,	2016a)	that	would	discipline	the	states	of	Greece	and	Italy	into	fingerprinting	all	incoming	migrants,	in	full	accordance	with	the	Dublin	Regulation.	In	that	way,	the	invigoration	of	EU	agencies’	presence	through	the	Hotspot	approach,	both	in	terms	of	material	apparatus,	human	workforces	and	upgraded	role,	can	be	seen	as	an	intensification	of	center-periphery	dynamics	within	the	EU,	which	have	been	at	play	in	a	number	of	fields,	no	less	in	the	implementation	of	the	Dublin	regulation.	For	some	scholars,	this	raises	issues	of	national	independence	under	the	emergence	of	an	EU	superstate	(Painter,	Papada,	Papoutsi,	&	Vradis,	2017).		The	fact	that	the	Dublin	Regulation	has	gone	through	various	stages	of	inactiveness	did	not	for	a	moment	annul	the	biopolitical	goal	of	a	biometric	and	demographic	archive	of	the	populations	on	the	move.		In	contradiction	with	the	EU,	agencies	play	an	important	role	in	the	process	of	“EU	integration”	since	they	evolved	as	actors	at	the	beginning	of	the	century.	As	actors,	they	are	considered	lower	in	the	hierarchical	relationship	that	they	develop	with	the	Member	State	they	work	with	each	time	(Coen	&	Thatcher,	2008).	However,	such	a	view	is	often	based	on	the	conditions	and	regulations	under	which	the	agencies	were	initially	launched	and	do	not	include	the	following	policy	acts	that	provide	more	strength	(especially	FRONTEX).	In	addition,	it	must	be	taken	seriously	into	consideration	that	there	are	significant	differences	between	formal	accountability	arrangements	and	the	reality	of	the	field.	The	de	jure	arrangements	regulating	the	agencies	may	not	coincide	with	the	
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reality	of	the	field	(Busuioc,	Groenleer,	&	Trondal,	2012).	Perhaps	the	most	infamous	examples	are	reoccurring	accusations	against	FRONTEX	and	practices	that	violate	the	principle	of	non-refoulement,	regarding	pushbacks	at	sea	(Keller,	Lunacek,	Lochbihler,	&	Flautre,	2011)(Human	Rights	Watch	(HRW),	2009).	The	chapter	that	follows	refers	to	FRONTEX	and	EASO	practices,	as	Europol	was	not	visible	or	available	during	my	visits.		 More	specifically,	article	2(6)	of	the	EASO	Regulation	states,	the	agency	“shall	have	no	powers	in	relation	to	the	taking	of	decisions	by	Member	States’	asylum	authorities	on	individual	applications	for	international	protection”	(European	Parliament	&	Council	of	the	European	Union,	2010).	As	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail,	this	was	not	always	the	case.	
6.3.4.	Relocation	and	resettlement		 The	Hotspot	approach	was	introduced	in	close	relation	with	the	Relocation	Programme	both	in	terms	of	time,	but	also	in	terms	of	the	two	elements	constituting	a	dual	step	towards	a	“solution”	for	the	“crisis”	as	it	was	developing	at	the	external	border	of	the	EU.	Both	elements	were	focal	points	of	the	Agenda	on	migration	and	are	bound	by	a	convergence	of	humanitarian	connotations	with	issues	of	security	and	responsibility.	The	Relocation	Programme	was	introduced	as	an	“emergency	response	mechanism	to	assist	Italy	and	Greece”	(European	Commission,	2015f).	The	Programme	was	designed	to	benefit	the	states	of	Greece	and	Italy	through	a	procedure	of	“burden-sharing”,	but	also	the	migrants	themselves	would	be	relocated	and	thus	offered	a	new	opportunity	away	from	the	grim	realities	of	the	Southern	states.		 The	relocation	measures	would	concern	persons	“in	clear	need	of	international	protection”,	and	thus	conceptually	represent	a	second	level	compared	to	the	reception	related	“Hotspot	approach”.	The	measures	presuppose	a	“clear”	distinction	between	those	in	need	and	those	deserving	protection.	As	the	European	Court	of	Auditors	mention	in	their	assessment	of	the	implementation	of	the	Hotspot	approach,	“The	hotspot	approach,	focusing	on	the	identification,	registration	and	fingerprinting	of	migrants	upon	arrival,	is	therefore	meant	to	facilitate	the	implementation	of	these	follow-up	procedures	and	can	even	be	seen	as	a	necessary	pre-condition	for	these	follow-up	
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procedures	to	work	effectively.”	(European	Court	of	Auditors,	2017).	At	the	same	time,	the	different	temporal	conditions	that	governed	the	relocation	regime	would	shape	the	“deservedness”	criteria,	often	with	reference	to	factors	such	as	time	of	arrival.	For	example,	at	some	point,	it	concerned	Syrians	and	Eritreans	that	arrived	in	Italy	or	Greece	after	15	April	2015	or	after	the	mechanism	was	launched.	While	the	“Hotspot	approach”	was	considered	a	success	regarding	the	aim	of	a	complete	registration	of	incoming	populations,	the	Relocation	scheme	on	multiple	occasions	failed	to	reach	its	goals.	The	figures	aimed	for	in	the	first	Council	decision	were	16,000	for	Greece	and	24,000	for	Italy.	These	numbers	were	claimed	to	be	decided	on	the	basis	of	being	“approximately	40%	of	the	total	number	of	third-country	nationals	in	clear	need	of	international	protection	who	have	entered	irregularly	in	Italy	or	Greece	in	2014”	(Council	of	the	European	Union,	2015a).	This	in	retrospective	naively	optimistic	rationale	raises	questions	both	on	the	ability	of	the	EU	to	estimate	the	sizes	of	the	migration	flows,	as	well	as	the	efficiency	of	its	planning	in	response.	A	few	months	after	the	aforementioned	decision,	the	number	of	monthly	arrivals	to	Greece	was	bigger	than	the	target	of	the	relocation	program	that	had	a	two-year	horizon.	In	September	of	the	same	year,	new	relocation	measures	were	announced,	this	time	aiming	for	a	figure	of	160,000	persons.	The	realization	of	both	sets	of	measures	also	fell	seriously	short	of	their	targets.	This	is	shown	by	the	fact	that	a	year	later,	the	percentage	of	materialization	of	the	relocations	were	at	2.57%	and	1.92%	for	Italy	and	Greece,	respectively	(Menéndez,	2016,	p.	398).		The	situation	was	even	worst	at	the	resettlement	front.	Resettlement	is	a	process	that	concerns	person	who	have	already	been	recognized	as	refugees	by	the	UNHCR,	remaining	in	UNHCR	sites	around	the	world,	and	then	applying	for	resettlement	to	a	third	country,	usually	Europe,	the	USA	and	Australia.	Though	this	was	much	more	mediated,	organized	and	less	direct	in	terms	of	the	spatial	distance	between	the	applicant	and	the	receiving	country,	it	also	depended	on	political	events,	discourses	and	developments,	as	shown	by	the	drop	in	the	actual	quota	of	the	USA	resettlement	program	after	9/11	(Popp,	2018).			Therefore,	we	can	see	that	the	EU’s	efforts	in	the	face	of	the	“summer	of	migration”	concerning	relocation	were	not	as	eager	as	they	were	when	faced	
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with	registration,	categorization,	and	fingerprinting.	The	goal	of	the	Hotspot	approach	for	a	transition	from	a	chaotic	and	un-ordered	reception	and	registration	process	to	an	orderly,	fast	and	complete	registration	of	all	incoming	migrants,	was	far	more	successful	than	the	Relocation	Programme.		
6.3.5.	Hotspots	as	temporal	spaces	of	exception		 Time	and	temporality	are	an	essential	element	of	the	reality	that	migrants	were	subjected	to	after	arriving	in	the	Greek	islands,	and	of	the	representation	of	this	reality	in	media	and	political	discourse.	The	“Hotspot	approach”	aimed	at	the	“swift”	identification	and	fingerprinting	of	incoming	migrants.		The	dominant	discourse	around	this	“swiftness”	has	been	one	of	a	humanitarian	“nature”.	It	assumes	that	faster	procedures	would	help	cope	with	the	bottleneck	phenomenon	that	fingerprinting	has	been	for	a	long	time,	and	facilitate	the	mobility	of	migrants.	However,	as	I	will	show	in	the	next	chapter,	this	acceleration	was	not	always	smooth,	and	definitely	did	not	always	work	in	favor	of	the	migrant	subject	interest.	The	“accelerated	temporality	of	control”	(Tazzioli,	2016c)	imposed	within	the	confined	space	of	the	Hotspot,	but	also	stretching	out	well	beyond	its	limits,	was	a	complex	set	of	dates	and	deadlines,	waiting	times,	and	“updates”	on	policies	and	practice	protocols.	This	assemblage	did	not	follow	a	linear	“progress”	model,	and	was	subject	to	swift	changes	and	transformations.		Even	the	border	guards	had	trouble	keeping	updated,	let	alone	understanding	their	rationale	(see	next	chapter).	The	EU-Turkey	Statement	signed	in	March	2016,	stands	out	as	the	most	important	milestone	in	the	“complex	temporality”	(Little,	2015)	that	characterizes	the	border	regime	of	the	EU	in	this	context.	However	in	different	periods,	different	procedures	benefited	migrants	of	different	nationalities,	and	produced	diverse	dynamics	in	the	populations	(Kingsley	&	Domokos,	2015).		As	Little	puts	it,	“complex	temporality	introduces	elements	of	contingency	that	undermine	some	of	the	normative	certainty	that	borders	have	traditionally	engendered… goes	beyond	the	widely	accepted	notion	that	borders	change	over	the	course	of	time	to	focus	on	the	nature	and	implications	of	that	change	across	different	bordering	practices.”	(Little,	2015).	
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The	shifts	in	the	protocol	of	migrant	governance,	the	changes	in	criteria	of	selection,	and	the	often	arbitrary	practices	of	border	guards,	render	the	Hotspots	a	space	of	exception.	The	Italian	Hotspots	“have	also	been	used	for	redistributing	migrants	already	present	on	the	national	territory,	and	particularly	for	removing	their	unruly	and	contested	presence	from	highly	visible	sites.”(Tazzioli	&	Garelli,	2018).	In	the	Greek	setting,	and	in	the	context	of	the	implementation	of	the	EU-Turkey	Statement	on	behalf	of	the	Greek	state,	the	Greek	Parliament	voted	for	a	law,	that	among	other	things,	allowed	for	the	detention	of	migrants	in	the	Hotspots	for	a	period	of	25	days,	leaving	the	decision	to	the	authority	of	the	Ηotspot	commander	(ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΔΑ	ΤΗΣ	ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΕΩΣ	ΤΗΣ	ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ	ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ,	2016,	p.	1212).		The	same	law	imposed	a	restriction	on	the	right	of	migrants	to	move	freely	across	the	country	of	Greece,	while	their	asylum	applications	were	examined,	thus	turning	the	islands	into	capricious,	large	scale,	detention	centers	for	thousands	of	people	who	could	not,	for	example,	seek	employment.	The	latter	measure,	almost	two	years	later,	was	found	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	country,	to	be	insufficiently	founded	in	the	text	of	the	law,	and	was	cancelled	(Μάνδρου,	2018).	However,	its	cancellation	only	concerned	the	migrants	arriving	at	the	islands	after	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision.	Therefore,	in	practice	it	changed	nothing	for	all	those	who	were	trapped	on	the	islands	in	the	meantime.		People	arriving	at	a	Hotspot	would	have	little	knowledge	of	what	the	outcome	of	their	interaction	with	its	mechanism	would	be.	The	infrastructure	of	the	Hotspot	“a	technologically	mediated,	dynamic	form	that	continuously	produces	and	transforms	socio-technical	relations”	would	process	the	information,	speech	acts,	and	documents	that	migrant	subjects	would	provide,	and	act	upon	them.	However,	the	specific	manner	in	which	this	act	would	be	unfolded	would	very	often	be	subject	to	change.	As	new	directives	were	introduced	at	EU	level,	and	new	guidelines	were	introduced	by	the	Greek	Ministry	of	Migration.	The	Hotspot	would	not	only	impose	temporalities	(of	detention,	waiting	for	asylum	claims	to	be	processed	etc.),	but	as	an	infrastructure	it	was	an	entity	subjected	to	temporalities	itself.	These	temporalities,	and	the	changes	that	brought,	were	of	great	importance	for	the	migrants.	
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6.3.6.	Hotspots	as	infrastructure		 The	ontological	ambivalence	of	Hotspots,	in	the	policy	papers	that	were	supposed	to	define	it,	was	sure	to	permeate	the	practices	carried	out	within	the	actual,	reified	organizational	and	operational	unit	that	were	Hotspots.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	explore	in	more	depth	certain	instances	of	those	functions.	Following	Reeves	(Reeves,	2016),	I	will	examine	Hotspots	“less	as	a	complete	technical	or	material	form”	and	consider	“the	improvisations	and	gaps	that	are	intrinsic	to	infrastructural	modes	of	operation”.	However,	initially,	it	is	important	to	note	a	few	points	about	the	notion	of	infrastructure	itself	and	how	it	can	help	in	understanding	and	analyzing	what	was	happening	in	Hotspots.		The	aforementioned	vagueness	concerning	Hotspots	has	led	scholars	to	consider	them	less	as	infrastructure	and	more	as	“a	series	of	procedures	and	mechanisms	for	identifying	and	selecting	migrants”	(Tazzioli,	2016c).	However,	the	emergence	of	Hotspots	can	also	be	seen	as	an	extended	“infrastructural	experimentation”(Harvey	et	al.,	2016)	aimed	at	regaining	control	and	restoring	order.	Even	if	the	“approach”	did	not	constitute	a	new	infrastructural	unit	per	se,	as	I	will	discuss	in	the	next	chapter,	this	happened	de	facto.	The	notion	of	Hotspots	presented	in	press	releases	was	as	a	simplified	and	“optimistic”	presentation	of	the	tasks	to	be	carried	out	within	it,	was	typical	of	policy	papers.	This	image	reflected	a	contained	place	where	the	process	of	“knowing”	the	incoming	populations	was	possible.	The	process	of	“knowing”	is	mediated	by	the	use	of	systems	of	categorization	and	the	corresponding	categories,	namely	refugee/migrant,	in	need	of	international	protection	etc.		In	the	specific	time	conjecture,	the	discourse	around	the	identity	of	the	incoming	populations	was	focal	in	the	EU.	Thus,	“Hotspot”	was	a	buzzword,	highly	visible	and	present	in	media	and	political	discourse	alike.	In	that	manner,	seen	as	infrastructure,	the	Hotspots	seem	to	escape	Star’s	input	that	infrastructures	are	“by	definition	invisible”,	some	sort	of	“silent	operators”	working	in	the	background,	that	only	“become	visible	upon	breakdown”	(Star,	1999,	p.	382).		While	infrastructures	similar	to	Hotspots	(like	the	Petrou	Rally	detention	center	for	Aliens	in	Athens)	do	remain	invisible	for	extended	periods	of	time,	this	time	the	Hotspots	were	on	the	high	visibility	side	of	the	spectrum	(Larkin,	2013,	
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p.	334).	Being	visible	as	infrastructural	units,	Hotspots	remained	invisible	and	opaque,	when	it	came	to	the	“core”	of	their	function.	The	workings	of	the	Greek	Police	and	FRONTEX	officials	interviewing	migrants	and	assessing	their	condition,	were	of	little	interest	to	journalists,	as	most	of	the	media	coverage	evolved	around	the	truly	disturbing	images	emerging	in	regard	to	living	conditions,	waiting	times,	conflicts	among	different	ethnicity	groups	and	riots.	There	is	little	doubt	that	coverage	of	this	reality	had	great	importance	in	communicating	the	situations	migrants	were	facing	on	EU	soil.	However,	its	focus	was	the	“malfunction”	of	Hotspots	as	reception/detention	centers,	namely	their	falling	short	in	providing	humane	conditions	for	the	migrants	that	were	forced	to	be	there.	In	this	body	of	work,	a	Hotspot	is	seen	as	a	sort	of	necessary	infrastructure,	with	a	clear	mission,	and	it	is	up	to	the	“fine	tuning”	of	the	“services	provided”,	the	goodwill	of	the	people	working	there,	and	the	better	equipment	provided	by	the	EU	and	the	Greek	state,	for	it	to	“function	properly”.	However,	as	Larkin	puts	it	“Infrastructures	are	not,	in	any	positivist	sense,	simply	out	there”.	The	act	of	defining	an	infrastructure	is	a	categorizing	moment.	Taken	thoughtfully,	it	comprises	a	cultural	analytic	that	highlights	the	epistemological	and	political	commitments	involved	in	selecting	that	one	sees	as	infrastructural	(…)	and	what	one	leaves	out”	(Larkin,	2013,	p.	330).	In	this	case,	what	was	left	out	was	the	fact	that	inside	the	Hotspots,	in	addition	to	the	mistreatment,	the	detention	and	the	(not	so	scarce)	instances	of	police	violence,	migrants	had	to	face	a	bureaucratic	apparatus	that	would	decide	on	their	“deservedness”.	The	next	chapter	aims	to	engage	with	precisely	that	invisibility	and	opaqueness	of	Hotspots,	thus	adding	to	the	scarce	bibliography	associated	with	the	notion.		
6.4.	Conclusions		 Throughout	the	first	period	of	“increased	migration	flows”,	registration	of	incoming	migrants	topped	the	list	of	the	EU’s	priorities.	After	an	initial	period	when	humanitarian	discourse	was	the	dominant	element	in	both	media	and	mainstream	political	discussions,	“order”	and	“lawfulness”	regained	their	central	positions	as	expressions	of	European	values.	These	replaced	the	element	of	
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“European	solidarity”.		Especially	a	complete	registration	of	all	incoming	migrants	was	positioned	as	a	perquisite	not	only	for	a	more	harmonic	coexistence	among	Member	States,	but	also	as	the	ontological	foundation	upon	which	migrant	rights	could	exist.	This	prevalence	of	registration	as	a	value	in	itself	was	enhanced	by	a	security-driven	discourse	that	associated	the	issue	of	identity	of	the	incoming	populations	with	that	of	“security”	of	the	European	Union’s	territory.	In	addition,	it	was	seen	as	a	safeguard	factor	protecting	the	EU	asylum	system	and	its	resources	from	abuse.	During	2015,	the	EU	“response”	placed	the	Hotspot	approach	and	the	Hotspots	as	the	primary	organizational	units	that	would	help	frontline	states	regain	control	of	their	border,	this	time	enforced	by	the	enhanced	presence	of	the	Union’s	agencies.	However,	the	constitution	of	the	Hotspot	as	a	policy	making	move,	as	well	as	an	organizational	unit	and	infrastructure	was	not	as	clear	and	specific	as	it	was	presented.	This	shaped	migrant	mobilities	in	ways	that	were	often	extra-juridical	and	outside	the	legal	context	of	Member	States	and	the	Union	alike.	While	achieving	its	primary	goal	of	a	complete	registration	of	migrants,	the	Hotspot	also	functioned	as	a	space	of	increased	insecurity	and	uncertainty	for	migrants,	as	a	set	of	practices	aimed	to	deter	people	from	crossing	into	Europe.	It	therefore	reconfigured	the	way	in	which	the	islands	of	the	Aegean	were	accounted	for	as	part	of	the	Greek’s	state	territory.		The	course	of	the	EU	policy	measures	deployed	at	the	time	reveals	clear	asymmetry	between	the	means	developed	to	pursue	the	two	distinct	goals	of	covering	people’s	need	for	asylum,	and	the	thorough	and	complete	registration.	In	the	following	chapter,	I	will	provide	an	ethnographical	account	of	what	comprised	the	notorious	registration	process.					
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Chapter	7.	An	ethnographic	account	of	registration		 	
7.1	Introduction		 In	the	previous	chapter,	I	presented	a	critical	account	of	the	position	of	identification,	registration	and	fingerprinting	in	the	public	and	political	debate	around	migration	throughout	2015-6-7.	As	I	showed,	the	biopolitical	goal	of	rendering	the	migrant	subject/population	known	in	a	manner	that	would	render	it	governable,	both	in	the	present	moment,	but	also	in	anticipation	of	the	future,	invested	the	process	of	registration	with	a	variety	of	meanings	and	connotations.	These	ranged	from	a	discourse	of	securitization	of	migration,	order	and	lawfulness	as	European	values,	to	justice	and	effectiveness	with	regard	to	distributing	asylum-related	resources,	and	the	deservedness	of	the	migrant	subject	to	the	above.		The	critical	reading	of	press	releases,	policy	papers,	legal	documents	and	news	articles	has	great	heuristic	value.	Particularly	in	the	context	of	migration,	where	the	practices	often	differ	from	the	proclamations,	ethnographic	fieldwork	is	in	a	position	to	offer	a	different	and	perhaps	more	valuable	picture.	Ethnographic	research	“demystifies	the	power	of	the	state	and	disrupts	normalized	legal	and	material	relations	with	alternative	narrations	from	within”(Mountz,	2003,	p.	640).	In	this	case,	the	proclamation	of	a	complete	and	thorough	registration	of	all	incoming	migrants	has	been	a	statement	uttered	at	the	higher	political	and	administrative	levels	of	the	EU,	to	be	implemented	basically	through	the	“Hotspot	approach”.	However,	any	declaration	is	practically	void	of	meaning	if	it	is	not	realized	in	the	practices	of	human	and	non-human	agents	deployed	in	the	field.	In	this	context,	it	is	important	to	remain	aware	(and	to	inform	those	who	are	not),	that	the	human	agents	delegated	with	this	task	(or	any	other	for	that	matter)	are	“people	who	are	informed	in	their	practices	by	notions	of	what	constitutes	border…	and	so	their	efforts	might	or	might	not	turn	out	in	the	way	intended”	(Green,	2010,	p.	262).		While	tension	was	rising	in	various	borderlands	across	Europe,	mainly	with	regard	to	issues	of	freedom	of	mobility,	asylum	and	reception,	the	issues	of	registration	and	identification,	at	least	for	the	year	of	2015,	and	the	first	half	of	2016,	were	to	a	great	extent	“localised”	in	the	Hotspots	of	Greece	and	Italy.	One	of	the	two	countries,	namely	Greece,	is	the	field	based	on	which,	in	the	present	
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chapter,	I	attempt	a	shift	in	the	focus	and	scale,	as	well	as	in	method.	From	the	examination	of	the	discourse,	I	will	provide	a	closer	look	at	the	set	of	processes	and	practices	that	made	up	what	constituted	registration	and	identification	of	migrants	during	that	period.	Building	on	fieldwork	material	that	I	gathered	during	two	research	trips	to	the	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios,	as	well	as	additional	interviews	conducted	in	the	Greek	capital	of	Athens,	I	will	present	a	critical	account	of	the	process	by	which	the	migrant	bodies	were	rendered	visible	in	the	EU’s	digital	infrastructure.	Likewise,	during	this	process,	their	identities	(in	the	sense	of	the	data	that	would	constitute	their	future	existence	in	Europe	as	well	as	their	interactions	with	other	aspects	of	European	bureaucracy)	were	shaped.	The	empirical	material	and	analysis	of	the	present	chapter	offer	insight	into	the	use	and	constructions	of	a	wider	set	of	categories	at	play	within	the	EU	migration	reception	system,	such	as	nationality,	age	and	kinship.	Keeping	in	mind,	that	categories	don’t	exist	“in	the	wild”,	but	come	from	(human	and	non-human)	action,	constantly	made,	maintained	and	refreshed	through	a	great	deal	of	skilled	work	(Bowker	&	Star,	1999).	Given	the	secrecy	under	which	a	good	deal	of	border	work	is	performed,	I	am	of	the	opinion	that	it	is	a	denaturalising	account	of	these	categories,	as	they	materialise	as	the	“end	result”	of	such	work.	
7.2	The	two	Hotspots	3			 Greece	and	Italy,	as	the	entry	points	to	Europe,	have	been	at	the	center	of	the	discourse	around	the	identity	of	the	incoming	populations.	While	tensions	rose	in	many	territorial	settings	around	the	continent,	whether	train	stations,	airports	or	border	venues,	few	places	have	gained	the	notoriety	of	Moria	or	Lampedusa.	The	sea	element	and	the	loss	of	life	have	been	the	most	crucial	factors	of	this	notoriety,	accompanied	by	the	practices	of	the	two	states	and,	of	course,	their	status	as	entry	points.	My	research	focused	on	the	Moria	and	VIAL	Hotspots	on	the	Greek	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios,	respectively.	The	two	islands	are	both	very	close	to	the	Turkish	shores,	less	than	10	kilometers	away,	which	
																																																								3	While	there	were	differences	in	the	function	of	the	two	Hotspots,	some	of	which	are	mentioned	in	this	chapter,	in	cases	of	observations	and	conclusions	that	applied	to	both,	I	will	simply	refer	to	as	“the	Hotspot”.	
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makes	them	ideal	for	sea	crossings.	In	the	following	section,	I	will	briefly	provide	some	context	for	the	geographical	form	and	setting	of	the	two	Hotspots.	
7.2.1.	Lesvos	and	Moria			 The	Moria	Hotspot	is	the	most	well-known	Hotspot,	perhaps	with	a	larger	capacity,	but	also	known	as	a	theatre	of	police	repression	and	violence,	as	well	as	migrant	struggles	more	than	any	other.	Moria	First	Reception	Camp,	as	it	was	originally	named,	had	an	original	capacity	of	150	persons	when	construction	began,	in	2014	(Singleton,	Moore,	&	Bunyan,	2014).	Alongside	Kara	Tepe,	it	had	been	one	of	the	two	main	camps	on	the	islands	since	October	2015.		 Built	along	the	side	of	a	hill;	the	camp	has	two	main	entrances,	one	on	the	lower	south	side,	and	one	on	the	upper	north	end.	The	two	main	administrative	centers	(the	registration	containers	and	the	offices	of	the	higher-ranking	officials)	are	positioned	close	to	the	exits,	with	the	tents	and	containers	used	for	“housing”,	food	and	hygiene,	occupying	the	space	between	them,	along	the	side	of	the	hill.	This	setting,	deliberately	or	not,	allowed	the	personnel	working	in	the	Hotspot	to	promptly	escape	in	times	of	migrant	uprising.	On	the	north	side,	which	is	also	the	one	that	is	more	distant	from	the	main	road,	a	series	of	containers	on	a	cement-based	balcony	overlook	the	Hotspot,	hosting	the	offices	of	high-ranking	administrative	officials	and	Police	officers.	Located	pretty	well	in	the	middle,	was	a	“detention	center	within	a	detention	center”,	where	migrants	to	be	deported	under	a	so-called	“pilot”	program	(which	was	discontinued	soon	after)	were	kept	behind	a	series	of	fences.	Close	to	the	southern,	main	entrance	and	behind	two	rows	of	fencing,	which	were	unguarded	for	most	of	the	time,	however,	(except	for	the	occasional	presence	of	an	NGO	member	closing	and	opening	the	gate),	is	the	complex	of	containers	where	the	registration	occurs.	At	the	bottom	of	the	hill,	next	to	the	registration	venue,	towards	the	interior	of	the	Hotspot,	there	is	a	large,	fenced	and	covered	space,	closely	resembling	a	massive	cage,	with	one	entrance	guarded	by	private	security	guards.	This	is,	in	practice,	the	waiting	area	for	the	asylum	interview,	carried	out	in	containers	that	are	located	inside	the	fenced	area.	This	area	has	been	inaccessible	every	time	I	have	visited	Moria.		 	
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7.2.2	Chios	and	VIAL			 The	VIAL	Hotspot,	unlike	the	Moria	Hotspot,	was	not	created	on	top	of	pre-existing	migration-related	infrastructure	but	was	made	“from	scratch”	after	previous	registration	venues	proved	inadequate.	For	example,	the	facility	in	Mirsinidi	did	not	have	internet	access,	and	fingerprints	were	taken	manually,	using	ink	and	paper	(Antonakaki	et	al.,	2016).		The	camp	was	developed	in	and	around	a	large,	metal	industrial	construction,	originally	built	as	an	aluminum	factory	(VIAL,	or	more	accurately	VI.AL.	is	the	English	translation	of	the	ΒΙ.ΑΛ	initials	for	βιομηχανία	αλουμινίου,	meaning	aluminum	manufacture).	Before	it	was	turned	into	a	Hotspot,	the	space	was	used	as	a	waste	processing	facility,	and	even	after	the	initiation	of	the	Hotspot,	a	large	part	of	the	metal	shed	would	still	function	as	such!		All	administrative	services	are	deployed	under	the	tin	roof	of	the	large	industrial	structure,	which	takes	up	the	center	of	the	camp.	In	the	open	space	around	the	structure,	containers	and	tents	formulate	the	“housing”	section	of	the	Hotspot.	A	metal	gate	blocks	and	regulates	the	west	entrance	to	the	shed,	with	direct	access	to	the	“houses”,	while	on	the	east	side,	a	fence	between	the	shed	and	the	“housing	containers”	forms	a	corridor	alongside	of	the	shed,	all	the	way	to	the	camp’s	main	entrance.		 Inside	the	large,	industrial	shed,	containers	house	the	administrative	and	other	services.	Two	centers	are	clearly	visible,	one	in	the	center	of	the	shed,	consisting	of	four	containers	connected	in	pairs,	with	a	small	space	between	them.	This	is	the	registration	venue.	The	first	two	containers	are	where	the	screening	interviews,	document	checks	and	occasionally	the	debriefing	interviews	happen.	After	that,	migrants	remain	in	the	space	between	the	container	complexes,	waiting	to	enter	the	other	two	containers,	where	photos	and	fingerprints	are	taken	and	the	documents	that	are	the	material	output	of	the	process	are	distributed.	The	other	administrative	“center”	is	formed	in	the	southwest	side	of	the	covered	space,	and	consists	of	the	chief’s	office,	and	one	more	complex	of	containers,	this	time	on	two	levels.	In	those	containers,	the	Greek	Asylum	Service	and	EASO	conduct	the	asylum	interviews,	as	well	as	other	asylum-related	procedures,	such	as	comparing	the	fingerprints	of	an	asylum	seeker	against	the	EURODAC	database.	Access	to	this	part	of	the	Hotspot	is	
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restricted	by	means	of	a	metal	door	and	private	security	guards.	At	the	time	of	my	visit,	such	security	measures	were	non-existent	for	containers	hosting	other	services,	such	as	doctors	and	even	the	screening	interviews,	and	are	indicative	of	the	connotations	that	the	asylum-handling	procedures	and	their	physical	agents	carry	in	the	migrant’s	views	and	actions.	It	has	been	reported	that	the	deployment	of	EASO	personnel	in	VIAL	was	delayed	until	the	completion	of	said	measures	as	there	were	concerns	about	their	safety	in	the	absence	of	the	latter	(Antonakaki	et	al.,	2016,	p.	12).	To	the	south	of	the	chief’s	office,	alongside	both	the	western	and	eastern	walls	of	the	shed,	additional	lines	of	containers	functioned	as	extra	office	space	for	GAS	and	EASO,	the	UNHCR	and	IOM,	as	well	as	NGOs	active	in	the	Hotspot.	These	included	the	Red	Cross	and	the	Doctors	without	Frontiers	(MSF),	offering	basic	medical	care,	Praksis,	which	was	busy	mainly	with	unaccompanied	minors,	MetaDrasis,	providing	translating	and	legal	services,	the	Women	and	Health	Alliance	International	(WAHA),	supporting	women,	the	Norwegian	Refugee	Council	(NRC),	offering	general	administrative	support,	and	the	Samaritan’s	Purse,	helping	with	food	and	non-food	item	distribution,		
7.3	Registration	in	the	Hotspots				 Despite	some	differences	that	are	mentioned	in	the	following	sections,	to	a	large	extent	the	registration	process	was	similar	in	both	islands,	as	it	was	developed	along	three	basic	axes:	the	screening	interview,	the	photo/biometric/personal	data	digital	entry,	and	the	output	of	documents.	In	both	cases,	the	screening,	documents	check	and	de-briefing	were	carried	out	in	different	containers	than	fingerprinting,	photo	taking	and	attribution	of	documents.	However,	in	Moria,	it	was	impossible	to	enter	the	screening	container,	and	most	information	around	screening	comes	from	visits	to	VIAL.	In	general,	I	could	say	that	with	regards	to	openness	when	it	comes	to	Police	officers	as	informants,	those	working	in	VIAL	were	of	much	more	value.	Without	further	evidence	to	support	this	assumption,	a	possible	explanation	for	this	could	be	the	explicit	negative	publicity	that	Moria	had	attracted	as	a	place	of	arbitrary	police	practices,	violence	and	repression,	which	were	often	the	cause	of	migrant	
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uprisings.	VIAL	on	the	other	hand,	would	also	see	its	share	of	the	above	practices,	however,	was	less	present	in	the	national	and	international	media.		
7.3.1	Pre-registration			 After	boats	landed	on	the	beach	or	were	rescued	at	sea,	migrants	were	transferred	to	the	Hotspots	for	registration.	The	means	of	transport	varied	from	time	to	time.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	6,	in	the	early	days	of	2015,	volunteer-run	transport	was	the	most	common	means,	which	was	later	discouraged	to	the	point	of	criminalization.	At	the	time	of	my	visits	(March	2016	and	summer	2017),	UNHCR	was	providing	transportation	from	the	beaches	to	the	Hotspot	with	buses	operated	by	a	local	business.	This	was	fairly	functional	considering	that	arrivals	at	the	time	were	low.	Once	the	buses	arrived	at	the	Hotspot,	people	underwent	what	NGO	workers	referred	to	as	pre-registration,	where	they	would	state	their	names	and	countries	of	origin.	At	this	point,	International	Organization	for	Migration	(IOM)	separated	people	into	groups	according	to	the	language	they	spoke,	and	tried	to	provide	each	group	with	a	first	briefing	on	their	rights,	obligations	and	their	legal	options.	A	representative	of	the	CFR/KYT	(Center	for	First	Registration,	2016	Δανάη),	informed	people	on	the	rules	and	regulations	of	the	camp	and	their	stay	at	the	“rap	hole”,	a	large	tent	structure	where	they	spent	their	time	waiting	for	the	procedures	to	progress.	As	my	informant	from	IOM	explained,	during	this	stage,	in	some	cases	there	would	be	some	Police	searches	in	the	form	of	frisking	and	bag	searching.	At	some	point,	the	commanding	officer	of	the	Police	asked	that	this	search	should	happen	before	the	legal	briefing,	which	remained	the	status	quo	for	a	while.	As	the	months	passed,	the	order	of	events	would	differ	from	time	to	time	according	to	objections	and	tensions	brought	forward	by	migrants.		After	this	short	briefing,	people	who	intended	to	apply	for	asylum	or	family	reunification	with	family	members	residing	in	other	EU	countries,	had	to	state	this	intention.	They	were	also	informed	that	if	they	were	granted	asylum,	they	would	be	allowed	to	embark	on	short	journeys,	that	if	they	do	not	gain	entry,	they	can	file	an	appeal	etc.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	time	margins	for	such	appeals	would	differ	from	time	to	time.	For	example,	since	April	2017,	the	time	margin	for	an	appeal	has	been	five	days,	which	was	considered	to	be	a	
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method	of	discouragement	by	the	government	in	order	to	have	fewer	appeals.	While	this	is	an	important	moment	when	migrants	need	to	make	decisions,	and	are	offered	legal	advice,	there	have	been	many	allegations	that	information	is	not	always	available	in	all	languages,	and	that	the	capacity	for	understanding	such	information	after	just	disembarked	from	boats	is	compromised,	to	say	the	least.	After	this	briefing,	some	(very	rare	cases)	would	opt	to	return	to	Turkey	in	accordance	with	the	readmission	agreement	between	the	two	countries.	Those	remaining	were	registered	in	some	preliminary	and	unofficial	lists,	offered	NFO	(non-food	items),	such	as	sleeping	bags	and	toiletries,	and	at	the	time	of	my	visit	at	least,	were	made	to	put	on	a	colored	wrist	band.	The	latter	gained	the	attention	of	the	Greek	media	for	a	short	period	of	time,	on	the	grounds	of	“marking”	people	and	thus	bearing	connotations	of	the	numbers	tattooed	on	concentration	camp	victims.	The	bracelets	were	color	coded,	with	each	color	signifying	a	day	of	arrival	during	the	week.	Finally,	they	were	handed	their	“health	cards”	and,	in	the	period	after	the	EU-Turkey	Statement,	which	is	discussed	in	chapter	8,	they	would	be	informed	about	the	restriction	of	movement	order,	which	would	apply	to	all	individuals.	The	preregistration	was	carried	out	by	UNHCR	and	IOM	personnel,	and	FRONTEX	and	the	Greek	Police	would	in	principle	not	participate,	unless	needed	for	“restoring	the	peace”.	Sometimes	however,	when	the	lines	in	the	official	registration	containers	became	scarce,	some	FRONTEX	officers	voluntarily	helped	with	the	distribution	of	food,	which	would	happen	in	close	vicinity	to	the	pre-registration.	As	the	leader	of	the	then	present	Dutch	task	force	told	me,	“The	presence	of	uniformed	men	helps	to	predispose	discipline.	Plus,	it	is	in	these	lines	that	we	can	look	for	suspicious	people,	maybe	you	see	someone	holding	a	kid	in	a	strange	way,	and	you	can	see	that	something	might	be	wrong”	(Interview	with	Anonymous	Dutch	Royal	Police	officer,	head	of	the	Dutch	Task	Fore,	Chios	(March	2016).			 All	this	was	typically	carried	out	at	the	entrance	to	the	Moria	Hotspot,	or	at	the	entrance	to	the	shed	in	VIAL.	From	there,	depending	on	the	influx	of	people	arriving,	they	would	be	taken	directly	to	the	registration	containers,	or	to	another	area	of	the	Hotspot	to	wait.		
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7.3.2	Screening	and	document	control			 Upon	entering	the	first	registration	container,	migrants	would	be	asked	to	present	any	personal	identification	documents	they	might	be	carrying	with	them.	Their	passport,	the	most	prominent	identification	document	in	the	world,	was	in	many,	perhaps	most,	cases	absent.	Travel	documents	can	and	often	do	get	lost	during	migrations.	They	can	be	stolen,	withheld	by	authorities	or	smugglers,	non-existent	in	the	first	place,	and	in	some	cases,	destroyed,	thrown	away,	or	hidden	by	their	owners.	Thus,	for	the	border	guards	working	here,	the	absence	of	a	passport	would	be	business	as	usual,	and	a	very	common	beginning	for	the	first	step	of	the	“identification”	process.	The	first	container	would	house	the	document	expert,	the	screeners	and	the	translators,	situated	in	adjoining	desks.	The	aforementioned	roles,	though	intertwined,	are	described	in	separate	paragraphs,	as	they	remain	distinct	processes.	
7.3.2.1	Screening		 The	screening	process,	in	both	the	Hotspots,	is	to	my	knowledge	the	part	of	the	registration	where	FRONTEX	is	involved	the	most	and	has	the	most	dominant	position.	FRONTEX	officers	also	remained	in	constant	training	mode,	providing	information	and	know-how	to	Greek	Police	officers	who	had	undergone	screening	training	in	the	past.	The	principle	goal	of	the	screening	process	is	to	“establish	a	presumed	nationality”,	as	well	as	to	confirm	or	denounce	other	claims	they	might	be	making	about	themselves,	such	as	age	and	family	relationships.	As	FRONTEX	themselves	put	it,	“As	the	vast	majority	of	migrants	arrive	undocumented,	screening	activities	are	essential	to	properly	verify	their	declaration	of	nationality.	False	declarations	of	nationality	are	rife	among	nationals	who	are	unlikely	to	obtain	asylum	in	the	EU,	are	liable	to	be	returned	to	their	country	of	origin	or	transit,	or	just	want	to	speed	up	their	journey.	With	a	large	number	of	persons	arriving	with	false	or	no	identification	documents	or	raising	concerns	over	the	validity	of	their	claimed	nationality	–	with	no	thorough	check	or	penalties	in	place	for	those	making	such	false	declarations,	there	is	a	risk	that	some	persons	representing	a	security	threat	to	the	EU	may	be	taking	advantage	of	this	situation.”(FRONTEX,	2016).		
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It	easily	becomes	clear	that	this	is	an	important	moment	of	the	border	work	that	we	meet	in	the	Hotspot	-	one	that	also	produces	very	persistent	outcomes.	As	I	discuss	later	in	this	chapter,	while	the	assessment	of	the	screening	committee	can	be	appealed,	in	the	reality	of	the	Hotspot,	such	an	appeal	is	a	highly	time-consuming	process	that	also	depends	on	other	forms	of	“capital”	that	the	migrant	may	or	may	not	bear.	In	principle,	the	rationale	under	which	screening	is	conducted	is	that	the	border	guards	examine	and	assess	an	individual’s	familiarity	with	cultural,	linguistic,	political	and	economic	“standards”	of	the	claimed	country	of	origin.	This	includes	the	person’s	dialect	and	accent,	but	also	their	ability	to	recognize	currency,	street	names,	locations,	figures	of	politicians	and	singers,	vehicle	license	plates	and	so	on.	Towards	that	goal,	FRONTEX	officers	have	compiled	a	paper	dossier	with	pages	containing	the	above-mentioned	pictures,	which	they	ask	migrants	to	point	out.	In	addition,	they	have	developed	a	set	of	around	110	questions	that	they	pose	to	migrants	to	indicate	familiarity	with	the	claimed	country	of	origin.	The	questions	are	mixed	up	and	circulated	to	avoid	the	emergence	of	“routine	tests”.	While	this	is	the	“protocol”	for	the	process,	officers	often	function	outside	that,	as	the	following	ethnographic	vignette4	demonstrates	and	as	I	discuss	in	the	following	paragraphs.	With	regard	to	the	possibility	of	appealing	a	nationality	assessment,	IOM	in	Lesvos	informed	me	that	there	is	no	specific	form	that	one	can	fill	in	to	appeal	against	the	screening	assessment.	Appeals	have	been	conducted	orally.	They	also	informed	me	of	cases	of	Moroccans	being	registered	as	Algerians,	as	well	as	West	Saharans.	According	to	my	informant,	if	the	appeal	was	filed	in	CFR/KYT,	(Center	of	First	Reception/	Κέντρο	Πρώτης	Υποδοχής)	it	would	have	to	be	backed	up	by																																																									4		 In	this	chapter	I	will	use	vignettes	as	pieces	of	text	in	italics	that	will	set	selected	ethnographic	data	apart	from	the	flow	of	the	text,	in	the	form	of	short,	descriptive	sketches.	The	vignettes	will	capture	specific,	data-dense	instances	of	the	function	of	the	Hotspot	that	I	came	across	during	my	fieldwork.	Vignettes	are	used	as	a	form	of		being	there	material(Bonisch-Brednich,	2018),		as	a	narrative	form	that	enhances	an	ethnographic	account	(Jacobsen,	2014),	creating	pieces	of	text	within	the	text,	reserved	for	latter	discussion	and	analysis.		
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original	documents	that	had	to	be	presented	on	the	same	day,	which	would	basically	render	the	possibility	of	a	well-funded	appeal	close	to	impossible.	If	the	appeal	involved	a	change	in	the	personal	data		and	was	filed	with	the	Asylum	Service	(GAS),	once	again,	original	documents	would	be	requested,	but	photocopies	might	also	be	accepted.	The	Asylum	Service	has	neither	the	means	nor	personnel	to	verify	documents,	thus	they	would	sometimes	send	documents	back	to	FRONTEX	experts	for	control.	It	is	unclear	whether	the	controls	would	differ	in	terms	of	thoroughness,	as	the	already	mentioned	interplay	between	document	expert	and	screener	would	now	be	absent.	
7.3.2.2	Ethnographic	vignette	1		
	 During	my	second	visit	to	VIAL	during	the	summer	of	2017,	I	had	the	chance	
to	interview	a	screener	of	the	Greek	Police.	This	visit	was	arranged	by	the	
administration	of	the	First	Reception	Agency	(FRA/ΥΠΥ),	unlike	my	first	visit	in	
March	2016,	when	I	had	to	come	into	direct	contact	with	the	Ministry	of	Migration.	
The	administrative	change	seemed	to	have	had	an	important	effect	on	the	form	of	
communication	that	was	now	available	to	researchers,	as	well	as	the	kind	of	
information	rendered	available.	“Visitors”	were	now	“offered”	90-minute	time	slots	
for	a	meeting	with	the	chief	of	the	Center	of	First	Reception	and	Identification	
(CFRI/ΚΥΤ)	Theofilos	Tsigalagis,	who	would	then	direct	them	to	other	officials	
according	to	the	need	of	the	researcher	and	their	own	facility.	
	 During	my	meeting	with	the	chief,	I	got	the	feeling	of	being	offered	pre-
determined,	non-informative,	automatic	answers.	When	I	told	him	that	I	was	
interested	in	talking	to	some	police	officers	working	at	the	Hotspot,	he	was	very	
willing	to	call	their	chief	and	introduce	me:	“Mr	Vlassis,	here,	is	authorized	by	the	
Ministry	to	conduct	research	on	the	registration	process.	Please	show	him	around	
the	container,	and	let	him	talk	to	the	officers.”	A	short	walk	later,	my	very	lively	and	
loud	escort	and	I	entered	the	FRONTEX	container	where	the	screening	interviews	
were	conducted.	One	Greek	Police	officer	in	civilian	clothes	was	sitting	there	alone,	
looking	at	a	tablet	screen.	As	there	had	been	no	arrivals	in	recent	days,	there	was	
no	one	to	interview.	I	was	told	later	that	it	became	standard	those	months	in	such	
cases	for	the	FRONTEX	officers	to	be	informed	and	they	are	now	not	required	to	be	
present.	My	escort	introduced	me	to	the	Greek	screener	and	to	my	surprise	added:	
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“He	will	come	back	later	for	an	interview.	You	tell	him	everything”.	His	words	do	
not	go	unnoticed,	as	the	screening	officer	was	indeed	very	open	and	willing	to	
discuss	his	work.	
	“I	received	my	first	training	in	2007.	Initially,	the	Hellenic	Police	officers	
would	receive	training	from	FRONTEX	and	then	some	of	them	would	become	
trainers	themselves	and	train	more	Greek	officers.	The	training	lasted	for	3-5	
days(!)	depending	on	whether	or	not	de-briefing	training	is	included.	We	receive	
information	on	human	rights,	vulnerable	social	groups,	stateless	persons,	
traumatized	individuals	etc.”		
While	discussing	the	methods	used	to	assess	a	person’s	nationality,	he	
showed	me	a	large	dossier	containing	pages	and	pages	of	pictures	of	flags,	bank	
notes,	photos	of	countries’	presidents,	popular	singers,	universities,	monuments	and	
mosques.	He	then	goes	on	to	say:	“Each	screener	has	his	(sic)	own	method,	his	own	
measures.	Some	still	use	this	old-fashioned	dossier.	I	think	this	is	an	outdated	
method	…	We	hear	and	I	believe	that	in	Turkey	there	are	schools	where	they	train	
them	how	to	pass	as	different	nationalities	than	those	they	are.”	
“Everything	has	changed	with	the	internet.	Now	you	can	ask	someone	their	
address,	and	immediately	see	what	exists	next	to	their	house	and	ask	them	about	it.	
For	that	reason,	I	make	sure	I	always	have	data	on	my	phone,	because	sometimes	
the	connection	here	might	go	down.	With	Google	Maps,	even	if	they	are	e.g.	from	a	
village	with	no	street	names	and	such,	you	can	ask	them	about	neighboring	
villages,	mountains,	and	rivers.”	
He	mentioned	that	sometimes	they	allowed	the	person	being	registered	to	
write	their	own	name	in	Latin	characters	as	“this	can	also	be	telling	and	used	to	
form	a	conclusion”.	At	this	point,	he	pulled	out	a	small	notebook	from	his	backpack	
and	showed	me	different	ways	of	spelling	the	name	Mohammad.	“Syrians	write	it	
like	this	but	never	like	this,	Moroccans	write	it	like	this	but	never	like	this,”	he	said,	
adding	that,	“Sometimes,	the	way	they	write	their	name	makes	me	have	second	
thoughts	and	be	inclined	not	to	believe	their	story.	
	 “We	work	a	lot	based	on	our	instinct	and	intuition.	Sometimes,	the	moment	
they	walk	through	the	door,	you	already	have	an	opinion,	and	then	you	seek	to	
validate	it.	
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	 “Occasionally,	just	by	the	flow	of	their	speech,	I	am	persuaded	and	sure	
whether	they	are	truly	from	there.	And	I	don't	even	have	to	ask	the	translator.	Of	
course,	if	they	have	a	strong	opinion,	I	consider	it.	It	can	be	the	case	that	their	
clothes	indicate	elsewhere,	maybe	they	are	wearing	a	ring,	for	example,	that	I	know	
is	from	Afghanistan.”	
	 At	this	point,	the	official	said	that	he	knew	the	Asylum	Service	was	in	a	
position	to	make	changes	in	the	data	of	the	person	being	registered	and	that	in	a	
way	makes	him	feel	safer	with	regard	to	his	conclusions.	“Here	we	have	20	minutes	
maximum	to	make	decisions,	people	are	tired,	scared,	babies	are	crying	in	their	
mothers’	arms.	After	a	few	days,	they	have	rested,	they	have	been	told	their	rights	
and	the	Asylum	Service	officers	have	more	time	to	do	their	job.	So,	if	we	make	a	
mistake,	it	can	be	fixed.	That	makes	me	feel	safer,	and	I	think	it	works	the	same	for	
my	colleagues.	We	are	not	gods	you	know…	So,	if	people	protest	my	decision,	they	
may	do	it	for	a	thousand	reasons,	but	I	won’t	change	it,	because	I	know	that	there	is	
a	second	procedure.”	I	wonder	if	he	is	aware	of	the	time	limitations	regarding	the	
objections	a	person	can	raise.	
	 He	then	told	me	the	story	of	a	Syrian	woman	who	crossed	the	border	with	
her	children	to	meet	her	Kuwaiti	husband	who	already	had	asylum	status	in	the	
UK.	“In	Syria,	you	don't	get	nationality	from	your	mother,	so	the	children	were	
basically	stateless.”	The	father	had	to	send	birth	certificates	from	the	UK,	and	the	
outcome	was	that	they	were	recognized	as	Kuwaitis.	None	of	us	knows	what	would	
have	happened	if	the	father	had	not	been	in	a	position	to	provide	the	birth	
certificates,	however	he	implied	that	it	would	be	“complicated”.	Testimonies	of	instinct-led	border	work	when	it	comes	to	screening	are	not	limited	to	oral	accounts	of	officers	working	in	the	field	but	make	their	appearance	in	official	FRONTEX	material.	“You	develop	a	kind	of	sixth	sense	for	when	people	are	not	telling	you	the	truth,”	said	a	“policewoman	with	20	years’	experience”	from	Denmark	(FRONTEX	&	Fergusson,	2014,	p.	34).	Another	field-informed	account	of	screening	arose	when,	in	Lesvos,	I	had	the	opportunity	to	interview	the	then	Operational	Coordinator	of	the	FRONTEX	mission,	Francisco	Ramos,	a	Spanish	officer	who	all	other	officers	of	all	
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nationalities	referred	to	as	Paco5.	Even	though	the	interview	was	an	official	interview,	during	which	he	talked	to	me	as	a	representative	of	FRONTEX,	he	still	did	not	want	it	to	be	recorded.	When	the	discussion	came	to	the	task	of	screening,	Paco	was	not	shy	of	offering	an	account	that	did	not	exactly	radiate	positivism	regarding	the	assessment	provided	by	the	screeners.	“The	outcome	of	screening	is	not	a	scientific	fact.	It	is	a	working	hypothesis,	the	best	we	can	do	and	what	we	will	work	with.”	While	this	testimony	coming	from	a	high-ranking	field	officer	may	seem	to	conflict	with	FRONTEX’s	self-declared	task	of	“properly	verifying”	a	migrant’s	declaration	of	nationality,	one	can	meet	the	same	general	attitude	in	FRONTEX’s	operational	handbook	from	2014,	where	a	screener	is	described	as	“an	officer	of	a	competent	authority	of	an	MS	who	interviews	and	establishes	assumptions	on	the	nationality	of	an	undocumented	person”	(FRONTEX,	2014a)	and	the	whole	process	of	screening	as	being	“carried	out	to	establish	a	presumed	nationality”	(FRONTEX	2014,	p22).		
7.3.2.3	The	interpreter		 As,	in	principle,	FRONTEX	and	Greek	Police	officers	are	not	trained	in	the	languages	spoken	by	most	migrants,	and	many	migrants	don't	speak	European	languages,	the	screening	interview	requires	the	presence	of	an	interpreter.	The	agency	of	interpreters	working	in	asylum-related	procedures,	but	also	in	other	public	service	contexts,	has	been	discussed	by	migration	scholars,	as	well	as	sociolinguists	and	interpreting	studies	scholars	(Craig,	2012)(Eades,	2005)	(Nick	&	Cambier-Langeveld,	2018).	While	often	considered	as	a	sort	of	passive	and	neutral	human	translation	apparatus	with	the	main	issue	being	their	competence,	interpreters	are	instead	seen	in	a	large	body	of	this	work	as	active	agents	in	the	process	they	are	involved	in,	whose	mediation	in	the	communication	is	vital,	even	if	they,	or	other	parties	involved,	are	not	aware	of	this	importance.	Some	researchers	have	straightforwardly	argued	that	asylum	seekers’	stories	are	radically	re-rendered	during	their	translation	for	the	needs	of	asylum	handling	committees,	to	the	point	of	costing	them	their	recognition	as																																																									5	“Paco”	is	a	Spanish	slang	word	for	Police	officer,	or	cop.	It	is	also	a	reference	to	the	1973	film	Serpico,	where	the	main	character	is	a	police	officer	with	the	same	name	who	tried	to	fight	police	corruption	It	seems	more	likely	that	the	earlier	was	the	inspiration	in	the	specific	case.	
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refugees	(Maryns,	2006).	Others	point	out	the	importance	of	“language	ideologies”	at	play,	seeing	the	latter	as	“systematic	ways	of	using	language	in	a	particular	way,	directing	the	formation	of	meanings,	creating	a	prototypical	set	of	oral,	written,	and	multimodal	genres	and	texts,	and	enacting,	reifying,	and	enforcing	ideologies	within	a	field	of	activity	or	an	institution”(Maatta,	2015).	The	present	thesis	cannot	and	will	not	explore	the	issues	of	linguistics	and	interpretation	in	depth.	However,	there	are	some	points	to	make	regarding	the	interpreter	as	an	actor	in	the	Hotspot	and	as	part	of	a	group	of	border	guards.	These	are	stemming	from	my	research	in	VIAL,	and	it	is	unknown	if	the	same	can	be	said	about	Moria.	In	the	context	of	Hotspots,	and	with	regard	to	everyday	organizational	communication,	most	of	the	interpreters	present	would	be	employed	by	NGOs.	NGOs,	such	as	MetaDrasi,	are	focused	on	providing	translation	and	intercultural	mediation,	while	others	are	present	as	support	organizations,	busy	with	protection	of	minors,	such	as	Praxis.	In	most	cases,	interpreters	are	persons	of	migratory	background,	and	in	some	cases	are	people	who	also	entered	EU	“irregularly”,	were	recognized	as	refugees,	and	developed	a	social	circle	and	a	new	life	in	the	Greek	islands.	Thus,	many,	if	not	most,	would	show	empathy	and	genuine	interest	in	the	incoming	migrants.	However,	and	even	so,	finding	a	translator	and	obtaining	their	services	was	a	complex	matter	of	social	engineering	and	“habitus”,	as	they	would	often	be	tired	and	very	busy,	which	would	affect	and	limit	both	their	professional	and	emotional	capacities.	This,	in	combination	with	the	insecure	and	vulnerable	position	of	the	migrants,	could	and	often	did	lead	to	tensions	in	many	aspects	of	everyday	life	in	the	camp,	like	healthcare	and	food	distribution.		When	it	came	to	screening	and	document	checks	however,	things	would	change	as	anticipated.	In	contrast	with	the	other	activities	mentioned	before,	these	are	conceived	as	highly	related	to	security	concerns.	The	compassionate	attitude	of	the	interpreters,	who	in	addition	often	inhabited	different	communities	within	the	Hotspot	than	those	inhabited	by	border	guards	and	higher-ranking	administrative	staff,	were	in	some	cases	perceived	as	a	potential	motive	that	could	undermine	the	validity	of	the	translation	offered.	Suspicion	of	this	kind,	present	in	many	aspects	of	migration	governance	(Anderson	et	al.,	
		 130	
2014)	was	not	limited	to	interpreters	working	for	NGOs	but	seemed	to	be	directed	even	towards	interpreters	employed	by	FRONTEX	and	the	Greek	Police.	In	certain	cases,	however,	group	dynamics	and	long-term	cooperation	would	annul	it,	as	was	the	case	of	the	Dutch	task	force	mentioned	above,	where	the	interpreter,	employed	by	the	Dutch	Royal	Police	force,	was	considered	a	fully	trustworthy,	integral	element	of	the	team.	The	testimony	of	the	Dutch	border	guards	about	interpreters	would	mention	them	as	“naturalized”	migrants,	on	account	of	them	having	spent	a	big	part	of	their	lives	in	Europe	and	“having	European	passports”.	This	positioning	seems	to	be	in	line	with	FRONTEX’s	handbook,	which	on	the	interpreters’	collaboration	with	screening	officers,	reads:	“An	important	task	for	the	interpreter	is	to	give	the	screening	expert	feedback	on	the	reliability	of	the	information	received.	Their	own	experience,	language	expertise	and	cultural	background	are	valuable	assets	that	can	be	used	to	evaluate	the	credibility	and	reliability	of	the	information	provided	by	the	migrant.”	(FRONTEX	2014,	p24).		
7.3.2.4	Document	control		 At	a	desk	adjoined	to	the	screener’s,	a	document	expert	sits	at	a	workstation	occupied	most	of	the	time	by	FRONTEX	officers.	While	screening,	at	least	in	FRONTEX’s	narrative,	serves	aims	that	exceed	the	detection	of	attempts	of	deception,	as	for	example	recognizing	vulnerable	individuals	(FRONTEX,	2014b),	document	control	is	by	nature	an	even	more	suspicion-led	process.	In	the	setting	of	migration-related	document	control,	as	the	latter	is	applied	in	the	institutional	setting	of	the	Hotspot,	scholars	(Webber,	2015),	have	been	skeptical	regarding	the	institutional	origin	of	the	officers	performing	it.	As	Webber	mentions,	there	is	the	danger	that	“seconded	civil	servants	from	member	states’	interior	ministries”	that	will	be	imported	to	take	on	the	task	will	have	their	mindset	“attuned	to	detecting	fraud	rather	than	responding	to	need”(Webber,	2015).	It	is	hard	to	grasp	the	nature	of	the	operational	capacity	and	training	of	all	FRONTEX	officers	deployed	in	the	Hotspots	over	time.	Most	of	the	information	I	could	get	on	this,	and	which	I	will	present,	came	from	the	seemingly	highly	trained	Dutch	document	expert,	who	was	part	of	a	Dutch	task	force	sent	in	a	supplementary	capacity	by	the	Dutch	government.	
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	 The	document	check	in	the	Hotspots	happens	under	a	very	special	regime	related	to	other	border	venues,	such	as	airports	or	“regular”	crossing	points.	While	in	the	latter,	the	presence	of	a	passport,	or	other	travel	document,	is	an	absolute	perquisite	for	crossing	a	border;	irregularized	migrants	are	often	unable	to	present	such	documents.	The	reasons	for	that	can	differ.	The	documents	can	be	lost,	stolen,	destroyed	during	the	journey,	or	sometimes	withheld	by	smugglers.	In	other	cases,	people	may	have	documents	with	them,	but	choose	not	to	present	them,	in	order	to	support	their	nationality	claim,	which	if	successful,	might	give	them	better	chances	in	their	asylum	applications.	In	other	cases,	a	feeling	of	general	mistrust	towards	authorities	may	lead	them	to	adopt	the	same	practice.	However,	even	in	cases	where	a	passport	is	presented,	it	is	not	necessarily	accepted	as	sufficient	proof	of	a	person’s	identity.	FRONTEX	considers	“travel	document	fraud”	to	be	“one	of	the	biggest	challenges	for	European	border	guards”	(FRONTEX,	2018).	Thus,	passports	are	subjected	to	checks	much	more	often	than	at	other	border	venues.		While	the	forging	of	travel	documents	is	definitely	a	significant	factor,	with	an	extensive	market	developed	around	it,	it	is	not	the	only	way	that	migrants	try	to	circumnavigate	European	border	control.	It	is	not	impossible	to	obtain	genuine	documents	published	by	authorities	using	falsified	documents,	such	as	birth	or	marriage	certificates,	that	are	published	and	circulated	under	a	less	strict	regime.	And	the	black	market	of	travel	documents	includes	the	selling	and	buying	of	authentic	passports	between	people	who	resemble	one	another.		The	document	expert	not	only	verifies	the	validity	or	detects	the	forging	of	a	document.	Things	can	also	proceed	in	the	opposite	direction.	In	some	cases,	due	to	time	pressure	or	perhaps	the	efforts	of	a	sophisticated	and	talented	forger,	fraud	documents	may	pass	undetected.	In	some	of	these	cases	however,	their	bearer	be	unable	to	maintain	their	story	and	may	admit	to	the	“fraud”.	In	such	cases,	the	document	is	proved	forged	a	posteriori	based	on	the	screener’s	work	and	conclusions.	The	document	is	then	subjected	to	a	more	thorough	examination,	this	time	under	the	knowledge	of	it	being	fake.	This	examination	provides	more	knowledge	about	the	modus	operandi	of	document	forgers,	which	is	documented	and	augments	the	existing	body	of	knowledge	on	the	issue.	
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While	the	above	may	be	the	case	when	it	comes	to	passports	and	ID	cards,	as	I	have	mentioned,	in	most	cases,	these	kinds	of	documents	are	absent.	Sometimes,	migrants	would	present	other	documents,	such	as	marriage	or	birth	certificates,	or	even	documents	published	by	their	local	municipalities,	which	are	in	general	produced	under	far	less	strict	security	protocols	than	passports.	The	document	expert	belonging	to	the	Dutch	team	informed	me	that	there	is	very	little	standardization	of	the	resources	used	for	these	papers	in	countries	such	as	Afghanistan.	Also,	there	is	little	knowledge	on	behalf	of	the	EU	on	the	standards,	materials	and	methods	used	in	the	production	of	said	documents	(Interview	with	Anonymous	Dutch	Royal	Police	officer,	document	expert,	member	of	the	Dutch	Task	Force,	Chios	(March	2016)).	Therefore,	it	is	hard	to	make	decisive	assessments	of	their	validity.	Also,	in	some	cases,	storage	locations	of	supplies	like	paper	used	in	governmental	services	have	been	looted	or	fallen	under	militia	control,	and	their	content	distributed	to	unknown	agents,	making	it	possible	for	other	actors	to	produce	forged	documents	of	very	high	quality.	In	the	case	of	the	presence	of	documents	other	than	passports,	the	FRONTEX	officer	constantly	referred	to	his	familiarity	with	printing	methods,	paper	qualities	and	so	on.	While	examining	such	papers,	equipment	like	the	UV	light	machine	that	he	had	on	his	desk	were	of	little	help.	A	tool	that	seems	to	be	more	useful	was	a	dossier	containing	all	information	concerning	different	protocols	and	methods	of	“third	countries”,	which	is	constantly	enriched	and	shared	among	different	European	border	agencies.	However,	there	are	many	“areas”	about	which	there	is	little	or	no	information.	In	such	cases,	the	document	expert’s	account	of	his	methods	is	full	of	references	to	qualities	such	as	“fine	print”,	“brightness	of	color”	and	“texture	of	the	paper”	(Interview	with	Anonymous	Dutch	Royal	Police	officer,	document	expert,	member	of	the	Dutch	Task	Force,	Chios	(March	2016)).	He	processes	these	quantities,	through	the	use	of	what	could	be	called	“document	maturity”,	or	expertise,	which,	however,	is	non-communicable,	or	purely	measurable.		
7.3.3	Photos	and	fingerprinting		 Migrants	who	have	been	through	the	screening	interview	are	ordered	to	wait	before	they	are	called	into	a	separate	container	for	the	remainder	of	the	
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procedure.	The	different	spatial	arrangement	of	the	containers,	but	also	the	more	structural	difference	among	the	two	Hotspots,	Moria	being	a	much	bigger,	more	open-air,	ex-military	camp,	and	VIAL	with	all	its	administrative	venues	inside	a	shed,	produced	some	minor	differences	in	this	stage.		In	VIAL,	migrants	who	had	completed	the	screening	were	handed	a	memo	with	their	personal	data	written	on	it,	which	they	themselves	had	to	hand	to	the	officers	working	in	the	next	container.	The	space	between	the	two	containers	was	small	and	bounded	by	a	barrier	space	containing	a	few	chairs.	In	Moria,	however,	there	was	more	open	space	–	the	size	of	a	small	schoolyard	–	where	migrants	waited	during	various	phases	of	registration.	Because	this	space	was	more	accessible,	it	was	easier	for	people	to	try	and	falsify	their	memo,	or	at	least	this	was	the	conviction	of	some	officers.	Thus,	the	memo	was	not	handed	over.	Instead,	every	person	would	be	called	and	escorted	by	an	officer	to	the	next	container,	with	the	small	piece	of	paper	changing	hands	only	between	border	guards.	This	of	course,	was	a	slower	process.	The	containers	hosting	this	stage	of	the	registration	in	VIAL	are	connected	lengthwise,	forming	a	corridor,	the	left	side	of	which	is	occupied	by	a	series	of	desks,	each	equipped	with	a	desktop	computer.	The	first	one	in	line	has	a	camera	mounted	on	top	of	its	monitor,	facing	away	from	the	operator.	The	three	subsequent	containers	have	no	accessories,	while	the	two	before	the	last	one	are	equipped	with		fingerprint	scanners	(or	EURODAC	machine,	as	the	operators	call	it).	Finally,	the	last	one	is	connected	to	a	simple	printer.	The	computers	are	connected	to	each	other	so	that	the	users	share	the	same	Excel	documents	on	which	they	list	the	migrant’s	data.	This	is	the	“tube”	the	Police	officers	refer	to,	and	it	is	a	sort	of	Tayloristic	line	of	production,	through	which	every	incoming	migrant	must	pass	in	order	to	be	registered.	The	first	workstation	in	this	line	is	supposed	to	be	operated	by	an	officer	from	the	Port	Police,	but	that	is	not	always	the	case,	as	Greek	Police	officers	often	fill	in	the	position.	The	person	behind	the	desk	calls	the	migrants	waiting	outside,	individually	or	in	groups	if	it	is	a	family.	They	collect	the	papers	the	screeners	have	provided	and	fill	in	the	written	data	in	an	excel	file	that	is	shared	among	all	the	computers	in	the	container.	They	mark	the	Excel	cells	that	concern	family	members	with	colors,	so	that	their	colleagues	down	the	line	know	this	is	a	family.	
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Then	every	person	has	their	picture	taken,	and	their	passport	is	also	photographed.	Apparently,	that	last	task	was	an	idea	from	the	head	of	the	Dutch	task	force	who	later	told	me	he	was	hoping	someone	would	develop	an	application	that	could	read	the	machine-readable	zone	of	the	passport	from	a	photo.	While	the	photos	are	taken,	the	second	and	third	workstations	perform	a	check	based	on	the	names	against	the	SIS	II	database,	as	well	as	the	national	database	of	aliens.	They	temporarily	mark	each	entry	with	a	letter	so	that	they	know	which	operator	is	working	on	which	entry.	During	my	first	visit	in	2016,	there	was	no	biometric	check;	people	were	only	checked	based	on	the	phonetic	spelling	of	the	names.	Then,	the	entries,	accompanied	with	the	photos	are	entered	in	the	national	database	of	Mapping	Aliens	of	the	Greek	Police.		After	the	photos	are	taken,	and	the	data	is	entered	in	the	Excel	file,	the	migrants	are	directed	into	the	second	container,	where	the	fingerprint	scanners	are	housed.	The	“EURODAC	operators”	call	them	one	by	one,	and	clean	their	hands	using	an	antiseptic	and	a	piece	of	cloth.	First,	they	scan	the	palm	of	the	hand,	then	they	take	a	“rolling	fingerprint”	of	each	finger,	then	the	four	fingers	except	the	thumb,	and	then	a	“static	print”	of	the	thumb.	A	monitor	connected	to	the	scanner	displays	green	and	red	indications	showing	a	successful	capture	of	the	fingerprint.	The	end	of	the	process	is	marked	by	a	“confirmation”	or	memo	being	issued.	This	is	the	process	for	many	of	the	cases.	However,	situations	that	are	“unscripted”	occur	relatively	frequently.	
7.3.4.	The	memo			 The	last	desk	in	the	line	or	“tube”	is	equipped	with	a	simple	printer.	Those	operating	these	workstations,	both	in	Lesvos	and	Chios,	are	responsible	for	producing	the	material	outcome	of	the	registration	process,	which	would	be	a	paper	with	the	personal	data	of	the	migrants	written	on	it.	This	was	a	simple	piece	of	paper	printed	on	a	basic	laser	printer	by	the	officer	operating	the	computer	at	the	last	“station”	in	the	final	container.	At	the	time	of	my	visit,	citizens	of	Syria,	Palestine,	Somalia,	Sudan,	Eritrea,	Yemen	and	Iraq	would	receive	a	paper	that	the	border	guards	would	refer	to	as	“confirmation”.	People	of	other	nationalities	would	receive	a	“memo”.	A	“confirmation”	or	a	“memo”	was	a	perquisite	for	someone	obtaining	a	ferry	ticket	that	would	take	them	to	the	
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mainland	(at	least	officially).	In	addition,	the	data	written	on	the	“confirmation/memo”,	especially	nationality,	had	(or	were	considered	to	have)	important	consequences	for	their	bearer’s	mobility.	The	“confirmation”	would	allow	someone	to	be	in	Greek	state	territory	for	a	time	period	of	six	months,	while	the	memo	was	only	good	for	one.		Different	nationalities	would	receive	different	treatment	upon	arrival	in	the	port	of	Piraeus.	I	cannot	say	with	certainty	what	power	the	specific	“confirmation/memo”	would	have	outside	the	Greek	state’s	territory,	however	in	the	last	months	of	2015,	the	north	border	of	Greece	to	Macedonia	was	closed	to	all	nationalities	except	Syrians,	Afghans	and	Iraqis(Protothema.gr,	2015).	All	of	the	above	rendered	the	memo	an	important	asset	for	migrants	and,	as	expected,	a	black	market	in	falsified,	altered	and	original	“confirmations”	soon	flourished	within	as	well	as	outside	the	Hotspot.		During	my	first	visit	in	VIAL	in	March	2016,	alongside	the	FRONTEX	officers	deployed	by	the	agency,	there	was	a	Dutch	task	force	of	Dutch	border	guards.	During	that	period,	the	Netherlands	was	under	the	presidency	of	the	EU,	and	had	decided	to	augment	the	deployed	corpus	of	FRONTEX	by	sending	men,	boats	and	land	vehicles	to	contribute	to	patrolling,	rescue	at	sea,	and	registration.	The	head	of	this	mission	came	up	with	a	method	to	upgrade	the	level	of	security	of	the	“confirmations”	and	the	memos,	by	ordering	and	having	made	a	metal	device	resembling	a	stapler	in	form,	which	was	used	to	mark	the	documents	with	a	sort	of	“invisible	stamp”	that	could	only	be	identified	in	the	hands	of	looking	for	it	by	running	their	fingers	through	the	document.	The	Dutch	border	guards	then	asked	their	Greek	colleagues	to	inform	all	travel	agents	of	the	islands	about	the	existence	of	the	“stamp”	and	only	to	issue	tickets	if	it	was	presence.	During	my	second	visit	in	VIAL,	I	was	informed	that	the	confirmation	was	substituted	by	a	paper	triptych,	from	which	people	were	now	busy	trying	to	remove	a	red	stamp,	and	that	departure	from	the	island	was	possible	only	for	people	included	on	a	special	list	compiled	by	the	Port	Police.	Almost	every	single	Police	officer	I	talked	to	in	Moria	and	VIAL	had	something	to	say	along	the	lines	of	how	undermined	the	registration	process	is	with	regard	to	people	being	able	to	undertake	the	procedure	again	under	different	“identities”.	“Nothing	stops	someone	from	going	down	to	the	beach,	mingling	with	the	crowd	from	a	new	arrival,	and	coming	back	here	to	register	again”.	At	this	point	in	time,	(March	
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2016)	fingerprints	are	only	stored	and	not	used	for	identification.	Thus,	it	is	not	only	possible	but	also	easy	for	migrants	to	take	another	shot	at	the	interview,	or	obtain	a	memo	with	different	data	written	on	it	etc.	“It	has	reached	the	point	where	we	had	to	put	up	pictures	of	certain	people	inside	the	screening	container	so	that	they	would	not	be	able	to	come	back”(Interview	with	Anonymous	Greek	Police	officer,	Desktop	operator	in	registration	container,	Lesvos	(March	2016).	I	will	now	turn	again	to	an	ethnographic	vignette,	presenting	my	observations	from	the	fingerprinting	containers	in	VIAL	in	March	2016.		
7.3.4.1	Ethnographic	vignette			
12-03-2016,	VIAL	
	
	 The	registration	“tube”	is	at	full	working	capacity.	Around	350	persons	have	
been	registered	today.	In	the	space	between	the	screening/debriefing	container	
and	the	fingerprint/photo	container,	people	who	have	been	screened	wait	
patiently,	papers	in	hand	to	be	called	into	the	next	container.	Earlier,	however,	the	
system	was	down	for	an	hour	or	so,	due	to	unspecified	reasons.	When	asked	about	
it,	the	officers	replied	that	they	are	waiting	for	a	new	order	that	will	specify	
whether	Afghans	will	be	detained	or	not.	They	say	that	changes	like	that	occur	
often.	“Tomorrow	is	another	day	and	it	will	be	different	again”.	Two	young	
migrants	caused	a	“flag	report”	during	their	screening	and	are	waiting	for	a	police	
car	to	take	them	to	the	station.	One	of	them	is	Palestinian.	
	 When	the	system	functions	properly,	the	operator	of	the	first	workstation	
calls	the	people	waiting	outside	to	come	in,	one	by	one,	or	by	family	group.	The	
operator	collects	the	papers	the	screeners	have	given	them,	and	briefly	checks	if	the	
data	written	on	them	match	the	passports	(if	passports	are	presented).	
Occasionally,	he	asks	how	a	name	is	pronounced.	He	feeds	the	data	into	the	Excel	
file	that	is	always	open	in	all	the	computers,	and	then	takes	photos	of	every	
passport	and	every	person.	Parents	smooth	the	hair	and	adjust	the	clothes	of	their	
children	before	telling	them	to	look	at	the	camera.	Some	children	then	rush	to	the	
computer	to	look	at	their	picture.	Popular	Greek	music	is	emanating	from	the	
speakers	that	one	of	the	Police	officers	has	connected	to	his	computer.	Some	Syrian	
		 137	
children,	after	checking	their	photo,	dance	to	the	music	before	their	parents	pick	
them	up.	
	 The	second	desk	has	no	interaction	with	the	migrants.	Its	operator	copies	
and	pastes	the	data	from	the	Excel	files	and	feeds	them	into	Police	On	Line	(POL	the	
Hellenic	Police	Systems).	He	also	checks	the	names	against	the	Schengen	
Information	System	II	(SIS	II),	the	European	database	for	stolen	or	missing	
documents,	vehicles,	weapons,	missing	children	as	well	as	persons		wanted	or	
banned	from	entering	the	EU.	Since	the	search	is	based	only	on	names,	it	often	
comes	back	with	a	long	list	of	names	spelled	similarly,	or	of	people	sharing	the	first	
name	but	with	different	surnames	and	the	opposite.	I	am	sitting	next	to	the	
operator	of	this	computer,	discussing	the	system’s	interface,	and	he	says:	“If	the	
search	returns	let's	say	50	or	100	names,	there’s	no	way	I	will	go	through	them	one	
by	one.	And	anyhow,	we	can’t	be	called	to	manage	something	like	that,	so…”	he	
then	proceeds	“in	my	opinion,	we	are	feeding	the	country	with	unknown	
individuals…	I	am	not	judging,	it’s	just	my	opinion.”		
	 After	the	photos	are	taken	and	the	excel	file	completed,	migrants	proceed	to	
the	second	container	to	be	fingerprinted.	The	monitor	connected	to	the	fingerprint	
scanner	shows	five	panels,	each	corresponding	to	a	finger,	that	alternate	between	
green	and	red	indications.	After	each	successful	capture	of	a	fingerprint,	the	
corresponding	square	in	the	screen	turns	green.	Migrants	are	offered	alcohol	to	
wash	dirt	of	their	hands,	and	the	surface	of	the	scanner	also	has	to	be	cleaned	
often.	Observing	the	people	being	fingerprinted,	I	cannot	help	but	get	the	
impression	that	they	obtain	a	sense	of	achievement	when	the	indications	on	the	
screen	turn	green.	Perhaps	they	believe	that	there	is	a	background	check	
happening,	which	is	not	the	case.	Most	likely	however,	they	are	just	happy	that	they	
are	one	step	closer	to	completing	the	procedure.	Once	the	fingerprinting	is	done,	
they	are	provided	with	a	new	memo	that	will	serve	as	identification	for	the	rest	of	
their	stay	in	Greece	and	allow	them	to	travel	to	Athens.	These	memos	are	believed	
to	have	been	falsified	and	a	small	trade	in	them	has	emerged.	While	the	operating	
computers	are	directly	connected	to	the	Mapping	of	Aliens	application,	they	are	
unable	to	directly	upload	the	data	to	the	EURODAC	database.	Instead,	every	12	
hours,	at	05.00	and	then	again	at	17.00,	they	upload	a	stack	of	data,	which	they	
refer	to	as	“a	case”.		
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	 The	system	being	down	for	an	hour	or	two	is	not	uncommon.	Nor	is	it	the	
only	noteworthy	event	that	takes	place	in	the	span	of	two	days,	12	and	13	March	
2016.	During	the	evening	shift,	in	5	different	cases,	people	enter	the	container	
through	its	exit	opening.	They	want	to	talk	to	the	operator	of	the	last	desk	of	the	
last	container,	the	one	who	prints	and	hands	out	the	“confirmations”	and	memos.	
All	of	them	ask	for	corrections	of	spelling	mistakes	that	they	realized	after	the	end	
of	the	registration.	These	demands	cause	frustration	among	the	officers,	and	often	
the	people	are	told	to	come	back	later	or	tomorrow	when	they	are	not	so	busy.	The	
talk	of	the	town	among	migrant	support	groups	is	that	since	the	border	between	
Greece	and	Macedonia	has	been	closed,	trapping	people	in	the	mainland,	the	
numbers	of	spelling	mistakes	and	other	errors	in	the	confirmations	and	memos	
have	increased.	Some	see	this	as	an	effort	to	delay	the	influx	of	people	from	the	
islands	to	the	mainland,	as	this	produces	political	pressure	on	the	government.	The	
officers	don’t	seem	to	think	much	of	it,	and	are	always	joking	about	how	slow	the	
system	is,	how	often	it	is	offline	etc.	
At	some	point,	a	tall	man	in	his	30s	arrives,	helped	by	another	person.	He	is	
blind	and	was	registered	yesterday.	He	explains	that	he	just	realized	that	he	has	
been	registered	as	Lebanese	but	that	he	is	in	fact	Syrian.	He	had	his	passport	when	
he	was	registered	but	has	lost	it	inside	the	camp.	The	police	officers	listen	to	his	
claim	and	to	my	surprise	they	decide	to	print	and	give	to	him	a	new	memo	stating	
Syrian	nationality.	Once	he	is	gone,	they	talk	about	his	case,	and	they	all	seem	
genuinely	convinced	that	someone	stole	his	passport.	
Later	the	same	night,	the	name	of	a	person	from	Iraq	activates	a	“hit”	from	
SIS	II,	stating	that	he	has	passed	through	the	Greek	borders	before.	After	talking	to	
him,	they	conclude	that	he	has	travelled	to	Belgium,	where	he	was	ordered	to	leave	
within	a	month	after	his	asylum	claim	fell	through	(rejected).	He	then	went	back	to	
Iraq	and	now	he	is	travelling	back	to	Europe,	this	time	with	his	family.	However,	
the	officers	are	not	sure	why	SIS	II	does	not	flag	him	as	banned	from	entering	the	
EU.	Not	sure	what	to	do,	they	discuss	previous	similar	cases,	and	call	the	
headquarters	of	the	Aliens	Directorate	in	Athens.	Worrying	that	my	presence	may	
lead	to	stricter	handling	of	the	case,	I	withdraw	from	the	container.	Later	in	the	
evening	I	ask	what	happened.	The	shift	chief	tells	me	that	when	he	was	registered,	
Iraq	was	on	the	“deportation	list”,	so	he	was	given	a	month	to	leave	the	country	
		 139	
voluntarily,	but	probably	his	case	never	made	it	onto	the	list	of	“unwanted	
individuals”.	So	now	he	should	be	detained.	However,	he	is	now	with	his	family,	
which	includes	3	children,	so	he	belongs	to	a	“vulnerable	group”	and	arresting	him	
would	just	mean	that	he	would	spend	3	days	in	prison	and	then	be	set	free.	So,	they	
might	as	well	save	him	the	trouble	and	pass	him	through.	He	concludes:	“I	don't	
mind	if	e.g.	an	Afghan	person	passes	through	with	a	passport	from	Iraq	on	my	shift.	
If	a	jihadist	does	however,	it	will	be	a	moral	burden	for	me”,	clearly	referring	to	the	
passport	found	near	one	of	the	Paris	attackers.	It	is	extremely	difficult	for	me	to	
understand	the	rationale	behind	their	actions,	and	it	is	doubtful	if	there	is	a	clear	
rationale	to	begin	with.		
One	last	“event”	of	the	shift	concerns	four	minors	who	have	probably	
“accidentally”	stated	their	ages,	and	are	now	not	allowed	to	proceed,	as	they	have	
to	be	escorted	either	to	the	police	station,	or	to	the	neighboring	islands	of	Kos	or	
Lesvos,	where	there	are	“appropriate	structures	for	minors”.	During	the	
registration	of	a	family,	and	after	some	communication	among	them,	the	mother	of	
the	family	and	two	of	the	minors	claim	that	they	are	part	of	the	family.	There	is	
some	back	and	forth	with	the	Police	officers,	but	in	the	end	they	all	walk	away	
together.	The	remaining	two	minors	now	claim	that	they	are	cousins	and	that	one	
of	them	is	19,	but	this	is	not	resolved	before	I	have	to	leave	for	the	city.		
7.3.5.	The	age	assessment			 Another	part	of	the	registration	process	that,	while	not	carried	out	within	the	containers,	still	comprises	an	integral	part	of	rendering	migrants	“known”	and	governable	is	the	detection	and	differentiated	treatment	of	people	who	are	under	the	age	of	18	and	are	unaccompanied.	This	process	is	complicated,	not	only	in	terms	of	methods	used,	but	also	with	regard	to	the	actors.	In	Chios	in	2017,	the	procedure	normally	involved	the	local	hospital,	where	an	x-ray	of	the	wrist	would	be	used	to	provide	an	assessment.	However,	that	was	not	always	possible	due	to	doctor’s	availability	but	also	as	a	person	working	for	IOM	informed	me,	an	x-ray	would	require	an	order	from	the	attorney	of	the	state,	which	was	not	always	available.	In	these	cases,	a	dental	examination	would	be	carried	out	instead,	and	it	would	not	be	a	rare	phenomenon	for	hospital	doctors	to	ultimately	refrain	from	providing	assessments.	
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	 When	talking	with	a	member	of	Doctors	without	Borders	in	Lesvos,	it	was	evident	that	there	was	a	concern	that	they/he	would	not	be	associated	with	FRONTEX	and	their	practices,	as	he	constantly	emphasized	the	fact	that	their	involvement	in	identification	procedures	was	conducted	in	collaboration	with	FRA/KYT	and	not	FRONTEX.	I	tried	to	ascertain	whether	they	provide	age	assessment	not	only	with	regard	to	18	years	of	age,	but	also	14,	which	is	the	limit	for	being	fingerprinted,	but	was	not	entirely	successful.	However,	I	was	provided	with	some	information	about	the	alleged	medical	practices	in	use	for	the	age	assessment.	Apparently,	the	method	they	use	is	“an	examination	regarding	age	and	sex,	where	we	look	at	characteristics…	the	secondary	attributes	of	sex.”	(Interview	with	Dimitris,	Doctors	Without	Borders,	Lesvos	(March	2016)	).	He	told	me	that	if	there	are	doubts	“about	some	people	who	may	be	in	the	limit”	they	may	ask	for	the	collaboration	of	the	hospital.	He	also	told	me	that	the	x-ray	method	can	provide	certain	results	with	regard	to	whether	or	not	a	person	is	over	12	years	of	age,	not	to	determine	adulthood.		 It	is	worth	noting	that	in	the	media	and	political	debate,	the	often	heated	discussion	around	“bogus	minors”	is	carried	out	under	the	presupposition	that	the	truth	about	someone’s	age	is	only	concealed	from	the	direction	of	an	adult	presenting	themselves	as	a	minor	in	order	to	reap	the	benefits.	However,	in	the	reality	of	the	Hotspot,	things	are	not	one	directional.	As	employees	from	Praxis	informed	me,	it	is	far	from	uncommon	for	minors,	once	they	realize	that	declaring	their	age	will	get	them	“pinned”	on	the	island	or	in	sheltered	housing	on	the	mainland,	to	alter	their	date	of	birth,	so	that	they	are	considered	adults	and	allowed	to	continue	their	journey.	In	some	of	these	cases,	their	motivation	was	that	they	were	under	pressure	to	reach	the	countries	of	the	North	as	soon	as	possible	and	establish	themselves	there,	and	later	bring	their	families	over	through	family	reunification.	These	individuals	had	very	little	interest	in	the	special	attention	reserved	for	minors,	and	they	would	also	not	consider	themselves	minor,	nor	in	need	of	extra	protection.	Instead,	they	felt	they	were	paving	the	way	for	the	rest	of	their	family	to	follow	them	to	Europe	once	they	had	settled.		
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7.3.5.1	Ethnographic	vignette	3			 Five	young	men,	escorted	by	a	person	working	for	IOM,	are	waiting	in	front	
of	the	lower	container	complex	in	the	registration	area.	The	containers	here	house	
IIOM,	Doctors	without	Borders,	MetaDrasi	and	UNHCR.	Earlier,	talking	to	a	
representative	from	FRA/KYT,	I	stated	my	interest	in	the	practice	of	age	
assessment	at	the	Hotspot.	After	I	attended	a	meeting	with	some	Greek	Police	
officers,	they	called	me	back	here,	and	ask	me	to	wait	for	a	while.	A	doctor	comes	
out	from	the	container	and	looks	at	the	migrants.	It	is	not	clear	to	what	extent	they	
are	informed	about	what	is	happening,	neither	did	I	have	the	chance	to	confirm	the	
exact	context	of	what	is	happening.	However,	it	is	clear	that	the	doctor	is	in	a	hurry	
and	perhaps	annoyed	that	he	had	to	stop	whatever	he	was	doing	in	the	container	
he	came	from.	
	 Without	approaching	within	one	meter	of	any	of	the	migrants,	he	starts	
pointing	at	them,	one	by	one	and	saying	“minor,	minor,	adult,	minor…”.	“He	said	he	
was	minor,”	says	the	escort,	referring	to	the	last	person	indicated	as	an	adult.	“He	
can	say	what	he	wants,”	comes	the	answer.	After	this	is	done,	the	escort	mentions	
me	and	asks	the	doctor	if	he	can	talk	to	me	about	the	age	assessment.	He	is	clearly	
is	caught	off	guard	and	disgruntled.	He	asks	her	to	step	into	the	container	with	him.	
I	did	not	see	him	again.	
7.4	Discussion			 The	Hotspot	approach	was	introduced	in	the	public	and	political	debate	as	the	determining	step	that	would	restore	order	at	the	external	border	of	the	EU,	by	rendering	the	incoming	populations	known	through	a	thorough	process	of	identification,	registration	and	fingerprinting,	no	less.	As	I	showed	in	chapter	6,	the	issue	of	identification	and	registration	exceeded	an	issue	of	proper	administration	and	population	management,	proceeding	well	into	a	discussion	of	rights,	ethics	and	“European	values”.	However,	the	tone	of	this	debate	did	not	(and	could	not)	address	the	complex	set	of	tasks	that	comprise	“identification	and	registration”.	Instead,	it	would	revolve	around	issues	of	“resources”,	both	human	and	non-human,	while	constantly	referring	to	claims	of	the	incomprehensible	size	of	the	incoming	populations.	After	presenting	the	findings	that	I	acquired	through	ethnographic	research,	in	the	following	sections,	
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maintaining	the	structure	of	the	chapter	so	far,	I	will	proceed	to	discuss	and	draw	conclusions	relating	to	each	stage	of	the	registration	separately	in	the	order	they	are	performed	in	the	Hotspot.	For	the	purpose	of	this	discussion,	I	will	incorporate	previous	work	and	insight	provided	by	the	migration	researchers	and	scholars	working	in	other	disciplines	scholars	that	were	introduced	in	chapter	2.	
7.4.1.	Screening		
7.4.1.1	Problematizing	the	screening	interview			 The	crossing	of	a	border	is	a	moment	when	an	individual	is	found	in	a	limbo	between	two	sovereign	bodies,	as	the	person	transitions	from	one	jurisdiction	to	another.	In	the	case	of	“legitimate”	travelers,	who	voluntarily	forfeit	the	“protection”	that	the	state	of	their	country	of	origin	in	principle	provides	them	with,	this	limbo	is	temporary	and	partial.	Implications	on	the	process,	or	doubts	about	the	identity	of	the	traveler,	will	most	likely	be	resolved	by	the	mediation	of	a	secure	travel	document,	namely	a	passport	and/or	a	visa.	If	the	situation	becomes	more	complicated,	travelers	can	always	ask	for	the	support	of	their	country’s	embassy	or	consulate.	In	the	context	of	irregularized	migration	and	the	Hotspot	more	specifically,	however,	this	transition	between	sovereign	bodies	is	both	more	time-consuming	and	more	complicated	and	multifactorial.	When	irregularized	migrants	are	called	upon	to	declare	as	part	of	their	identity,	their	country	of	origin,	name,	age	etc.	both	sides	of	equation	(migrants	and	border	guards)	are	aware	of	the	fluidity	that	characterizes	the	present	moment.	The	absence	of	certainty	constitutes	the	principal	challenge	for	the	border	agencies	and	their	recruits,	and	most	of	their	actions	evolve	around	the	stabilization	of	this	uncertainty.	In	this	context,	the	screening	procedure	is	the	first	step.		The	screening	process	and	its	outcomes	have	been	criticized	as	being	prone	to	problematic	decisions	in	the	past,	before	the	emergence	of	the	“migrant	crisis”	and	the	Hotspots.	Many	of	the	denouncements	revolve	around	the	(apparently	not	always	guaranteed)	presence	of	an	interpreter	who	can	speak	the	language	of	the	interviewee,	the	extent	to	which	the	interviewee	is	properly	
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informed	(PROASYL,	2012),	cases	of	mistaken	assessments,	(Migreurop,	FIDH,	&	EMHRN,	2014),	the	unclear	role	that	the	interpreters	play	in	decision-making	(Keller	et	al.,	2011),	and	the	distribution	of	tasks	among	Member-State	officials	and	FRONTEX	officials	(Maniar,	2016).	Other	denouncements	concern	the	inappropriateness	of	the	screening	material	“for	illiterate	people	or	for	those	who	have	lived	for	long	periods	as	refugees	in	other	countries,	thus	not	being	able	to	give	the	proper	answer	to	geographical,	political	and	cultural	questions”	(PROASYL,	2012,	p21).		Other	points	of	critique	exceed	issues	of	the	proper	execution	of	the	script	of	the	process,	and	to	the	realities	enacted	by	the	possible	outcomes	available	to	the	screeners.	A	report	from	Migreurop	from	2014,	based	on	a	research	visit	conducted	in	October	2013,	examined	the	category	of	“stateless	person”,	and	its	implications	in	the	context	of	the	Greek	border	work.		More	specifically,	it	mentions	cases	where	Palestinian	refugees	from	Syria,	carrying	Syrian	travel	documents	were	recorded	as	“stateless”	from	Greek	Police	and	Frontex	“despite	the	fact	that	they	had	been	living	in	Syria,	they	were	unable	to	benefit	from	the	specific	regime	applicable	to	Syrian	refugees	(obligation	to	leave	the	territory	within	6	months)	and	were	given	an	order	to	leave	the	territory	within	30	days.”	(Migreurop	et	al.,	2014,	p.	36).		
7.4.1.2.	Doing	identities	with	words		 At	a	fundamental	level,	the	screening	interview	is	an	exchange	of	words.	The	trained	officials	and	interpreters	set	questions	for	the	interviewed	migrants	and	evaluate	their	answers.	In	this	manner,	they	shape	the	future	of	the	latter,	and	to	an	extent,	that	constitutes	their	identity.	The	subject	is	being	shaped	by	the	actions	and	decisions	of	an	intra-state	institution.	The	“test”,	according	to	which	a	person’s	nationality	is	assessed,	can	be	seen	as	an	effort	to	quantify	nationality.	It	depends	heavily	on	the	familiarity	with	cultural	tokens,	which	to	use	a	metaphor	from	mathematics,	seems	to	function	as	a	continuous	variable,	meaning	that	it	is	not	something	directly	countable	with	precision,	for	example,	on	a	scale	with	distinct	values	counting	as	scores.	Building	on	the	metaphor,	the	opposite	of	a	non-continuous	variable	is	a	discrete	variable,	the	most	common	example	being	the	set	of	integral	numbers.	These	are	discrete,	ontologically	
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separable	from	one	another,	and	most	importantly	can	be	uttered	in	a	finite	way,	no	matter	their	size.	The	screener’s	assessment	is	in	some	ways	a	discrete	variable.	A	person	is	found	to	be	Syrian,	Iraqi	or	of	any	other	ethnicity	in	a	discrete	manner.	There	is	no	x%	Afghan.	In	that	manner,	we	can	see	screening	as	a	transformation	(a	function	to	continue	with	the	metaphor)	from	the	highly	continuous	domain	that	constitutes	people’s	paths	of	life	experiences	to	the	discrete	categorizing	system	necessary	for	the	EU’s	asylum	system	to	achieve	its	aims.	While	I	find	that	this	metaphor	stands,	metaphors	from	the	natural	sciences	can	be	inspiring	and	useful,	but	more	often	than	not,	have	a	limited	scope	and	should	be	used	with	caution.		Instead,	the	testimonies	of	the	screeners	and	other	FRONTEX	officers	that	I	presented	in	section	7.3.2.	can	be	analyzed	and	discussed	with	the	use	of	performativity	theory	as	discussed	in	chapter	2.	The	interviewed	person	is	called	to	back	up	their	identity	claim,	and	more	specifically	their	nationality	claim,	through	a	satisfactory	performance	of	a	script	that	the	screeners	set	before	them.	The	flow	of	their	speech,	and	their	accent	and	their	spelling	are	all	seen	as	elements	of	this	performance,	evaluated	and	compared	by	the	expertise	of	officials,	each	of	whom	“has	his	(sic)	own	method,	his	own	measure”(Interview	with	Anonymous	Greek	Police	officer,	screener,	Lesvos	(August	2017)).	They	are	called	to	do	themselves	with	words,	to	paraphrase	Austin.	However,	the	performance	is	not	solely	verbal,	but	includes	non-verbal	cues,	such	as	the	apparel	that	the	person	examined	is	wearing,	as	well	as	the	vigor	with	which	they	support	their	claim.	It	has	been	impossible	for	me	to	dig	deeper	into	the	content	of	the	screening	process,	as	the	precise	content	of	the	questions	would	of	course	consist	of	classified	material.	In	any	case,	attending	an	interview	was	out	of	the	question	and	would	have	raised	significant	ethical	concerns.	However,	from	the	screener’s	approach	to	spelling,	it	is	clear	that	the	interviewed	person	is	expected	to	perform	specific	modes	of	literal	existence,	to	satisfy	criteria	that	shape	the	understanding	of	nationality	for	the	screener.	It	is	also	through	these	criteria	that	the	individual	being	interviewed	is	being	performed,	shaped	as	a	specific	kind	of	subject,	worthy	or	less	worthy,	allowed	to	remain	in	the	territory,	and	deserving	of	compassion	and	access	to	institutionalized	support	or	not.		
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At	the	same	time,	and	through	the	same	process,	it	is	the	border	as	a	filter	that	is	being	performed.	Through	the	actions	of	the	border	guards,	and	“as	a	judgment	is	performed	on	an	interviewee,	so	the	border	is	augured	into	being”	(Parsley,	2003,	p.	55).	In	this	interaction	of	the	border	guards’	presumptions	and	methods	with	the	answers	that	migrants	provide,	borders	are	constituted	not	geographically	as	lines	in	the	sand,	but	as	sets	of	social	processes,	as	the	outcome	of	human	labor.	
7.4.1.3.	Inside	the	“thought	worlds”	of	border	agents		 It	is	important	to	note	that	this	border	work	does	not	happen	in	an	epistemological	vacuum.	Instead,	the	screener’s	work	is	saturated	with	epistemological	and	ontological	presuppositions.	First	of	all,	the	process	of	“identifying”	a	person,	and	the	necessity	of	this	action,	presupposes	the	eventuality	of	the	person	lying	about	their	identity.	In	a	universe	where	there	would	be	a	certainty	that	nobody	is	willing	or	able	to	lie	about	their	identity,	there	would	be	no	need	for	identification	measures	and	equipment	in	the	first	place.	Here	on	the	other	hand,	the	motivation	for	a	person	to	lie	about	their	identity	is	more	than	present,	it	is	the	norm	and	it	is	supported	by	a	widespread	discourse	around	bogus	refugees	that	far	exceeds	the	limits	of	the	Hotspot.	The	“culture	of	disbelief”	(Anderson	et	al.,	2014),	depends	heavily	on	the	stereotypes	cultivated	by	border	guards,	shaping	their	criteria	and	decisions	(Jubany,	2011).	Immigration	officers,	like	all	humans,	inhabit	worlds	where	rumors,	stories	and	personal	experiences,	interact	with	other	people’s	similar	accounts,	often	within	the	context	of	bureaucratic	work	and	shape	their	“thought	worlds”(J.	Heyman,	1995,	pp.	271–273).	These	“thought	worlds”,	can	be	very	specific,	extending	well	beyond	the	general	notion	of	disbelief,	as	illustrated	by	my	informant	screener’s	belief	in	the	existence	of	training	schools	for	ambitious	bogus	refugees	in	Turkey.	Furthermore,	such	beliefs,	regardless	of	their	truth	value,	shape	not	only	the	manner	in	which	a	border	guard	sees	and	considers	a	migrant	standing	in	front	of	his	office	but	are	also	in	a	position	to	shape	their	practices.	In	the	present	case,	it	affected	my	informant	to	the	extent	of	him	discarding	the	“traditional”	method	of	the	dossier	and	questions	and	relying	on	Google	maps	instead,	thus	conceiving	new	standards	of	geographical	literacy	and	habitude	in	the	screening	process.	
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7.4.1.4.	Positioning	the	outcomes	of	screening	interviews	at	the	Hotspots		 The	screening	interview	and	the	outcomes	it	produces	cannot	and	should	not	be	seen	as	a	process	in	isolation	from	the	rest	of	the	functions	occurring	at	the	Hotspots,	the	actors	performing	those	functions,	and	also	the	perception	of	said	functions	by	the	screeners.	At	this	point,	I	would	like	to	return	to	the	screener’s	reference	to	the	role	of	the	Asylum	Service	in	initiating	a	backdrop	procedure	available	for	migrants	wishing	to	challenge	the	nationality	assessment	that	is	mentioned	in	the	ethnographic	vignette:	“if	people	will	protest	my	decision,	
they	may	do	it	for	a	thousand	reasons,	but	I	won’t	change	it,	because	I	know	that	
there	is	a	second	procedure”	(Interview	with	Anonymous	Greek	Police	officer,	screener,	Lesvos	(August	2017)).	In	this	quote,	it	is	clear	that	the	screener	is	convinced	that	a	different	agency	and	set	of	actors,	in	this	case	the	Asylum	Service	and	the	asylum	operators,	will	be	in	a	position	to	address	and	correct	a	possibly	flawed	assessment	stemming	from	the	screener.	This	conviction	actively	shapes	the	screener’s	own	perception	of	his	actions	and	their	consequences.	More	precisely,	it	distributes	decisions	on	the	nationality	assessment	across	a	wider	set	of	actors	active	at	the	Hotspots.	This	distribution	of	accountability	has	two	effects.	Firstly,	it	lightens	the	moral	burden	of	a	possible	false	assessment,	as	the	latter	is	now	distributed	to	a	vaguely	interconnected	system	that	is	the	Hotspot.	However,	and	perhaps	more	importantly,	it	makes	it	easier	for	the	screener	to	discard	a	person’s	objections	and	protests,	and	enforce	his	initial	decision,	as	the	screener	is	assured	that	if	he	makes	a	mistake,	others	are	in	a	position	to	fix	it.	This	sharing	of	the	moral	burden	allows	screeners	to	act	as	“petty	sovereigns”	(Butler,	2006b),	inside	the	general	context	of	an	institution	which	they	do	not	fully	control	or	understand.	Being	part	of	such	an	apparatus	of	governmentality	and	enjoying	the	moral	relief	of	functional	backdrops	allows	for	decisions	to	be	made.	 However,	of	equal	importance	is	the	limited	interest	that	the	screener	expresses	towards	the	materialities	of	the	actual	processing	of	potential	appeals.	During	said	processing,	we	have	the	introduction	of	yet	two	more	factors	in	what	will	be	the	final,	more	stable	outcome	of	the	“identification”.	One	is	the	“social	capital”	that	a	migrant	may	or	may	not	possess.	This	may	take	the	form	of	family	
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members	or	close	acquaintances	in	their	country	of	origin	who	are	in	a	position	to	help	by	sending	the	appropriate	documentation	on	time,	not	to	mention	the	existing,	or	non-existent,	infrastructure	for	said	mailing	services,	as	this	can	be	of	vital	importance.		Secondly,	the	work	ethics,	and	time	that	Asylum	Service	or	NGO	employees	have	available	to	guide	and	help	the	migrant	through	the	appeal	are	vital.	This	may	sound	banal,	or	something	that	should	be	considered	as	a	given	by	any	professional.	Yet,	in	the	reality	of	the	Hotspot,	even	the	most	motivated	individuals	quickly	burn	out,	and	may	resort	to	doing	the	minimum	for	a	period,	or	using	intuitive	criteria	to	decide	who	is	worthy	of	their	efforts	to	go	the	extra	mile.	
7.4.2	Document	check			 The	document	check	draws	its	validity	as	a	procedure	from	scientific	methods	to	a	much	larger	extent	that	the	screening	method.	Certain	documents,	such	as	passports,	can	be	verified	to	a	great	degree	of	certainty	due	to	high	levels	of	standardization	in	the	material	and	techniques	used	in	their	production.	However,	the	validity	of	a	document	is	only	one	step	in	the	process	of	document	control,	as	the	bearer	of	the	document	may	have	bought	it,	or	had	it	published	under	a	different	set	of	personal	data.	In	such	cases,	the	document	may	be	proved	to	be	forged,	not	due	to	the	expertise	of	the	document	expert,	but	due	to	information	derived	from	the	screening.	The	document	expert	will	then	proceed	to	examine	the	document	already	equipped	with	the	knowledge	that	it	is	forged.	In	such	cases,	the	Hotspot	functions	as	a	laboratory	of	production	of	knowledge	for	FRONTEX	and	their	officers.	New	knowledge	is	produced,	analyzed,	documented,	recorded	to	be	subsequently	circulated	within	the	national	border	agencies	through	FRONTEX.	This	is	not	the	only	case	where	new	border-related	knowledge	is	being	mined	from	the	Hotspots.	For	example,	in	the	de-briefing	processes,	FRONTEX	is	constantly	making	an	effort	to	collect	information	on	the	modus	operandi	of	smuggling	networks.			 In	the	document	check,	I	also	see	a	classic	but	modified	example	of	what		is	often	discussed	as	the	“entry	point	paradox”,	to	describe	a	characteristic	of	token-based	identification	methods.	Namely,	“the	problem	of	low	integrity	being	
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propagated	from	seed	documents	to	derivative	documents”(Clarke,	1994,	p.	8).	The	term	is	in	principle	and	most	often	used	to	describe	the	weaknesses	and	shortfalls	of	identification	systems	with	regard	to	them	relying	on	weaker	“seed”	documents,	and	thus	being	prone	to	a	“fraudulently”	stabilized	identity	being	available	to	“scammers”.	On	the	same	issue,	Van	der	Ploeg	(2016)	argues	that	“the	accuracy	of	each	digital	identification	or	verification	system,	however	sophisticated,	is	only	as	strong	as	its	weaker	link,	which	often	lies	right	at	the	start	of	the	whole	procedure,	the	authenticity	of	“breeder	documents”.	In	the	case	of	migrant	registration	in	Hotspots,	it	can	be	argued	that	an	inversion	is	taking	place.	We	see	a	relatively	“weak”	identity	document	(or	just	an	identity	even),	being	produced,	out	of	a	set	of	procedures	that,	according	to	the	very	actors	performing	them,	are	equal	to	informed	assumptions.	
7.4.3	Age	assessment			 Age	assessment	is	another	field	where	the	migration-related	policies	of	the	EU	and	its	member	states	are	contested,	and	Hotspots	are	by	no	means	the	only	spaces	where	this	contestation	takes	place.	Reports	have	been	published	regarding	Italian	Hotspots,	about	the	practice	of	attributing	a	fictional	date	of	birth	to	minors	so	that	they	can	be	considered	merely	18	years	old	(Redattore	sociale,	2015).	In	Austria,	transfers	of	persons	related	to	the	Dublin	Regulation	are	carried	out	while	age	assessments	are	still	pending,	thus	once	again	exposing	minors	to	trauma	(ECRE	&	Knapp,	2015).		 Methods	used	for	the	purpose	of	age	assessment,	such	as	wrist	or	collar-bone	x-rays,	as	well	as	the	dental	examination,	are	medical	examinations	and	as	such	are	bound	by	the	bioethics	principle	of	non-maleficence,	as	they	are	in	a	position	to	expose	minors	to	radiation-related	risk,	without	any	potential	benefits	for	their	health.	Moreover,	both	methods	do	not	provide	definite	results	with	regard	to	exact	age,	but	more	of	a	margin	within	the	person’s	age	is	estimated,	a	margin	that	can	be	within	the	range	of	5	years	(Benson	&	Williams,	2008).	It	is	left	to	the	medical	expert	to	make	a	more	exact	assessment.	Furthermore,	the	validity	of	the	aforementioned	methods	is	challenged	when	it	comes	to	their	applicability	to	persons	coming	from	the	countries	from	where	most	migrants	come	to	Europe,	namely	Asian	and	African	countries.	Most	studies	
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on	the	issue	have	been	conducted	based	on	European	and	North	American	references	groups,	and	thus	have	been	argued	to	be	unsuitable	for	this	specific	context	(Gregor	Noll,	2016)(Aynsley-Green,	2009).			 Body-targeting	methods	for	age	assessment	are	problematic	to	begin	with,	however	in	the	context	of	Hotspots,	the	protocols	surrounding	them	would	very	rarely	be	maintained.	It	seems	that	some	doctors	in	hospitals	refused	to	assess	age	as	they	were	aware	of	the	limitations	of	the	methods.	Others,	like	those	I	had	the	opportunity	to	observe	in	Moria,	and	who	are	mentioned	in	the	ethnographic	vignette,	would	have	less	if	any	reservations	about	declaring	a	person	to	be	a	minor	or	an	adult.	The	manner	in	which	this	specific	examination	took	place	showed	little,	if	any,	respect	for	the	integrity	of	the	persons	examined,	left	no	space	for	appeal,	and	to	say	that	it	was	methodologically	flawed	would	be	an	understatement.	Age	assessment	is	yet	another	field	of	the	identification	and	registration	process	of	irregularized	migrants	that	is	based	largely	on	the	“scientific	expertise”	of	human	actors,	namely	the	doctors.	Apart	from	the	fact	that	some	of	said	doctors	refrain	from	this	duty,	it	is	important	to	note	that,	in	this	case,	the	possibility	to	appeal	is	absent,	perhaps	more	than	in	the	screening	process.	The	delegation	to	the	experts’	agency	in	order	to	annul	the	uncertainty	that	is	inherent	in	the	methods	themselves	is	absolute,	while	the	methods	themselves	are	problematic	and	disputed	with	regard	to	their	precision	and	applicability	in	relation	to	people	with	different	racial	backgrounds.		Beyond	the	issue	of	the	accuracy	of	the	age	assessment,	it	is	important	to	note	two	more	points.	Firstly,	that	the	categorization	of	a	person	as	an	adult	or	minor,	and	therefore	as	a	vulnerable	person	or	not,	in	a	binary	manner,	raises	issues	with	regards	to	the	notion	of	vulnerability	and	the	social	category	of	adulthood.	Through	body-targeting	practices	of	age	assessment,	adulthood	and	vulnerability	are	both	quantified	in	a	concerning	manner,	and	this	can	and	has	been	addressed,	as	in	the	case	of	the	UK,	where	socio-psychological	assessments	are	the	norm.	To	consider	a	person	an	adult,	and	thus	not	vulnerable	based	solely	on	their	date	of	birth,	let	alone	on	a	rough	estimation	of	it,	is	a	problematic,	one-sided	method,	that	does	not	account	for	other	factors,	such	as	emotional	and	social	growth,	and	trauma.	
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Secondly,	the	age	assessment	has	been	present	in	the	public	and	political	debate	in	two	main	forms.	On	the	one	hand,	the	spectacle	of	minors	traveling	alone	or	losing	their		relatives	during	their	travels,	or	losing	their	own	lives,	as	was	the	case	with	the	case	of	young	Alan	Kurdi,	would	“activate”	a	humanitarian	discourse	centered	around	the	moral	responsibility	of	the	EU	to	provide	care	and	shelter	for	these	young	people.	On	the	other	hand,	mostly	right-wing	politicians	and	more	conservatively	inclined	media	often	cultivate	a	discourse	quite	similar	to	that	of	“bogus	refugees”,	this	time	through	references	to	“bogus	minor”	asylum	seekers.	With	regard	to	the	latter,	“bogus	minors”	would	be	seen	as	misusing	the	EU	asylum	system	by	occupying	positions	in	the	minor	protection	schemes,	thus	blocking	the	access	to	actual	minors	who	could	benefit	from	it	(Sharman,	2016)(Braw,	2016).	However,	the	testimonies	of	NGO	employees	question	this	one-directional	narrative	and	provides	other	input.	Some	minors,	when	made	aware	of	the	fact	that	the,	in	other	terms,	beneficial	treatment	reserved	for	them	will	slow	down	their	mobility	would	choose	to	hide	their	age	and	be	registered	as	adults.	This	inversion	challenges	the	narrative	that	I	have	mentioned.	It	also	challenges	the	notion	of	the	minor	as	an	individual	irrelevant	to	notions	such	as	right	to	choose	and	agency,	accentuating	the	tension	between	a	strictly	biological	and	a	more	socio-cultural	definition	of	adulthood.	
7.5.	Conclusion		
7.5.1.	“Identification	and	registration”	as	negotiation			 The	identification	and	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	in	the	context	of	the	Hotspot	is	a	multi-factorial,	multi-levelled	process	involving	a	range	of	actors.	Identification	is	conceptually	associated	with	the	verification	of	a	person’s	identifying	data,	such	as	name,	age,	nationality	and	family	relationships,	or	the	debunking	of	their	false	claims	concerning	this	data.	In	the	political	and	media	debate,	as	it	unraveled	during	the	“migrant	crisis”,	identification	has	been	discussed	as	an	exploration	and	discovery	of	the	identities	of	incoming	migrants,	of	their	true	self,	which	would	then	be	fir	to	suit	the	categories	available	within	the	migration	reception	system	of	the	EU.	Those	categories	are	consistently	naturalized	and	presented	as	having	a	pre-discursive	and	mutually	exclusive	existence	outside	the	bureaucratic	framework	that	enforces	and	maintains	them	
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(Hume,	2015;	A.	Taylor,	2015a;	UNHCR	&	Edwards,	2016).	This	naturalization	has	been	challenged	by	scholars	who	have	argued	precisely	that	dipoles	such	as	the	legal/illegal	and	migrant/refugee,	do	not	exist	outside	their	discursive,	legal	and	socio-cultural	construction	(Andersson,	2014,	2016;	Crawley	&	Skleparis,	2017;	De	Genova,	2002;	Guild,	2004;	J.	McC.	Heyman,	2001),	which	is	further	constructed	and	confirmed	by	the	relevant	border	and	migration	agencies	of	a	receiving	state.	Furthermore,	scholars	have	argued	that	the	“categorical	fetishism”	that	developed	around	especially	the	dipole	migrant/refugee	fails	to	encapsulate	the	plurality	of	positions	and	experiences	in	which	irregularized	migrants	on	the	move	find	themselves	(Crawley	&	Skleparis,	2017).		 This	chapter	continues	along	the	lines	of	the	work	mentioned	above	and	is	an	effort	to	capture	and	analyze	the	complexity	of	the	identification	process	outside	simplifying	schemes	often	present	in	the	political	and	media	debate.	I	argue	that	in	the	context	of	Hotspots,	the	identification	of	irregularized	migrants,	and	their	subsequent	registration	can	be	seen	not	only	as	a	forensic	discovery	of	a	person’s	“true”	identity,	but	instead	as	the	outcome	of	a	performative	negotiation	process	between	an	individual	and	a	set	of	agencies	and	institutions.	While	this	chapter	retains	a	focus	on	the	work	of	Greek	Police	and	FRONTEX	officers,	it	still	touches	on	the	fact	that	a	similar	argument	can	be	(and	has	been)	formulated	for	the	asylum	interviews	(Dagg	&	Haugaard,	2016;	Maryns,	2006).		 Every	element	of	the	identification	process	draws	its	validity	from	the	acclaimed	expertise	of	the	human	agent	involved	in	it.	From	the	screening	interview	to	the	age	assessment,	there	is	a	constant	reference	to	intuition;	the	impact	of	the	“thought	worlds”	of	the	border	guards,	visual	and	non-visual	cues	and	work	experience	on	which	every	assessment	is	based.	Even	the	document	control,	the	most	automated	and	apparatus-mediated	of	all	processes	is	to	a	certain	degree	based	on	the	expert’s	intuition	as	well	as	their	communication	and	interplay	with	their	colleagues.	The	negotiation	metaphor	could	be	argued	to	imply	two	participating	parties	who	enjoy	the	same	level	of	agency	when	facing	each	other.	Although	this	is	clearly	not	the	case,	it	must	be	noted	that	irregularized	migrants	are	often	not	passive	agents	in	the	identification	process.	While	this	is	not	the	focus	of	the	present	thesis,	in	the	face	of	the	constantly	
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evolving	European	policies,	they	develop	their	own	agency	through	a	series	of	acts,	be	they	conscious,	planned	or	spontaneous.			 In	the	context	of	Hotspots,	nationality,	country	of	origin,	bonds	of	kinship	and	age	–	all	constitutive	elements	of	what	will	be	solidified	as	a	person’s	identity	–	can	never	be	pinpointed	with	absolute	certainty.	The	agents	of	FRONTEX	and	the	Greek	Police	are	fully	aware	of	this,	as	is	evident	from	their	accounts	of	the	epistemological	nature	of	the	screening	interview.	Nevertheless,	as	their	task	is	to	produce	results,	they	deploy	different	tactics	to	overcome	this	uncertainty,	which	is	inherent	in	the	process.	They	may	for	example	utilize	additional	technologies,	such	as	Google	maps.	In	this	case,	we	see	the	introduction	of	a	technology	designed	for	personal	use,	namely	the	smartphone	and	Google	maps,	entering	the	forensic	realm,	and	introducing	new	standards	that	migrants	must	meet	in	order	to	successfully	support	their	claim.	These	literacy	standards,	if	we	may	apply	that	term,	judge	a	person’s	familiarity	with	their	claimed	country	of	origin,	attempting	to	render	nationality	and	belonging	as	sizable	quantities	that	should	enable	one	to	produce	a	specific	kind	of	performance	upon	request.	Thus,	screeners	in	the	process	of	validating	a	person’s	claim,	produce	definitions	and	necessary	conditions	concerning	what	it	means	to	be	from	a	place	or	country,	as	it	is	their	assessment	that	will	determine	whether	or	not	the	specific	origin	and	nationality	will	be	part	of	the	person’s	identity	in	the	future.	They	performatively	produce	the	interviewees’	identity	as	an	ontological	effect	(Butler,	2010),	thus	producing	specific	future	realities	in	which	they	will	inhabit,	in	terms	of	freedom	of	mobility,	access	to	resources	and	rights.		In	some	cases,	screeners	may	resort	to	conceptualizing	their	assessments	as	easily	reversible	if	they	are	based	on	fallacies.	This	understanding	of	their	work	on	the	one	hand	renders	the	decisions	easier	to	cope	with	on	an	ethical	level,	and	on	the	other	hand	it	frames	them	as	potentially	less	harmful.	As	the	power	delegated	to	these	officials	is	not	absolute,	it	constitutes	them	as	“petty	sovereigns”	delegated	with	a	power	to	utter	decisions	within	the	context	of	“aims	and	tactics	of	power	they	do	not	inaugurate	or	fully	control”	(Butler,	2006b,	p.	56).		
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	 In	the	face	of	this	condition,	irregularized	migrants	exercise	their	own	agency,	which	is,	of	course,	of	a	different	ontological	level.	They	support	their	claims	of	kinship,	try	to	re-register,	help	each	other,	and	return	at	a	later	time	to	have	mistakes	in	their	memos	corrected.	They	utilize	their	social	networks	to	provide	them	with	paperwork,	when	needed,	if	they	have	this	form	of	social	capital.	In	this	assemblage	of	practices,	truth	is	the	outcome	of	a	negotiation,	the	condition	where	actors	stop	working	towards	a	direction.	For	the	migrants,	this	involves	exhausting	all	their	possibilities	and	using	their	social	capital.	For	the	officials,	it	entails	getting	to	a	point	where	they	feel	sufficiently	secure	to	stop	their	investigation.	Thus,	I	argue,	the	identity	of	irregularized	migrants	is	not	discovered	in	the	Hotspots.	Instead,	it	is	constructed	and	performed	as	the	outcome	of	a	very	non-symmetrical	negotiative	struggle	between	migrant	bodies	and	the	EU	border	apparatus,	as	embodied	by	its	agencies	and	their	equipment.	
7.5.2.	The	hotspot	as	a	knowledge	production	site		 Similarly,	the	Hotspot	as	a	whole,	but	also	the	identification	and	registration	process	specifically,	function	as	a	laboratory	that	constantly	produces	new	knowledge.	Screeners	are	being	constantly	trained	by	more	experienced	colleagues	on	the	spot.	The	analysis	of	documents	found	to	be	falsified,	stolen	or	forged	not	by	the	document	control	process,	but	during	screening,	also	produces	new	knowledge	on	the	techniques	used	in	document	fraud	and	trade	in	these	commodities.	This	knowledge	is	documented,	registered	and	circulated	between	FRONTEX	and	national	border	agencies	and	constitutes	a	valuable	resource	for	them.	At	the	same	time,	the	FRONTEX	officers	are	constantly	surveilling	the	migrant	population,	including	at	times	when	they	voluntarily	help	in	everyday	functions	outside	their	set	duties,	such	as	when	distributing	food.	This	mix	of	humanitarian	and	policing	work	is	not	only	designed	to	enforce	discipline	“the	presence	of	uniformed	men	helps	to	predispose	
discipline”	(Interview	with	Anonymous	Dutch	Royal	Police	officer,	head	of	the	Dutch	Task	Fore,	Chios	(March	2016)),	it	also	seeks	to	produce	intelligence	concerning	the	qualities	of	these	populations.	Finally,	the	debriefing	interviews,	scarcely	mentioned	in	the	present	chapter,	also	provide	information	on	the	modus	operandi	of	smuggling	networks.	
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7.5.3.	The	memo	as	a	technological	stabilizer				 The	function	of	the	Hotspots	and	the	identification	and	registration	process	spans	a	wide	set	of	technologies,	ranging	from	high	to	low	tech.	Low-tech	initiatives	were	on	occasion	surprising,	as	in	the	case	of	the	invisible	stamp	used	in	the	memo.	The	latter	can	be	seen	as	a	low-tech	temporary	stabilizer	of	the	outcome	of	the	negotiation	discussed	earlier	in	this	section.	What	we	see	in	the	case	of	the	memo,	is	non-linear	“progress”	of	the	means	by	which	biopolitical	control	and	restriction	of	the	right	to	movement	is	achieved	on	behalf	of	institutions	such	as	the	Police	and	border	guard	agencies	such	as	FRONTEX.	While	an	extended	and	often	high-end	collection	of	technologies	was	in	operation	during	e.g.	the	document	check,	the	material	outcome	of	the	process	was	in	terms	of	document	security	fragile,	to	say	the	least.	The	solution	devised	by	the	Dutch	border	guards	with	is	counter-intuitive	with	regard	to	the	narration	of	high-end	technologies	such	as	biometrics	and	interconnected	databases	used	in	border	control.	Instead,	it	reveals	that	lower-tech,	“analogue”	technologies	are	always	on	call	to	supplement	and	reinforce	the	control	apparatus.	What	is	crucial	is	that	the	aforementioned	technologies	are	not	common	knowledge.	In	other	words,	they	are	not	known	by	the	subjects	they	are	designed	to	govern.	Instead,	their	existence,	use	and	mode	of	operation	needs	to	be	communicated	and	shared	with	a	selected	set	of	actors,	such	as	the	travel	agents	booking	domestic	ferry	tickets	to	the	mainland.	In	a	way,	the	effectiveness	of	the	technology	relies	almost	entirely	on	the	subjects’	ignorance	of	them	and	is	destined	to	fail	as	a	repressive	technique	the	moment	this	ignorance	is	overcome.	I	did	not	have	the	opportunity	to	discover	whether	this	“moment	of	overcoming”	actually	came,	or	if	the	stamp	technology	was	simply	no	longer	necessary	as	the	situation	evolved	or	what	happened	to	it.	However,	it	is	safe	to	assume	that	at	some	point,	the	fact	of	its	existence	would	leak	out,	and	efforts	to	falsify	it	would	arise,	with	varying	degrees	of	success.				
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Chapter	8.	The	EU-Turkey	Statement	
8.1.	Introduction		 In	this	chapter	I	present	and	discuss	a	very	drastic	and	potent	moment	of	EU	policy	making	that	largely	recalibrated	the	EU’s	“migration	machine”.	This	moment	entailed	“the	sum	of	systems	that	are	used	in	Europe	in	migration	policy	and	border	control…a	cross	border	policy	apparatus	for	limiting	the	movement	of	aliens	and	for	making	choices	about	the	migrants	(desirable/undesirable)	who	report	to	the	borders.”	(Dijstelbloem	et	al.,	2011).	This	“EU-Turkey	Statement”	(hereafter	the	“Statement”)	was	published	in	March	2016,	and	introduced	as	a	step	towards	resolving	the	“migrant	crisis”.	Despite	the	widespread	criticism	it	has	received,	it	is	considered	by	various	EU	politicians	to	be	a	successful	move,	and	has	even	been	seen	as	an	example	for	future	similar	acts	(Delcker,	2017).	Considering	the	“Statement”	and	its	implementation	by	the	Greek	state	will	allow	me	to	pinpoint	one	more	instance	of	the	controversies	surrounding	the	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	in	a	context	shaped	by	the	determination	of	the	Greek	state	to	render	the	“Statement”	a	solid	construction	that	is	immune	to	critique	or	doubt.	The	chapter	is	structured	as	follows:	The	first	section	briefly	presents	the	main	points	of	the	“Statement”.	An	elaboration	of	the	most	controversial	points	follows.	Two	more	sections	focus	on	more	specific	points	of	criticism	concerning	the	legal	status	of	the	“Statement”	and	other	implications.	Following	that,	and	maintaining	the	research	focus	of	the	present	thesis	in	the	context	of	the	Greek	state’s	practices,	I	present	the	measures	and	legislation	that	the	Greek	state	mobilized	for	the	purpose	of	implementing	the	“Statement”.	This	forms	the	backdrop	for	subsequently	describing	a	specific	instance	of	implementing	the	practices	enabled	by	the	latter	measures	and	legislations	as	they	pertain	to	the	overall	issue	of	registration.	All	of	the	above	are	discussed	in	section	8.8	which	forms	the	basis	for	the	final	conclusions	presented	at	the	end	of	the	chapter.	
8.2.	The	Statement	at	a	glance		 The	relatively	short	text	of	the	Statement	consisted	of	nine	points,	of	which	the	first	three	arguably	form	the	core	of	the	Statement.	The	first	point	
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dictates	that,	as	of	the	publishing	date	of	the	Statement,	“all	new	irregular	migrants	crossing	from	Turkey	into	Greek	islands…	will	be	returned	to	Turkey”	if	their	application	for	asylum	“has	been	found	unfounded	or	inadmissible”	by	the	Greek	authorities.	The	second	point,	which	is	often	referred	to	as	the	1-1	measure,	states	that	“For	every	Syrian	being	returned	to	Turkey	from	Greek	islands,	another	Syrian	will	be	resettled	from	Turkey	to	the	EU	taking	into	account	the	UN	Vulnerability	Criteria”.	The	third	point	concerns	Turkey’s	part	and	plainly	reads	“Turkey	will	take	any	necessary	measures	to	prevent	new	sea	or	land	routes	for	illegal	migration	opening	from	Turkey	to	the	EU,	and	will	cooperate	with	neighboring	states	as	well	as	the	EU	to	this	effect”.	In	return	for	the	cooperation	of	the	Turkish	state	on	those	three	points,	the	EU	Member	states	are	to	accelerate	the	visa	liberation	roadmap	for	Turkish	citizens	“with	a	view	to	lifting	the	visa	requirements	for	Turkish	citizens”.	Finally,	the	Statement	foresees	for	the	“speed	up	(of)	the	disbursement	of	the	initially	allocated	3	billion	euros	under	the	Facility	for	Refugees	in	Turkey	and	ensures	funding	of	further	projects	for	persons	under	temporary	protection	identified	with	swift	input	from	Turkey	before	the	end	of	March”,	as	well	as	the	“additional	funding	for	the	Facility	of	an	additional	3	billion	euro	up	to	the	end	of	2018	(European	Council	&	Council	of	the	European	Union,	2016)”,	totaling	6	billion	euros.	
8.3.	Admissibility	and	Turkey	as	a	Safe	Third	Country	(STC)	The	Statement	and	more	specifically	its	first	point	regarding	the	return	to	Turkey	of	all	new	arrivals	is	conceptually	related	to	the	notion	of	the	admissibility	of	an	asylum	claim.	The	latter	has	been	part	of	the	European	asylum	system	since	as	early	as	2005.	Its	function	has	been	to	allow	a	state	not	to	examine	an	asylum	application	based	on	criteria	additional	to	those	of	the	Dublin	Regulation.	The	2005	Directive	regulating	those	criteria	dictated	that	inadmissibility	of	an	application	for	protection	may	be	ordered	when	the	applicant	“(a)	has	been	granted	international	protection	by	another	Member	State;	(b)	comes	from	a	“first	country	of	asylum”;	(c)	comes	from	a	“safe	third	country”;	(d)	makes	a	subsequent	application	with	no	new	elements;	or	(e)	is	dependent	on	an	applicant	and	makes	a	separate	claim	without	justification.”	(Council	of	the	European	Union,	2005).	Different	national	legal	frameworks	
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allowed	for	different	selections	of	grounds	for	inadmissibility	in	Member	States	under	the	Directive.	In	the	case	of	Greece,	which	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	later	in	this	chapter,	the	“first	country	of	asylum”	criteria	were	used,	but	were	required	to	satisfy	the	“safe	third	country”	concept,	a	practice	that	changed	for	the	implementation	of	the	Statement	(AIDA	&	ECRE,	2016).			 The	notion	of	“safe	third	country”	(STC)	is	founded	upon	two	central	conditions,	namely	the	level	of	protection	in	the	country	in	question,	and	the	connection	between	the	individual	asylum	seeker	and	that	country	(AIDA	&	ECRE,	2016).	In	European	law,	the	notion	of	SFC	has	been	defined	by	the	2005	Asylum	Procedures	Directive	as	a	country	that	has	“ratified	and	observes	the	provisions	of	the	Geneva	Convention	without	any	geographical	limitations…	has	in	place	an	asylum	procedure	prescribed	by	law…	and	has	ratified	the	European	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms	and	observes	its	provisions,	including	the	standards	relating	to	effective	remedies;”	(Council	of	the	European	Union,	2005).	In	the	Asylum	Procedures	Directive	of	2013,	the	definition	was	altered,	also	leaving	the	option	to	Member	States	to	pass	their	own	national	legislation	for	establishing	both	their	own	lists	of	SFC	but	also	for	determining	the	connection	between	applicants	and	third	countries	on	which	these	lists	are	based.	Overall,	and	in	practice,	there	is	no	exact,	timeless	and	widely	accepted	definition	of	an	STC.	At	a	practical	level	it	is	perceived	as	a	state	through	which	a	person	fleeing	from	their	own	country	of	origin	has	passed,	where	they	could	have	found	protection,	but	did	not	do	so	(Roman,	Baird,	&	Radcliffe,	2016).	This	working	definition	is	based	on	the	grounds	of	an	interpretation	of	Article	31(1)	of	the	Refugee	Convention,	stating	that	asylum	seekers	who	enter	the	territory	of	a	state	“coming	directly	from	a	territory	where	their	life	or	freedom	was	threatened”	shall	not	be	subjected	to	penalties.	This	implies	that	people	fleeing	their	country	should	claim	asylum	in	the	first	safe	third	country	they	reach.	However,	this	would	be	unfair	to	countries	neighboring	on	conflict	zones	(Van	Selm,	2001).	It	is	also	contested	as	a	rational	interpretation	of	the	Convention	in	general	(Byrne	and	Shacknove	1996,	Costello	2005,	Peers	2015).	In	the	context	of	the	Statement,	it	was	crucial	that	Turkey	would	be	thereafter	considered	to	be	an	SFC	by	Greece.	This	was	achieved	by	a	series	of	
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administrative	maneuvers	that	are	discussed	in	sections	8.3	and	8.6.2.1	of	this	chapter.	The	characterization	of	Turkey	as	an	STC	came	at	a	time	when	the	country	was	already	hosting	2.5	million	Syrians	(Broomfield,	2016)	accused	of	illegally	pushing	Syrian	refugees	back	to	Syria	(Payton,	2016)	and	even	shooting	refugees	at	the	border	(Worley,	2016).	It	has	been	contested	by	almost	all	NGOs	working	with	refugee	support	and	countless	scholars	(Amnesty	International,	2017b;	Gogou	&	Amnesty	International,	2017;	Norwegian	Refugee	Council,	International	Rescue	Committee,	&	OXFAM,	2017;	Spanish	Refugee	Aid	Commission,	2017).	It	is	worth	noting	that	during	the	first	days	after	the	Statement	was	published,	a	number	of	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	were	returned	to	Turkey	under	highly	questionable	circumstances,	as	documented	by	Amnesty	International	and	other	organizations.	The	very	first	instances	of	people	being	returned	took	place	on	4	April	2016	when	202	people	were	returned	to	Turkey	from	the	islands	of	Lesvos	and	Chios.	The	European	Commission	announced	that	none	of	the	returnees	sought	asylum	in	Greece,	while	UNHCR	stated	that	13	of	the	returnees	had	communicated	their	wish	to	seek	asylum	but	their	applications	were	not	registered.	The	Agency	believed	this	was	a	result	of	the	chaos	in	Chios	following	the	EU-Turkey	deal	(Amnesty	Intenational,	2017a,	p.	17).	
8.4.	The	sealing	of	the	Greek	border			 Among	the	points	in	the	Statement,	the	second	most	infrequently	uttered	is	point	number	3,	which	reads	“Turkey	will	take	any	necessary	measures	to	prevent	new	sea	or	land	routes	for	illegal	migration	opening	from	Turkey	to	the	EU,	and	will	cooperate	with	neighboring	states	as	well	as	the	EU	to	this	effect”.	Pertinently,	while	the	returning	of	migrants	to	Turkey	was	largely	not	enabled	due	to	different	factors,	the	Turkish	state	was	indeed	quite	efficient	in	reducing	the	“flows”,	as	arrivals	dropped	drastically	within	the	weeks	immediately	following	the	Statement	(European	Commission,	2016d).		The	vagueness	of	those	“necessary	measures”	persisted,	as	media	coverage	of	the	public	debate	regarding	how	the	Turkish	state	reduced	the	departures	from	the	coasts	has	been	scarce	to	say	the	least	.	The	reports	on	the	implementation	of	the	Statement	
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that	were	published	by	the	Commission	scarcely	mention	patrolling	activity	of	the	Greek	and	Turkish	coast	guards,	the	contribution	of	a	NATO	patrolling	ship	sharing	information,	and	financial	support	for	the	Turkish	coast	guard	(European	Commission,	2016b,	2016c),	all	of	which	were	present	before	the	Statement.			 It	is	important	to	mention	that	the	involvement	of	the	Turkish	state	in	the	EU’s	ardent	pursuit	of	deterring	migrants	from	crossing	the	Aegean	is	not	a	new	phenomenon.	Turkey	has	been	a	transit	country	for	most	of	the	Syrians,	Iraqis	and	Afghanis	traveling	to	Europe,	and	has	hosted	significant	populations	of	Syrian	refugees.	In	addition,	Turkey	has	been	a	EU	discussion	partner	on	migration	issues	throughout	the	years.	In	November	2015,	a	deal	was	reached	between	the	EU	and	the	Turkish	state	with	a	focus	on	the	“active	cooperation	on	migrants	who	are	not	in	need	of	international	protection,	preventing	travel	to	Turkey	and	the	EU,	ensuring	the	application	of	the	established	bilateral	readmission	provisions	and	swiftly	returning	migrants	who	are	not	in	need	of	international	protection	to	their	countries	of	origin”(Council	of	the	EU,	2015).	However,	since	the	arrivals	at	that	time	were	mostly	people	from	countries	with	high	recognition	rates	for	asylum	claims,	namely	Syria,	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	(Peers,	2016),	the	numbers	of	people	to	be	returned	to	Turkey	were	too	small	to	impact	on	the	agendas	of	politicians	aiming	for	a	significant	drop	in	the	incoming	“flows”.	Thus,	the	November	deal	was	not	sufficient.	Another	deal	was	required	for	the	significantly	larger	population.		During	the	period	between	the	two	deals	concluded	with	Turkey,	and	with	a	very	unclear	legal	and	operational	framework,	NATO	was	called	to	intervene.	Accompanied	by	a	debate	focusing	on	the	“criminal	networks	that	traffic	in	human	suffering”	(NATO,	2016),		NATO’s	Standing	Maritime	Group	2	was	deployed	to	the	Aegean	Sea	under	German	command.	The	official	aim	of	this	operation	was	not	related	to	pushbacks	or	rescue	at	sea,	but	“surveillance,	reconnaissance,	and	monitoring	the	situation,	and	thereby	provided	high-quality	information	to	the	Coast	Guard	of	Turkey,	the	Coast	Guard	of	Greece,	and	also	to	the	efforts	of	the	European	Union”.	Nevertheless,	critical	voices	have	addressed	that	the	deployment	of	military	boats,	which	was	reportedly	agreed	in	the	space	
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of	24	hours	(Graham-Harrison,	2016)	served	the	underlying	goal	of	deterring	migration	(Garelli	&	Tazzioli,	2016b).	The	“sealing	of	a	border”	is	more	of	a	communicative	act	than	an	“actual”	description	of	an	event,	or	a	border	reality.	The	idea	of	completely	shutting	down	an	irregular	border-crossing	route	is	admittedly	unattainable.	What	is	at	stake	is	rendering	a	specific	route	“statistically	significant”,	and	this	statistical	significance	has	as	much	to	do	with	the	“hard	numbers”,	as	it	has	to	do	with	the	attention	they	receive.	
8.5.	The	legal	status	of	the	Statement		 In	many	(if	not	most)	instances	of	public	deliberation	concerning	the	Statement,	the	latter	was	referred	to	as	a	“deal”	or	“agreement”	between	the	EU	and	Turkey	(Deutsche	Welle,	2018;	BBC,	2016).	Notably,	the	specific	terms	(deal	and	agreement)	used	carry	connotations	of	an	orderly	understanding	between	two	well-defined	and	mutually	trusting	partners.	Moreover,	they	render	visible	the	trade	element	of	the	approach	that	the	EU	had	by	then	adopted	towards	the	management	of	the	migration	flows,	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	humanitarian	discourse	that	was	paramount	during	the	summer	and	fall	of	2015.		Contrary	to	the	“orderly”	appearance	of	the	Statement,	legal	scholars	have	underlined	its	dubious	status.	The	three	cases	of	migrants	affected	by	the	Statement	whose	cases	were	taken	to	the	General	Court	of	the	EU	are	particularly	enlightening.	The	Court	decision	published	regarding	the	cases,	refers	to	the	Statement	as	“a	press	release,	on	the	website	shared	by	the	European	Council	and	the	Council	of	the	European	Union”,	and	notes	“that	measure	was	not	adopted	by	one	of	the	institutions	of	the	EU”	and	therefore	the	Court	“	lacks	jurisdiction	to	hear	and	determine	the	actions	pursuant	to	Article	263	TFEU,	and,	accordingly,	dismisses	them”	(General	Court	of	the	European	Union,	2017).	The	Court	proceeds	to	describe	how	it	was	not	the	EU,	but	its	Member	States	as	actors	under	international	law	that	conducted	the	negotiations	leading	to	the	Statement,	and	makes	a	point	about	“inaccuracies	in	the	press	release	of	18	March	2016	regarding	the	identification	of	the	authors	of	the	“EU-Turkey	Statement”	(General	Court	of	the	European	Union,	2017).		
		 161	
The	Court	concluded	that	the	Statement	is	not	an	EU	act	and	that	the	Court	itself	has	no	jurisdiction	to	hear	and	determine	cases	that	concern	the	Statement.	This	basically	renders	the	Statement	an	extra-juridical	act	not	subjected	to	any	kind	of	accountability	by	European	institutions.	This	lack	of	accountability	led	to	a	range	of	institutional	fallout,	such	as	the	publishing	of	an	EASO	report	on	the	status	of	Turkey	as	a	Safe	Third	Country	(SFC)(Nielsen,	n.d.).	While	the	examination	of	this	subject	falls	exactly	under	the	scope	of	EASO,	the	report	itself	was	never	published.	Further	reports	on	this	issue,	state	that	the	specific	report	was	shelved	“upon	the	judgment	of	its	findings	being	unsupportive	of	the	priorities	of	a	group	of	EU	Member	states	and	the	Commission	regarding	the	implementation	of	the	Statement”	(Φωτιάδης,	2019).	Finally,	as	legal	scholars	have	pointed	out,	the	Statement,	and	the	extraordinary	manner	by	which	it	was	debated,	decided	upon	and	published,	“affected	the	relationship	between	the	institutions”	(Idriz,	2017)	,	as	the	role	of	the		European	Parliament	was	sidestepped,	and	the	Treaty	of	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	“also	became	illusory”	(Idriz,	2017).	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	Statement	has	been	considered	successful	by	many	EU	politicians,	to	the	extent	it	is	considered	a	model	to	be	followed	with	other	states,	namely	the	states	of	North	Africa	(Goulard,	2016).	As	we	shall	see	later,	it	was	not	only	the	Statement	that	existed	in	the	margins	of	law,	but	also	the	practices	that	came	in	its	wake	during	its	implementation.	
8.6.	The	Statement	and	the	Greek	state			 In	the	context	of	the	Greek	state’s	practices,	the	implementation	of	the	Statement	was	met	with	criticism	from	a	wide	range	of	actors	(ECRE,	2016b;	GISTI,	2016;	Norwegian	Refugee	Council	et	al.,	2017).	This	was	accompanied	by	practical	resistance	from	institutional	organs	involved	in	the	asylum	procedure	and	migrant	reception.	Greek	law	practitioners	actively	monitoring	the	implementing	measures	noted	that	the	Statement’s	implementation	was	never	examined	or	debated	in	the	Greek	Parliament	(Φωτιάδης,	2019).	Instead,	the	new	law	4375/2016	was	passed,	(ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΔΑ	ΤΗΣ	ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΕΩΣ	ΤΗΣ	ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ	ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ,	2016),	with	various	subsequent	amendments	that	
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introduced	significant	changes	in	the	procedures	to	align	them	with	the	Statement.			In	some	ways,	the	Statement	not	only	brought	into	reality	new	relationships	between	the	EU	and	Turkey,	and	significant	changes	in	the	mobility	of	irregularized	migrants,	it	also	brought	a	new	chapter	in	terms	of	intra-EU	conflicts.	For	example,	in	December	2016, “The	Commission	decided	to	close	infringement	procedures	against	Italy	and	Greece	for	non-implementation	of	the	Eurodac	regulation	because	in	both	Member	States,	there	is	now	a	fingerprinting	rate	of	close	to	100%	of	third-country	nationals	liable	to	be	fingerprinted	who	entered	the	EU	irregularly	at	their	external	borders.”	(European	Commission,	2016d,	p.	5).	This	peculiar	amnesty	for	“previous	sins”	of	the	two	Southern	states	indicates	the	extraordinary	character	of	the	Statement	and	the	new	period	that	it	signaled	with	regard	to	the	management	of	the	migration	“flows”.	It	also	reveals	that	in	this	new	period,	concerns	dominant	during	previous	years	were	now	considered	secondary	so	as	to	remove	all	possible	obstacles	to	implementing	the	Statement.	Interestingly	enough,	those	infringement	procedures	were	introduced	alongside	a	total	of	40	procedures,	as	part	of	the	EU’s	call	for	“more	responsibility	in	managing	the	refugee	crisis”	in	September	2015	(European	Commission,	2015g).	
8.6.1.	Geographical	restriction	of	new	arrivals		 As	an	implementing	measure	of	the	Statement,	a	geographical	restriction	has	been	applied	to	all	incoming	migrants	whose	asylum	cases	are	still	under	examination,	preventing	them	from	leaving	the	islands	bound	for	the	mainland.	This	measure	took	the	already	conflictual	reality	of	the	Greek	islands	at	the	coastal	borderline	between	Greece	and	Turkey	one	step	beyond.	The	islands,	which	were	already	at	the	center	of	international	attention	during	the	period	of	increased	migration	flows,	are	to	this	day	(August	2019),	under	an	exceptional	rule	of	law.	Until	March	2016,	as	described	in	chapter	7,	after	arriving	on	an	island,	migrants	were	transferred	from	the	landing	spot	(usually	a	beach)	to	reception	centers.	Here,	they	were	screened,	identified	and	registered,	provided	with	a	memo	from	the	Greek	Police	and	then	allowed	to	continue	their	journey.		
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While	the	rate	of	incoming	migrants	was	significantly	reduced,	arrivals	on	the	islands	did	not	cease	entirely.	This,	combined	with	people	being	prevented	from	leaving	the	islands,	resulted	in	the	already	highly	problematic	living	conditions	in	the	overcrowded	reception/detention	centers	(now	named	Centers	for	Reception	and	Identification)	deteriorating,	resulting	in	frequent	riots	(in.gr,	2018)(Huffpost,	2017).	As	might	be	expected,	the	increasingly	gloomy	situation	took	its	toll	on	the	migrant	population’s	moral.	Doctors	Without	Borders	reported	that	in	the	year	following	the	“Statement”,	150%	rises	in	stress	and	depression	symptoms	were	documented	among	migrants	held	in	Moria	camp	in	Lesvos,	and	instances	of	post-traumatic	stress	disorder	tripled	(Γιατροί	Χωρίς	Σύνορα,	2017).	The	Greek	islands,	where	mortality	rates	were	extremely	high,	while	simultaneously	celebrated	as	places	of	“European	solidarity”,	were	now	transformed	into	large-scale	detention	centers.	However,	the	Greek	islands	were	not	the	only	locations	affected	by	the	Statement	regarding	Greek	state	practices.		
8.6.2.	Reformations	in	the	asylum	administration			 In	this	section	I	will	examine	how	the	time-specific	notion	of	admissibility	had	to	be	worked	into	the	procedures	of	the	Greek	asylum	system.	The	two	main	areas	discussed	concern	the	restructuring	of	the	Appeal	Committees,	and	the	upgrading	of	the	role	of	EASO	in	asylum	handling.	
8.6.2.1.	The	Appeal	Committees			 The	Greek	Asylum	Service,	as	the	first	instance	authority	of	the	Greek	state,	has	been	responsible	for	implementing	the	Statement,	and	has	done	so	by	determining	that	asylum	seekers	whose	applications	had	been	rejected	could	rightfully	be	returned	to	Turkey,	which	could	offer	them	adequate	protection	(Gkliati,	2017).	However,	the	Appeal	Committees,	being	the	institution	examining	the	applications	in	the	second	degree,	overturned	390	out	of	the	first	393	rulings	on	the	grounds	of	not	considering	Turkey	an	SFC	for	Syrians.	This	of	course,	was	in	direct	opposition	to	the	spirit	of	the	Statement	and	more	precisely	the	presumption	of	Turkey	as	a	Safe	Third	Country	(STC)	(Amnesty	Intenational,	2017a).	This	annulation	of	such	an	important	parameter	of	the	Statement	was	not	warmly	received	by	the	EU.	It	reportedly	“created	a	major	upset	in	Brussels”,	
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rendering	the	committees	“an	enemy	of	the	deal”	(Zalan,	2016).	The	EU	then	applied	pressure	on	the	Greek	state	to	introduce	new	legislation,	and	a	new	Appeal	Authority	and	new	Appeal	Committees	were	established	that	were	more	eager	to	comply	(European	Commission,	2016b).			 The	Greek	state	did	not	fail	to	deliver,	and	in	record	time,	on	16	June	2016,	approved	an	amendment	of	the	relevant	law	(4375/2016),	changing	the	composition	of	said	Committees.	The	earlier	composition	included	one	government	representative,	one	representative	of	the	UNHCR,	and	a	human	rights	expert	selected	from	a	list	compiled	by	the	National	Commission	on	Human	Rights	(ECRE,	2016b).	The	new	composition	characteristically	dispensed	with	the	human	rights	expert,	introduced	two	judges	of	the	Administrative	Courts,	and	retained	the	UNHCR	representative.	The	whole	escapade	was,	of	course,	criticized	by	scholars	and	organizations	alike	(ECRE,	2016b;	Gkliati,	2017;	Zalan,	2016).	An	open	letter	published	by	members	of	the	old	committees	pointed	out	that	their	institutional	replacement	was	not	“due	to	the	rationale	of	the	decisions	being	incomplete	or	unjustified,	but	because	it	doubted	the	political	planning	of	the	Ministry”	(The	Press	Project,	2016).	The	outcome	in	terms	of	decisions	was	that	the	new	Appeal	Committees,	as	of	31	December	2017,	upheld	all	inadmissibility	decisions	of	the	Greek	Asylum	Service	in	the	context	of	the	Statement	(Amnesty	Intenational,	2017a,	p.	15).	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	same	law	(4375/2016)	has	caused	conditions	for	asylum	seekers	to	deteriorate	in	more	ways,	including	but	not	limited	to,	restricting	free	legal	assistance	for	the	first	degree	examination	of	their	claim	as	well	as	refusing	their	right	to	be	present	in	person	during	the	examination	of	the	appeal.	On	22	September	2017,	the	Greek	Council	of	State	(CoS)	examined	whether	Turkey	is	a	safe	third	country	for	asylum	applicants	who	have	previously	appealed	against	a	decision	of	the	Appeals	Committee.	The	rationale	behind	the	decision,	which	found	the	applications	indeed	inadmissible	on	the	basis	of	article	54	of	4375/2016,	was	that	the	Asylum	Procedures	Directive	(Council	of	the	European	Union	&	European	Parliament,	2013)	“does	not	explicitly	require	that	the	third	country	concerned	needs	to	operate	a	legal	system	that	guarantees	all	the	rights	enshrined	in	the	Geneva	Convention. Rather,	it	can	still	be	considered	safe	if	refugees	can	receive	in	practice	
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‘equivalent’	protection	to	that	envisaged	in	the	Geneva	Convention.”	(Tsiliou,	2018).	This	“equivalent	protection”	offered	by	Turkey,	must	and	has	been	noted	to	be	a	status	of	Temporary	Protection,	by	order	of	the	Turkish	Council	of	Ministers,	on	account	of	the	mass	influx	of	Syrians.	This	status,	as	opposed	to	asylum	status,	which	is	offered	after	a	personalized	evaluation	of	a	person’s	condition,	is	granted	collectively	and	can	also	be	withdrawn	collectively.	In	addition,	it	can	be	problematic	in	terms	of	access	for	stateless	persons	as	well	as	members	of	minority	ethnicities	who	are	usually	discriminated	against	in	Turkey	(Norwegian	Association	for	Asylum	Seekers,	2016)(Refucomm,	n.d.,	p.	3).	
8.6.2.2.	The	role	of	EASO		 	During	the	same	period,	the	role	of	the	European	Asylum	Support	Office	(EASO)	was	upgraded,	both	in	a	formal	and	an	informal	sense.	EASO,	originally	intended	as	a	supportive	agent	for	the	Greek	Asylum	Service’s	task	of	conducting	asylum	interviews,	was	now	given	the	capacity	to	conduct	admissibility	interviews	in	the	context	of	the	“fast	track”	procedure	applied	at	the	border	(ECRE,	2016b).	This	involvement	of	EASO	has	been	criticized	for	being	unclear	and	exceeding	the	legal	framework	of	asylum	handling	(Greek	Council	for	Refugees,	European	Council	on	Refugees	and	Exiles,	Solidarity	Now,	&	Αίτημα,	2016).	EASO’s	involvement	in	the	decision-making	process	regarding	asylum	application,	as	regulated	by	the	EU	Regulation	establishing	the	agency	(European	Parliament	&	Council	of	the	European	Union,	2010),	provides	no	legal	basis	for	such	actions.	Instead,	it	clearly	states	that	EASO	“shall	have	no	direct	or	indirect	powers	in	relation	to	the	taking	of	decisions	by	Member	States'	asylum	authorities	on	individual	applications	for	international	protection”	(Preamble	§14	and	Article	2(6)).	Furthermore,	GAS	has	been	repeatedly	reported	to	rely	on	EASO’s	records	without	ever	ultimately	directly	addressing	questions	to	the	applicants	(ECCHR,	2018).	The	same	report	from	ECCHR	states	that	“EASO	officers	often	stuck	to	a	rigid	questionnaire	without	giving	the	applicant	room	to	elaborate	on	their	personal	history	of	harm	or	persecution.”	Drawing	the	conclusion	that	“In	sum,	the	interviews	consistently	failed	to	consider	the	individual	experiences	and	vulnerabilities	of	the	applicants”.	For	its	part,	EASO	has	done	little	towards	debunking	such	claims,	as	they	seem	to	have	claimed	in	
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communications	with	the	Ombudsman	when	stating	that	it	“kept	no	record	of	its	conduct	of	interviews	and	ensuing	concluding	remarks”	(ECCHR,	2018).	By	now,	the	reader	should	be	beginning	to	appreciate	the	impact	of	publishing	the	Statement	as	a	significant	game	changer	on	many	levels.	In	the	following	sections,	I	illuminate	the	“rupture”	aspect	of	the	Statement,	partly	by	presenting	a	specific	case	in	which	irregularized	migrants	were	faced	with	the	new	reality	that	the	Statement	enabled.	
8.7.	The	Statement	as	a	rupture		 “Today	marks	a	dark	day	in	the	history	of	refugee	protection:	one	in	which	
Europe’s	leaders	attempted	to	buy	themselves	out	of	their	international	
obligations,	heedless	of	the	cost	in	human	misery,”	said	John	Dalhuisen,	Amnesty	International’s	Director	for	Europe	(Amnesty	Intenational,	2017b).	The	reformation	of	the	Appeal	Committees	took	some	time,	and	the	implementing	law	4375/2016	was	amended	on	a	few	occasions	during	the	months	immediately	following	the	Statement.	However,	in	other	fields	of	administration	and	migrant	governance,	events	accelerated	to	a	higher	degree.		It	rapidly	became	clear	that	the	Statement	was	a	moment	of	rupture	for	reality	as	it	related	to	migration	and	asylum	in	the	EU.	As	the	spokesperson	from	the	Greek	department	of	Doctors	Without	Borders	explained,	it	was	“the	time	when	the	trolley	doors	were	shut,	leaving	those	behind	running	to	catch	up”	(Μπερση,	2017).	The	extent	to	which	the	Greek	state	was	determined	to	not	let	anything	stand	in	the	way	of	the	implementation	measures	is	clearly	shown	in	the	transformation	of	the	Appeal	Committees	discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter.	The	Statement	introduced	a	new	temporal	factor	for	migrants	arriving	in	the	EU,	which	came	with	a	new	de	facto	categorization,	namely	those	who	arrived	before	and	after	the	publishing	date.	However,	the	arbitrary	and	vague	nature	of	the	Statement’s	text	allowed	and	enabled	more	controversy	when	it	came	to	people	who	were	caught	in	a	“liminal”	limbo,	with	regard	to	their	status	in	this	temporality.	One	report	published	by	the	NGO	“Αίτημα”	said:	
“A	Syrian	citizen	entered	Greece	on	19/3/16	as	is	determined	by	order	
of	the	Director	of	the	Police	Prefecture	of	Lesvos	dated	19/03/2016.	However,	
the	 asylum	 application	 that	 they	 claimed	 was	 rejected	 by	 decision	 of	 the	
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Prefectural	 Office	 of	 Asylum	 of	 Lesvos,	 which	 considered	 that	 the	 applicant	
should	 be	 readmitted	 to	 Turkey	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 19/03/2016	 Common	
Statement	as	the	office	did	not	accept	the	applicant’s	claim	of	entering	Greek	
territory	on	19/03/2016.	The	applicant	appealed	against	the	decision,	and	the	
Appeal	Committee	issued	an	Act	of	Incompetence,	accepting	that	the	appellant	
entered	 the	 country	 before	 20/3/2016	 and	 thus,	 the	 Common	 Statement	
cannot	be	enforced	and	prompted	the	appellant	to	the	competent	authority	to	
examine	their	case.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	case	should	have	been	prompted	
for	a	first-level	procedure,	the	Director	of	Appeal	Committees	passed	the	case	
to	 a	 different	 second-level	 committee.	 After	 our	 organization’s	 interference,	
the	 second-level	 committee	 considered	 itself	 lacking	 the	 required	 legal	
capacity	 and	 returned	 the	 file.	 	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 October,	 an	 application	
was	 filed	 with	 the	 Prefectural	 Office	 of	 Asylum	 of	 Attica	 in	 order	 for	 the	
aforementioned	 order	 of	 the	 Police	 Prefecture	 of	 Lesvos	 to	 be	 taken	 under	
consideration	 and	 the	 applicant	 permitted	 to	 join	 the	 relocation	 scheme,	 as	
entitled.	 By	 email,	 we	 received	 the	 answer	 “you	 are	 informed	 that	 in	 the	
European	 database	 EURODAC,	 the	 precise	 date	 of	 entry	 to	 our	 country	 is	
determined	 as	 23.03.2016.	 The	 aforementioned	 date	 does	 not	 correspond	 to	
the	memo	submitted	by	 the	applicant	and	 is	anyway	binding	 for	our	Service	
with	regard	to	our	ability	to	send	a	claim	for	another	European	state	to	take	
over	the	responsibility	of	examining	the	 international	protection	application,	
on	the	basis	of	the	EU	Council	decision	1523/2015	and	1601/2015.	Therefore,	
it	was	a	just	decision	to	forward	the	specific	case	to	the	national	procedure”(!)	
(sic).	 We	 reported	 all	 of	 the	 above	 to	 the	 Central	 Asylum	 Service.	 In	 early	
December,	an	application	was	filed	with	the	Police	Prefecture	of	Lesvos	for	the	
EURODAC	 entry	 to	 be	 corrected	 with	 the	 addition	 of	 a	 relevant	 note.	 The	
answer	 from	Lesvos	 states	 that	 there	 can	be	no	 such	 correction	because	 the	
fingerprints	 were	 taken	 on	 23/03/2016.”	 	 (Original	 in	 Greek,	 my	translation)(Αίτημα,	2017,	pp.	40–41)		In	the	Eurodac	regulation,		the	“place	and	date	of	apprehension”	and	“date	on	which	the	fingerprints	were	taken”	are	indeed	two	separate	entry	fields	(Article	14.2	(b)	and	(e))	and	it	also	calls	for	the	transmission	of	the	data	“no	later	than	72	hours	after	the	date	of	apprehension”.	According	to	IOM,	for	March	2016,	the	average	number	of	daily	arrivals	was	1,885	(IOM,	
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2016a)	 (for	 Europe).	 UNHCR	 gives	 a	 number	 of	 895	 (UNHCR,	 2016)	 for	Greece,	 noting	 that	 these	 estimates	 are	 based	 “on	 the	 most	 reliable	information	available	by	the	authorities”.	In	the	context	of	that	period,	it	is	impossible	to	calculate	precise	numbers.	However,	it	is	safe	to	assume	that	daily	arrivals	exceeded	800.	Given	that	the	migrants	who	asked	Αίτημα	for	help	arrived	on	19	March	and	were	registered	on	23	March,	a	“margin”	of	more	than	2,000	persons	is	the	lowest	estimation	of	people	affected	by	this	situation	alone.		 In	practice,	people	being	registered	a	few	days	after	their	arrival	in	the	 Greek	 islands	 is	 common-place	 practice.	 Therefore,	 it	 would	 seem	common	sense	that	such	implications	would	be	predicted	and	acted	upon.	Following	up	on	 the	 cases	mentioned	above,	 I	 conducted	 interviews	with	relevant	 actors,	 namely	 employees	 of	 the	 GAS,	 the	 Greek	 Police,	 and	 the	Greek	Ombudsman.	The	various	departments	of	the	Greek	Police	involved	in	 the	 function	 and	 management	 of	 the	 migrant-related	 databases	responded	 to	 questions	 on	 this	 case	 with	 uncertainty	 regarding	 which	department	 is	 ultimately	 responsible	 for	 decisions	 on	 changing	 entries.	Those	 departments	 are	 the	 Informatics	 Department	 (ID),	 the	 Asylum	Department	 of	 the	 Aliens	 Sector	 (AD),	 and	 the	 Department	 of	 Forensic	Investigations	 (DFI).	The	 latter	 is	 involved	due	 to	 the	 forensic	 “nature”	of	fingerprint	 data,	 and	 also	 recruits	 fingerprint	 experts	 who	 manually	(visually)	 confirm	 “hits”	 returned	 by	 the	 automated	 fingerprint	matching	procedure.		 The	 DI	 clearly	 responded	 that	 the	 DFI	 was	 responsible	 for	 any	changes	 in	 the	 entries	 (Interview	with	 DI	 officer,	 4/7/2018),	which	 is	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 DFI’s	 institutional	 position	 as	 the	 national	 control	authority	of	the	EURODAC	system	(ΔΕΕ,	2015).	My	contact	and	request	for	a	 visit	 with	 DFI	 was	 by	 far	 the	 most	 slow	 and	 time	 consuming,	 with	repeated	 claims	 on	 behalf	 of	 DFI	 of	 	 “rigid	 obligations”,	 “increased	workload”	and	access	 to	 the	office	of	 the	national	unit	of	EURODAC	being	denied	 “as	 it	 is	 a	 space	of	 restricted	 access,	 only	 accessible	 to	 authorized	persons”	 (Communication	 with	 DEE	 via	 email,	 June	 2018),	 though	 the	agency	 itself	 provides	 these	 very	 authorizations.	 When	 finally,	 an	
		 169	
appointment	with	an	employee	of	the	DFI	was	arranged,	I	had	the	chance	to	meet	a	police	officer	working	as	a	“fingerprint	expert”	whose	main	task	was	to	manually	and	visually	examine	the	“hits”	that	the	automated	fingerprint	comparison	 software	 returned.	 It	 was	 on	 his	 advice	 that	 I	 contacted	 DI,	which	again	prompted	me	to	return	to	the	DFI.	After	sending	a	written	set	of	 questions	 to	 the	 DFI	 focused	 on	 the	 procedure	 of	 data	 changes	 in	EURODAC	entries	and	the	case	in	particular,	I	received	a	final	refusal	for	a	second	 meeting	 as	 “a	 satisfactory	 number	 of	 the	 questions	 have	 been	answered”	(Communication	with	DEE	via	email,	August	2018).	 It	 is	worth	noting	that	on	the	issues	of	the	change	of	data,	the	answer	referred	to	the	text	of	the	Eurodac	Regulation	and	its	relevant	article.			 Further	 research	 on	 the	 issue	 included	 an	 interview	 with	 a	representative	 of	 the	 Greek	Ombudsman.	 Their	 view	 of	 the	 stance	 of	 the	Greek	 Police	 stemmed	 from	 a	 different	 standpoint	 beyond	 the	 technical	potentiality	of	 the	change	of	an	entry,	and	 the	administrative	 labyrinth	of	the	Greek	Police.	
“If	 they	 [those	 administering	 the	 entries	 in	 the	 database]	 were	 to	 make	
changes	for	the	first	 individuals	who	reported	them,	then	they	would	have	to	
admit	 the	 same	 for	 more	 people.	 It	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 principle	 not	 to	 publicly	
admit	that	the	specific	registrations	are	mistaken	…	EL.AS	[the	Greek	Police]	
blamed	 a	 technical	 difficulty,	 which	 we	 consider	 proverbial	 and	 that	 the	
difficulty	 is	 political…	 The	 pressure	 [upon	 the	 Greek	 state]	 for	 the	
implementation	of	the	Statement	is	so	big	that	the	Greek	Police	did	not	want	
to	admit	that	there	are	problems	in	the	registers	…	In	both	cases,	the	case	was	
passed	 to	 the	 asylum	 service,	 and	 due	 to	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 individuals	
there,	 no	 longer	 constituted	 a	 conflict.	 Both	 cases	 that	 came	 to	 us	 were	
protected	 because	 they	 came	with	 two	different	NGOs.	 People	 by	 themselves	
(Note:	 not	 assisted	 by	 NGOs),	 could	 and	 easily	 might	 have	 already	 been	
returned	 with	 the	 first	 readmissions…	 There	 are	 no	 data	 for	 the	 first	
readmissions”.	(Interview	with	Xrysh	Xatzh,	May	2018,	my	translation)		 This	 quote	 places	 the	 case	 under	 the	 very	 specific	 political	conjunction.	The	Greek	state	has	been	heavily	criticized	for	its	handling	of	the	 migration	 flows,	 especially	 for	 the	 reluctance	 of	 its	 officials	 to	thoroughly	carry	out	the	registration	of	all	incoming	migrants.	It	could	not	
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“afford”	doubts	 to	begin	circulating	about	 the	accuracy	of	 the	registration	and	the	legitimacy	of	the	implementation	of	the	Statement.	In	this	context,	the	refusal	to	investigate	the	actual	date	of	arrival	of	the	persons	involved,	and	 the	 overall	 stance	 of	 the	 Greek	 police	 can	 be	 read	 as	 a	 pretense	intended	 to	 cover	 up	 a	 political	 agenda	 that	 dictated	 that	 no	 cracks	 are	allowed	to	be	visible	in	the	solid	construction	that	 is	the	EU’s	response	to	the	 “migrant	 crisis”.	The	 role	 that	 registration	 systems	 such	as	EURODAC	played	in	this	situation	proved	to	be	critical,	as	it	was	the	technical	resort	to	which	 Greek	 institutions	 would	 refer	 to	 in	 order	 to	 legitimatize	 their	actions	(or	lack	of	thereof).	
8.8.	Discussion	
8.8.1.	The	fate	of	migrants	as	a	bargaining	chip				 Considering	the	Statement	without	examining	the	legislative	reformations	that	were	necessary	for	its	implementation	and	the	arguments	developed	around	them,	the	Statement	signals	in	very	crude	and	material	terms	the	“monetization”	of	asylum	and	international	protection	procedures.	That	is	understood	to	mean	that	by	providing	funds	and	other	political	exchanges,	the	EU	more	or	less	“hired”	Turkey	to	become	a	stricter	gatekeeper,	diverting	the	mobile	populations	away	from	EU	territory.	This	outsourcing	of	border	control	and	asylum	administration	is	far	from	innovational	in	its	conception,	as	it	has	been	standard	practice	for	the	EU	for	the	past	decade	(Gammeltoft-Hansen,	2013).	Yet,	the	scale	to	which	it	was	realized	with	the	specific	move	in	the	specific	context	makes	it	stand	out	in	the	history	of	similar	exchanges.	The	reliance	on	Turkey	to	perform	the	role	of	the	gatekeeper	to	some	extent	empowered	the	government	of	Turkish	President	Erdogan	(The	Economist,	2016)	in	a	number	of	political	conflicts	during	the	period	after	the	Statement.	Specifically,	the	potential	ability	of	the	Turkish	state	to	discard	the	Statement	and	re-establish	the	previous	state	of	play	with	regard	to	boats	landing	in	the	Greek	islands	was	often	present	in	the	discourse	as	a	bargaining	chip	in	the	hands	of	the	Turkish	Government.		When	for	example,	tensions	rose	between	the	Turkish	government	and	EU	Member	States	due	to	the	latter	not	allowing	public	speeches	to	be	made	by	the	(ruling)	JDP	party’s	ministers	and	MPs	to	members	of	the	Turkish	diaspora,	
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the	Turkish	Minister	of	the	Interior	no	less	than	threatened	to	“open	way	for	15,000	refugees	who	we	don't	send	each	month	and	blow	the	mind	(of	Europe)(Euractiv,	2017)”.	Again,	this	is	not	a	singular	occurrence	on	behalf	of	the	Turkish	state,	as	the	former	Greek	Minister	of	Defense	Panos	Kammenos	has	made	similar	statements	“threatening”	that	European	cities	may	be	“filled	with	Jihadists”	if	the	“EU	keeps	bullying	Greece”	(Τα	Νέα,	2015).		
8.8.2.	Asylum	and	other	categorizations		 In	Chapter	2	(Theory),	I	engaged	with	a	body	of	literature	that	sees	“border”	beyond	the	predominant	“gate”	metaphor,	opening	and	closing	in	relation	to	the	person	standing	before	it.	Instead	of	talking	of	borders	as	fixed	entities	that	are	sufficient	or	insufficient	for	their	task,	certain	branches	of	border	scholarship	see	a	“border”	as	a	series/set	of	bordering	practices.	“Bordering”	does	not	take	on	the	task	of	materializing	an	already	“present”	or	“real”	distinction	among	subjects	such	as	the	migrant/refugee	dichotomy.	Instead,	to	a	certain	extent	it	performs	and	constructs	the	subject	positions	on	which	distinctions	and	categorizations	are	based.	By	avoiding	a	view	of	borders	as	“objects	of	knowledge…	already	given”,	instead	one	may	“investigate	the	processes	by	which	these	objects	are	constituted”	(Mezzadra	&	Neilson,	2012).	For	Greece,	the	implementation	of	the	Statement,	radically	recalibrated	an	integral	element	of	the	conceptual	basis	of	many	practices	that	constitute	this	“bordering”.	Both	at	formal/legislative	and	informal/arbitrary	levels,	the	limits	between	the	two	were	often	not	well	defined,	also	due	to	new	laws	rendered	active.	In	this	context,	introducing	the	admissibility	evaluation	of	an	asylum	claim	achieved	two	aims.	On	the	one	hand,	alongside	the	Turkish	state’s	actions	to	deter	new	arrivals,	it	outsourced	the	administrative,	social	and	humanitarian	“burden”	of	recognizing	and	hosting	refugees	for	Turkey.	On	the	other,	it	reshaped	the	notion	of	asylum	within	a	European	context.	Migrants	now	had	to	prove	not	that	they	are	in	need	of	European	sanctioned	protection,	but	instead	that	their	presence	in	Turkey	was	not	safe,	a	new	form	of	“deservedness”	became	the	dominant	criteria	for	the	specific	form	if	inclusion	that	is	the	recognition	of	a	person’s	refugee	status.		
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Whereas	until	that	point,	a	person	was	seen	as	“deserving	asylum	and	protection”	with	regard	to	the	situation	of	their	country	of	origin,	now	their	“deservedness”	was	mediated	by	the	fact	that	they	arrived	in	the	EU	through	Turkey.	Thus,	the	asylum	procedure,	being	a	process	incorporating	the	highly	performative	aspects	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	underwent	significant	changes.	Examining	the	admissibility	of	an	asylum	claim	shifts	the	case	handler’s	task	from	assessing	whether	or	not	a	person	is	in	danger	and	in	need	of	international	protection,	to	assessing	whether	or	not	they	can	be	“safely”	returned	to	Turkey.	This	is	vividly	illustrated	by	the	words	of	a	lawyer	presented	in	a	2017	report: “the	minute	an	applicant	undergoing	an	admissibility	interview	utters	a	word	about	Syria,	they	are	stopped	by	the	caseworker	and	told	that	the	interview	has	nothing	to	do	with	Syria,	even	if	in	fact	it	does.”	(Norwegian	Refugee	Council	et	al.,	2017,	p.	4).	Clearly,	in	light	of	all	the	above,	the	migration	status	of	an	individual,	a	highly	naturalized	concept	in	the	public	and	political	debate,	is	an	outcome	of	different	biopolitical	choices,	regimes	and	processes	(Balibar,	2015).	
8.8.3.	Temporality	of	bordering	and	the	agency	of	database	entries		 In	migration	policy	making,	it	is	not	uncommon	for	situations	to	change	suddenly	and	without	warning.	Griffiths	refers	to	periods	of	accelerated	action,	be	that	political	and	administrative	reorganization	or	the	acceleration	of	individual	cases	of	deportation,	as	“frenzied	time”	(M.	B.	E.	Griffiths,	2014)	when	“time	accelerates	quickly	and	rushes	out	of	control”.	The	sealing	of	the	border	between	Greece	and	Turkey,	the	restructuring	of	the	Appeal	Committees,	the	passing	and	amending	of	4375/2016	and	the	first	reportedly	arbitrary	deportations	following	the	Statement	all	happened	at	a	rapid	pace	and	can	be	seen	as	being	carried	out	in	“frenzied	time”.	The	same	can	be	said	for	the	people	on	the	Turkish	side	of	the	border,	who	from	one	day	to	the	next	were	blocked	from	attempting	a	border	crossing	that	thousands	had	made	during	the	previous	years,	months	and	even	days.		However,	other	aspects	of	the	Statement,	such	as	the	relocation,	were	not	treated	in	the	same	accelerated	manner.	Instead,	migrants	living	in	and	outside	the	Hotspots	were	as	it	often	happens	stuck	in	an	administrative	limbo	for	
		 173	
extended	periods	of	uncertainty.	This	“absence	of	synchronicity”	is	inherent	in	the	“complex	temporality	of	borders”	(Little,	2015),	the	complexity	of	which	also	lies	in	the	different	tempos	at	which	changes	are	made	in	bordering	practices.	In	this	case,	I	believe	that	the	absence	of	synchronicity	is	indicative	of	the	political	priorities	that	the	EU	had	set	at	the	time,	which	in	turn	shed	light	on	what	was	considered	“critical”	during	the	“migrant	crisis”.	After	a	short	period	of	time	when	the	“crisis”	was	largely	a	“humanitarian	crisis”,	with	the	main	reference	being	human	suffering,	it	was	relatively	quickly	transformed	into	a	crisis	of	control	of	human	mobility.	It	can	also	be	considered	a	political	crisis	of	power	struggles	between	Member	States	and	intra-national	conflicts	of	political	agendas.	In	most	cases,	parliamentary	politics	and	the	struggle	for	political	survival	involved	national	elections	as	a	focal	point, as	discussed	in	chapter	5.	
In	the	case	of	the	delayed	registration	described	in	section	8.7,	we	see	the	complex	temporality	of	borders,	and	its	handling	by	the	Greek	Asylum	Service	and	the	Greek	Police,	mediated	and	construed	by	the	entries	in	the	EURODAC	database.	The	temporal	division	or	rupture	that	the	Statement	introduced,	and	the	two	subsequent	categories	of	migrants,	namely	those	who	arrived	before	and	those	after	its	implementation,	are	not	clear	and	distinct,	due	to	the	textual	nature	of	the	Statement	and	its	inherit	vagueness.	This	was	exacerbated	by	the	interplay	of	this	vagueness	with	the	reality	of	bordering	practices	at	the	Hotspots	and	Athens.	This	interplay	creates	room	for	liminality,	as	the	state	of	being	between	categories,	where	“people	are	tainted	with	danger,	pollution	or	illegality”	(M.	Griffiths,	2012).		The	resolution	of	the	liminality	is	achieved	by	referring	to	the	“data	double”	of	the	migrants.	Here,	this	is	seen	as	a	migrant’s	entire	journey	being	reduced	to	a	database	entry,	and	the	predominance	of	this	entry	against	all	other	forms	of	evidence,	even	evidence	that	is	produced	by	institutional	agents	such	as	the	Lesvos	Police.	The	EURODAC	procedure	and	the	rigidness	of	its	entries	are	evident	in	this	case,	and	were	enabled	by	the	specific	position	of	the	Greek	state	within	the	EU	and	the	“migrant	crisis”.	Specifically,	a	“migrant	crisis”	in	which	the	momentum	of	the	Statement	does	not	allow	for	errors	to	be	considered	and	no	less	admitted,	for	fear	of	similar	cases	emerging	and	thus	causing	“cracks”	in	
		 174	
the	solid	and	decisive	legal	artifact	that	is	the	Statement.	Thus,	in	this	case,	I	see	one	instance	that	corroborates	the	reoccurring	position	of	many	scholars,	that	socio-technical	systems,	especially	those	of	biopolitical	control	and	surveillance	and	their	use	are	always	embedded	in	specific	social,	political	and	cultural	conditions	that	shape	the	acts	of	their	users	and	subjects	(Oudshoorn	&	Pinch,	2003;	Woolgar,	1990)	The	Registration	of	irregularised	migrants	in	the	EURODAC	database,	whose	point	of	departure	as	a	tool	for	implementing	the	Dublin	Regulation	should	be	kept	in	mind	at	this	point,	underwent	a	series	of	transformations	and	was	invested	with	a	variety	of	meanings	throughout	the	“migrant	crisis”.	During	this	period,	we	see	it	completely	disassociated	with	Dublin,	and	we	also	see	a	temporal	“upgrade”	of	the	agency	of	data	elements	that,	outside	the	context	of	the	Statement,	would	be	considered	secondary	or	even	mundane.	
8.8.4.The	fuzziness	of	borders		 The	sudden	sealing	of	the	Greek-Turkish	border,	and	the	simultaneous	blockade	aimed	at	migrants	on	the	Greek	islands,	radically	changed	the	reality	regarding	migrant	mobility.	These	aspects	also	changed	the	islands	as	border	venues,	essentially	turning	them	into	large-scale,	open-air	detention	centers	for	thousands	of	migrants.	The	clear	and	dynamic	interventions	of	the	EU	in	the	way	that	the	Greek	state	generally	handled	matters	during	this	period,	reminds	us	of	Balibar’s	position	that	“no	political	border	is	ever	the	mere	boundary	between	two	states	but	is	always	over-determined,	and,	in	that	sense,	sanctioned,	reduplicated	and	relativized	by	other	geopolitical	divisions”(Balibar,	2002,	p.	79).	Taking	this	over-determination	slightly	further	in	relation	to	the	“fuzzy”	character	of	the	EU’s	maritime	borders	with	Turkey,	several	more	points	require	attention.	While	at	first	glance,	sealing	the	border	seems	to	be	a	step	towards	re-determining	the	EU	border,	if	we	see	“the	border”	as	a	set	of	practices,	this	clear	image	becomes	more	blurred.	As	an	actor,	Turkey	is	now	more	present	than	ever	in	the	handling	of	asylum	applications	through	the	upgrading	and	reintroduction	of	the	admissibility	procedure.	The	extensive	outsourcing	of	protection	to	Turkey	on	the	basis	of	an	economical	trade,	binds	the	EU	and	Turkey	even	further.	In	this	way,	even	though	for	now	it	would	seem	the	“border”	has	been	
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re-established	and	forcefully	drawn,	it	is	more	“fuzzy”	than	before,	as	the	deal/agreement	between	the	two	entities	is	precarious.	
8.9.	Conclusions		 In	chapter	5,	I	argued	that	among	the	various	elements	that	constituted	the	“migrant	crisis”	narrative,	some	were	silenced	and	some	were	seen	as	overly	“critical”.	Among	them	was	the	need	for	“knowledge”	of	the	incoming	subjects,	and	the	“overwhelming	sizes”	of	the	migration	“flows”.	In	chapter	6,	I	discussed	the	Hotspot	approach	regarding	the	former,	and	in	the	present	chapter	I	engage	with	the	Statement	as	a	solution	to	the	latter.	The	“migrant	crisis”,	as	it	is	inherent	in	“crises”	in	general,	shrank	“the	time	and	space	of	action	to	a	“here	and	now”	of	emergency	response”	(van	Reekum,	2016).	However,	as	we	saw,	this	“emergency	response”	was	significantly	uneven	in	its	distribution	among	the	different	constitutive	elements	of	the	“migrant	crisis”.	The	response	focused	extensively	on	the	deterrence	of	new	arrivals,	and	the	return	of	migrants.	This	is	not	unusual	for	crises,	as	they	tend	to	be	“presented	as	an	unpredictable	surprise	demanding	an	immediate	response”	(Calhoun	2014:	31).	Such	representations	render	invisible	and	obscure	the	political	backgrounds	of	crises,	while	at	the	same	time	focusing	and	capitalizing	on	human	suffering.		The	method	employed	for	both	goals	originated	in	the	past	and	was	by	no	means	novel	in	its	conception.	The	recipe	of	externalization	of	border	control	was	in	use	before	Schengen	and	it	has	also	grown	with	it.	However,	questions	remained	unanswered	regarding	moral	and	legal	content	in	terms	of	this	move.	As	Roitman	notes,	the	“crisis	narratives”	are	not	“false	or	merely	symbolic”,	they	also	“regulate	narrative	construction,	just	as	they	regulate	the	questions	asked	and	foreclosed”.	The	proclamation	of	a	“crisis”	does	more	than	state	a	demand	for	effective	(even	extraordinary)	measures,	even	though	the	latter	are	inseparable	aspects	of	crisis.	It	calls	for	“life	deciding	alternatives	meant	to	answer	questions	about	what	is	just	or	unjust”	(Koselleck	2006:	361).	The	manner	in	which	these	questions	are	posed	forms	new	moral	obligations,	which	find	their	fulfillment	at	a	higher	political	level,	and	this	is	what	happened	in	the	cases	described	in	this	chapter.	From	the	reformation	of	the	Appeal	Committees	
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to	the	case	of	delayed	registration,	we	see	a	shift	in	what	is	relevant,	and	what	counts	as	a	question.	Once	again,	it	seems	that	the	EU’s	response	to	the	“migrant	crisis”,	was	directed	towards	specific	elements	of	what	comprised	the	“crisis”.	Despite	the	rhetoric	surrounding	the	need	for	“fairer”,	elaborated	asylum	system,	relatively	few	core	fundamental	changes	occurred	in	that	respect.	The	Dublin	Regulation	has	largely	remained	intact	despite	intense	criticisms	and	its	commonly	accepted	failure.	The	proposal	for	a	new	Regulation	does	not	seem	to	entail	drastic	changes,	except	a	few	manipulations.	FRONTEX	has	been	renamed	as	the	European	Border	and	Coast	Guard	Agency	and	its	budget	and	operational	scope	have	seen	significant	increases.	However,	this	cannot	be	viewed	as	something	new,	but	rather	as	a	strengthening	of	the	old	model	of	“fortress	Europe”.	Instead,	the	EU	chose	to	seal	its	borders	with	Turkey	and	insert	asylum	matters	in	an	arena	of	exchanges	with	neighboring	countries.	Meanwhile,	economic	and	political	returns	were	offered	to	Turkey	and	Libya	in	order	for	them	to	accept	further	externalization	of	the	European	border,	and	to	outsource	asylum	and	border	control	procedures.	In	the	case	of	Turkey,	this	far	exceeded	the	acceleration	of	litigations	that	were	underway,	such	as	the	Readmission	Agreement,	but	called	for	recalibrations	of	national	laws,	and	even	the	reshaping	of	notions	such	as	“sufficient	protection”	and	“safe	third	country”.	Without	the	declaration	of	the	situation	as	a	“crisis”	and	the	repeated	utterances	of	a	critical	situation,	such	exceptional	and	“emergency”	governmental	measures	cannot	find	their	way	into	actual	policy	making	(De	Genova,	2016).	The	notion	of	“crisis”	as	well	as	its	impact,	emerges	and	vanishes	not	in	relation	to	“hard	facts”,	or	measurable	quantities,	but	is	instead	intertwined	with	conflicting	domestic	and	international	political	agendas,	power	struggles	among	different	states,	and	estimations	concerning	an	election-related	“common	sense”.	This	is	a	permanent	characteristic	of	western	democracies.	An	outcome	of	the	EU’s	reactions	was	a	re-merging	of	the	categories	of	“migrant”	and	“refugee”	with	the	wider	category	of	“irregular	migration”.	The	ever	present,	perhaps	dominant	aspect	of	the	debate	surrounding	the	“mixed	flows”,	which	shaped	the	moral	and	ethical	tone	of	the	discussion	through	2015	and	2016	–	the	distinction	between	“deserving	refugees”	and	“undeserving	
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migrants”	or	“bogus	asylum	seekers”	–	was	set	aside	as	irrelevant.	The	notion	of	asylum	was	significantly	weakened	as	a	measure	of	protection	for	those	who	need	it.	The	performative	aspects	of	the	asylum	interviews	were	enhanced	and	shifted	in	a	new	direction,	which	necessitated	including	Turkey	and	life	there	as	a	factor.	Within	the	context	of	the	Greek	state,	relatively	little	could	stand	in	the	way	of	this	transformation.	Appeals	were	rapidly	dismissed,	institutional	instruments	were	dismantled	and	reassembled	overnight,	and	even	at	a	top	administrative	level,	extra-juridical	measures	were	taken.	It	seemed	that	the	character	of	the	state	as	a	not-so-coherent	whole	was	temporarily	sidestepped	and	the	Greek	state	acted	as	a	pretty	coherent	organism.	People	and	institutions	that	were	obstacles	to	implementing	the	Statement	were	promptly	removed.	Such	profound	changes	in	the	composition	of	decision	makers	are	profound	changes	within	the	state	(Mountz,	2003).	The	Statement	was	published	and	implemented	under	a	state	of	exception	(Agamben,	2005).	It	was	extra-juridical,	in	that	it	was	not	subject	to	control	by	any	administrative	or	juridical	body.	The	decision	to	exclude	or	include	from	the	law	not	only	applies	to	including	or	excluding	individuals	but	also	to	policy	acts.																
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Chapter	9.	Summary,	final	discussion	and	conclusions			 This	final	chapter	summarizes	the	conclusions	of	my	research	in	the	context	of	the	theoretical	framework	of	the	thesis,	while	also	exploring	the	ways	in	which	they	are	interconnected.	As	discussed	in	the	opening	chapters,	this	thesis	engaged	with	the	identification	and	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	in	the	EU,	under	the	admission	that	it	can	only	encapsulate	localized	but	intense	and	useful	glimpses	of	the	social	practices	and	phenomena	that	constitute	identification	and	registration,	both	in	geographical,	but	also	contextual	terms.	The	political	conjecture,	the	context	that	it	generated,	and	its	relation	to	this	project	were	discussed	in	chapters	5	and	6,	as	well	as	partially	in	chapter	3,	providing	the	backdrop	for	the	following	conclusions.	
9.1.	The	legacy	of	the	Dublin	Regulation			 The	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	in	the	EU	is	better	understood	when	seen	in	relation	to	the	construction	and	functions	of	the	Dublin	Regulation.	In	practice,	the	latter	connect	the	EU’s	Member	States	with	regard	to	the	administration	and	governance	of	people	arriving	in	the	EU	irregularly.	It	is	within	the	context	of	the	Dublin	Regulation	that	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	has	been	associated	with	the	notion	of	“European	solidarity”	in	the	very	non-straightforward	and	convoluted	manner	that	has	evolved.	In	the	field	of	migration	and	asylum	policy,	the	Dublin	Regulation	can	be	seen	as	the	reification	of	the	power	struggles	and	subsequent	balance	established	among	the	members	of	the	EU	(Garcés-Mascareñas,	2015;	Guild	et	al.,	2015).	It	can	and	should	also	be	seen	as	a	pretense	of	harmonization	of	European	asylum	systems,	however,	one	that	did	not	hold	in	the	face	of	reality	and	the	challenges	presented	by	asylum	seekers	who	made	cases	for	themselves,	as	has	been	shown	by	its	suspension	with	regard	to	Greece	(Guild	et	al.,	2015).	The	Dublin	Regulation	has	been	developed	and	applied	on	the	basis	of	the	conception	of	irregular	migrants,	and	more	specifically	asylum	seekers,	as	a	“burden”	that	every	Member	State	was	eager	to	avoid	(den	Heijer	et	al.,	2016).	As	a	direct	outcome	of	this	fundamental	issue,	the	Dublin	Regulation	has	functioned	more	as	a	strict	disciplinary	mechanism	than	a	distribution	model	for	asylum	
		 179	
seekers	and	their	applications.	This	disciplinary-inducing	function	of	the	Dublin	Regulation	works	in	two	levels.	On	an	intra-state	level,	it	has	created	an	unequal	distribution	of	asylum	applications	among	Member	states.	This	can	be	seen	as	an	imprint	of	the	aforementioned	power	struggles	and	balances	among	Member	states.	Ironically,	the	Dublin	Regulation,	with	its	underlying	functional	assumption	of	a	presumed	equality	in	the	level	of	the	asylum	services	offered	by	the	different	Member	States,	enabled	a	shift	in	the	opposite	direction	to	that	of	harmonization.	It	has	led	states	to	pursue	a	“race	to	the	bottom”(den	Heijer	et	al.,	2016,	p.	5)	in	terms	of	the	quality	and	efficiency	of	their	domestic	asylum	systems,	as	the	latter	were	considered	to	be	pull	factors	for	irregularized	migrants.		In	addition,	it	offered	serious	motivation	to	the	southern	states	of	Italy	and	Greece	to	be	less	than	willing	to	carry	out	registration	in	full,	as	such	a	practice	would	lead	to	an	additional	“burden”	on	their	national	systems.	In	relation	to	irregularized	migrants,	Dublin	has	enabled	specific	modes	of	bio	political	governance	of	those	populations,	and	in	that	manner	has	created	what	can	be	referred	to	as	“political	subjects”.	Built	upon	the	principle	of	neglecting	any	preferences	on	behalf	of	asylum	seekers	with	regards	to	the	countries	where	they	would	settle,	the	Dublin	Regulation	enforced	obedience	with	regard	to	the	illegalization	of	secondary	movement	among	states.	To	be	precise,	migrants	who	were	unwilling	to	comply	with	lengthy	detentions,	administrative	limbo	and	deportations	were	punished.	In	that	way,	for	decades,	it	forced	people	deeper	and	deeper	underground,	away	from	interactions	with	European	bureaucracy.	Those	who	either	did	not	manage	to	evade,	or	chose	not	to,	in	many	cases	involuntarily	found	themselves	enduring	a	complicated	and	lengthy	stint	in	limbo,	giving	rise	to	the	category	of	migrants	known	as	“Dubliners”.		 With	the	introduction	of	EURODAC,	and	the	use	of	fingerprints	as	a	registration,	the	bio	politics	of	the	Dublin	Regulation	were	now	directly	inscribed	on	the	migrant	body	(Van	der	Ploeg,	2003,	2006).	Subsequently,	perspectives	and	actions	of	resistance	were	similarly	inscribed	on	the	migrant	body,	which	gave	rose	to	testimonies	of	migrants	committing	acts	of	self-mutilation	in	order	to	avoid	Dublin	procedures	(REF).	Finally,	by	being	fluid	in	its	scope,	namely	being	available	for	forensic	purposes	after	the	2013	recast	of	the	EURODAC	
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Regulation	(European	Council	&	European	Parliament,	2013),	it	ultimately	served	the	exact	purposes	that	were	clearly	prohibited	in	the	its	original	version,	thus	further	criminalizing	irregularized	migrants	(Roots,	2015).		 Dublin	and	EURODAC	are	both	bio-political	instruments	for	the	governance	of	irregularized	migrant	populations.	They	have	the	agency	to	discontinue	the	right	of	an	individual	to	remain	within	a	territory,	by	detainment	or	deportation	while	simultaneously	retaining	a	productive	function,	as	they	are	essentially	the	only	way	through	which	the	same	individual	can	hope	to	gain	access	to	the	asylum	system	of	the	EU.	The	irregularized	migrant	body,	upon	arrival	to	the	EU,	or	better	said,	upon	interaction	with	its	bureaucratic	apparatus,	is	examined,	and	its	“data	double”	is	registered	in	EURODAC.	This	process	of	subjectification	has	been	met	with	resistance	by	migrants	avoiding	registration,	cultivating	an	underground	existence	or	attempting	to	render	their	bodies	unreadable,	and	thus	temporarily	ungovernable.	
9.2.	Registration	and	the	“migrant	crisis”			 The	legislation	concerning	migration	and	asylum,	EURODAC	being	no	exception,	has	been	largely	both	enabled	and	driven	by	discourses	of	emergencies	and	“crises”.	In	the	context	of	the	most	recent	“migrant/refugee	crisis”,	identification	and	registration	were	present	in	almost	every	instance	of	the	public	debate.	After	an	initial	period	of	shock,	during	which	the	focus	of	the	debate	was	the	suffering	of	the	populations	on	the	move,	the	attention	shifted	towards	a	discourse	highlighting	the	saturation	of	Europe’s	capacity	to	host	the	incoming	populations	and	their	unknown	identity.			 The	narrative	of	the	“European	migrant	crisis”	was	triggered	and	augmented	by	different	events	that	initiated	the	relevant	discourse	for	different	Member	States	or	other	European	states.	Even	so,	viewed	at	local/national	level,	or	EU	level,	all	the	narrations	share	some	common	characteristics.	For	example,	none	of	them	acknowledged	the	cause	and	effect	relationship	between	the	EU’s	long-term	migration	policy	and	the	fact	that	all	asylum	seekers	were,	in	practice,	left	with	no	other	choice	than	to	attempt	perilous	sea	crossings	in	the	Mediterranean.	Similarly,	the	“crisis”	narrative	constantly	referred	to	a	finite	and	limited	capacity	of	the	EU	with	regard	to	“hosting	refugees”,	a	capacity	that	was	
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presented	as	being	exceeded	by	the	number	of	migrants	that,	seen	in	the	wider	global	picture	at	that	time,	was	relatively	small	for	the	economic	and	social	super-power	that	European	states	are	in	relation	to	other	Middle-Eastern	states.	This	selective	construction	of	the	“European	migrant	crisis”	has	led	many	scholars	to	criticize	both	its	articulation	as	well	as	the	spirit	with	which	it	was	addressed	legislatively,	especially	after	the	first	wave	of	grass-roots	solidarity	had	lost	its	momentum	and	its	pressure	on	the	European	governments.	Acknowledging	and	criticizing	the	fact	that	the	“European	migrant	crisis”	is	a	constructed	narrative	allows	a	researcher	to	drift	away	from	the	rationalizing	of	whether	or	not	what	we	are	witnessing	is	a	“crisis”,	or	ascertaining	when	it	became	one,	and	instead	focus	on	what	discourses,	policies	and	practices	the	proclamation	of	a	situation	of	“crisis”	enables	and	legalizes.		 In	this	context,	almost	every	proclamation	of	measures	regarding	relocation,	resettlement	and	the	improvement	of	the	reception	facilities	fell	far	short	of	accomplishing	their	goals.	Similarly,	the	issue	of	the	incomplete	registration	of	incoming	migrants	always	occupied	a	central	role	in	the	debate.	It	was	highly	prioritized	in	policy	texts	published	after	the	Agenda	on	migration.	It	was	also	conceptually	associated	with	the	“European	values	of	humanitarianism,	solidarity	and	asylum”	(Triandafyllidou,	2018)	to	the	extent	that	it	became	a	prerequisite	for	the	acknowledgement	of	migrant	rights,	as	expressed	by	European	Commission	President	Jean-Claude	Juncker	(Juncker,	2015).	Identification	and	registration,	other	than	being	connected	with	European	values,	were	frequently	discussed	in	connection	with	a	discourse	of	securitization	with	regard	to	the	“terror	threat”.	The	latter	was	discursively	related	to	the	phenomena	of	migration.	Accordingly,	migrant	subjects	were	discussed	as	potential	terrorists,	and	the	“migration	flows”	were	described	as	a	gateway	for	militants	into	Europe,	especially	following	attacks	with	significant	impact	such	as	the	Bataklan	shootings	in	Paris	in	November	2015.	This	conceptualization	of	identification	and	registration	would	shape	the	way	that	the	EU	planned	and	implement	its	“response”	to	the	migration	flows,	through	the	“Hotspot	approach”.	
9.3.	The	“Hotspots”		
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	 In	this	context,	the	EU’s	“response”	focused	on	the	“frontline	states”	and	their	operation	capacities	concerning	receiving	incoming	irregularized	migrant	populations.	This	response	came	with	the	introduction	of	vaguely	defined	administrative	and	organizational	units	called	“Hotspots”.	Hotspots,	as	places	where	European	agencies	united	in	the	face	of	“extraordinary	migratory	pressure”,	remained	open-ended	and	fluid	in	their	function,	as	their	internal	procedures	were	subject	to	swift	changes,	often	overnight.	Such	changes	concerned	the	practices	of	e.g.	the	Police	officers	working	in	the	Hotspots,	as	well	as	issues	of	greater	scope,	including	the	freedom	of	movement	of	the	migrants	present	in	the	Hotspots.	Within	the	Hotspots,	EU	agencies	such	as	EASO	and	FRONTEX,	routinely	functioned	beyond	their	scope	and	overrode	the	restrictions	imposed	by	their	constitutive	frameworks.	This,	combined	with	the	actions	of	the	Greek	Government,	rendered	the	Hotspots	“spaces	of	exception”	(Agamben,	2005;	Kasparek,	2016).			 Other	than	a	state	of	exception,	Hotspots	also	constituted	open-ended	infrastructure	with	administrative,	regulative	framework	that	was	in	constant	flux.		To	an	extent,	they	were	infrastructural	sites	of	bio	political	experiment	(Harvey	et	al.,	2016),	which	through	trial	and	error	governance	related	attempts,	navigated	to	establish	stabilization.	Yet,	even	in	this	stabilized	form,	gaps	and	holes	intrinsic	not	only	to	“infrastructural	modes	of	operation”	(Reeves,	2016),	but	as	the	ethnographic	research	presented	in	chapter	7	indicates,	in	the	methods	used	for	the	identification	and	registration	of	irregularized	migrants,	constantly	called	for	improvisations	on	the	part	of	the	border	guards.	This	is	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.		 The	conjecture	of	a	fully	blown	“migrant	crisis”	and	the	implementation	of	the	“Hotspot	approach”,	subjected	migrant	bodies	to	an	assemblage	of	practices	and	institutions	that	would	surveille,	detain,	categorize	and	identify	them	in	a	procedure	with	intense	Tayloristic	characteristics	and	references	(Antonakaki	et	al.,	2016;	Tazzioli,	2016b;	Tazzioli	&	Garelli,	2018).	The	duo	of	identification	and	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	has	been	invested	with	many	powerful	and	diverse	meanings.	In	its	absence,	border	practices	are	considered	weak,	the	safety	of	the	populations	already	residing	in	the	EU	are	seen	as	being	under	constant	threat,	and	the	rational	and	efficient	distribution	of	the	asylum-related	
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resources	are	considered	hindered.	It	is	therefore	viewed	as	critical	that	the	border	apparatus	consisting	of	human	and	non-human	actors	discovers	the	“real”	identity	of	the	migrant.	We	return	to	the	narration	of	“discovery”	of	the	identity	of	the	migrant	bodies	later	in	this	chapter.		 Vital	as	the	above	“discovery”	may	be,	it	is	incomplete	and	futile	without	the	storage	of	the	resulting	data	in	the	relevant	databases	constituting	the	undisputed	registers	of	both	the	identity	of	the	migrant	bodies	as	well	as	the	milestone	events	regarding	their	mobilities.	This	linear	and	somewhat	simplistic	narrative	presumes	a	well-functioning,	scientifically	informed,	objective	set	of	actors	carrying	out	their	complex,	yet	well-defined	tasks,	under	the	objective	of	discovering	and	registering	an	equally	objective	truth.	The	state	and	intra-state	institutions	and	agencies,	do	not	exist	outside	the	individuals	carrying	out	the	everyday	work	(Mountz,	2003).	This	seemingly	banal	ascertainment	is	often	either	absent	or	reduced	to	the	issue	of	lack	of	human	resources	in	the	discussion	concerning	the	identification	and	registration	of	irregularized	migrants.	However,	taking	that	into	account	is	a	step	towards	the	deconstruction	of	naturalized	categories	that	are	the	specific	outcome	of	this	everyday	work.	The	ethnographic	and,	to	the	extent	possible,	in-depth	inquiry	surrounding	the	practices	shaping	registration	that	the	present	thesis	offers,	challenges	the	linearity	and	the	emphasis	on	the	subjectivity	of	the	procedures	that	comprise	registration	in	the	context	of	the	Hotspot.	This	border	work,	crucial	for	the	mobility	and	sometimes	freedom	of	migrants,	does	not	occur	in	a	vacuum.	Instead,	a	good	part	of	it	is	embedded	in	the	social	relationships	and	worldviews	of	the	officials	involved.	Heyman	describes	the	“thought	worlds”	of	immigration	officers	as	“the	basic,	organizationally	shared	assumptions	about	relationships	between	self	and	various	others”	(J.	Heyman,	1995,	p.	261).	As	was	shown	in	the	empirical	chapter	7,	also	through	the	use	of	the	ethnographic	vignettes,	these	assumptions	shape	the	way	that	these	“petty	sovereigns”(Butler,	2006b)	exercise	their	practice	of	identifying	individuals,	or	better	yet,	attributing	identities	to	individuals.	These	assumptions	include,	but	are	not	thematically	limited	to,	border	workers	regarding	the	motivations,	practices	and	beliefs	of	irregularized	migrants,	which	feeds	and	maintains	a	“culture	of	disbelief”	(Anderson	et	al.,	2014)	under	which	border	work	is	conducted.	Assumptions	are	
		 184	
also	involved	regarding	the	work	of	other	actors	located	at	the	Hotspots,	which	function	as	an	ethical	backdrop	that	removes	the	burden	of	a	final	decision	from	the	shoulders	of	individual	screeners	and	distributes	it	to	the	Hotspot	as	infrastructure.	
9.3.1.	Discovering	and	constructing	identities		 Studying	the	screening	interview	as	part	of	the	border	work	that	is	the	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	through	the	lens	of	performativity	theory,	sheds	a	different	light	on	the	matter.	On	the	one	hand,	we	see	that	individual	irregularized	migrants	are	called	on	to	perform	a	certain	script	in	the	presence	of	specific	border	guards	who	are	authorized	to	evaluate,	and	consequently	approve	or	reject	the	performance.	They	can	do	this		in	a	series	of	ways:	by	responding	in	the	appropriate	way	to	the	standardized	sets	of	questions	that	confirm	their	claims	about	their	country	of	origin	and	nationality;	by	providing	a	consistent	story	about	their	journey,	to	which	they	can	adhere	in	the	face	of	the	attempts	of	the	screeners	to	denounce	it;	or	by	adopting	a	non-responsive,	less	communicative	profile	that	may	motivate	feelings	of	compassion,	a	tactic	also	related	to	conceptualizations	of	age	and	gender.	All	of	the	above	can	be	seen	as	alternative	modes	of	response	to	the	border	work	as	“a	confessionary	machine	for	producing	the	categories	of	insider/outsider”	(Salter,	2008,	p.	373),	and	can	be	seen	as	organic	extensions	of	the	role	played	by	traditional	confession	in	terms	of	shaping	modern	governmentality	and	the	modern	subject	(Foucault,	1977).	Nevertheless,	as	discussed	in	chapter	1,	performance	and	performativity	are	not	one	and	the	same,	which	brings	us	to	consider	not	only	the	screening	interview,	but	also	the	document	control,	the	photo	and	fingerprinting	capture	as	potentially	belonging	to	a	set	of	“a	stylized	repetition	of	acts”	(Butler,	1988b).	These	acts	perform	the	identity	of	the	migrant	on	many	levels.	Here,	it	is	no	longer	a	matter	concerning	the	migrant	subject,	but	instead	concerns	performative	agency	(Butler,	2010)	of	the	border	(as	the	act	of	bordering).	It	is	through	these	acts	that	the	categories	and	dichotomies	of	nationality,	asylum	status,	and	family	relationships	are	established.	It	is	here	the	identity	is	
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constructed	and	attributed.	Here,	where	the	migrant	body	is	rendered	known	in	the	only	way	acceptable,	in	the	way	that	enables	its	future	governance.	Although	the	confession	in	the	face	of	the	border	apparatus	still	holds	great	heuristic	value	in	conjunction	with	Foucault’s	work	on	governmentality,	I	am	inclined	to	see	the	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	as	I	witnessed	it	at	the	Greek	Hotspots,	as	a	highly	unequal	“negotiation”	between	ontologically	different	actors.	On	the	one	side,	the	EU’s	border	apparatus,	recruiting	and	utilizing	human	experts,	low-grade	Police	officers	typing	in	data,	and	non-human	actors,	not	only	“traditional”	ones,	such	as	the	fingerprint	scanners	and	the	document	control	equipment,	but	also	the	cell	phones	of	the	screeners,	equipped	with	the	Google	Maps	application	and	the	invisible	stamp.	On	the	other	side	are	irregularized	migrants	who	may	or	may	not	back	up	falsified	claims,	participate	in	this	negotiation	by	their	own	means,	holding	a	significantly	weaker	amount	of	agency.	The	identity	that	will	accompany	them	for	the	rest	of	their	journey	is	the	outcome	of	this	multi-factorial	negotiation	and	is	stabilized	temporarily	through	the	memo	or	the	“confirmation”	as	a	textual	output	of	the	entire	procedure.	The	elements	that	constitute	said	identity;	nationality,	age,	family	relationships	and	kinship	are	inherently	inaccessible	in	the	context	of	irregularized	migration.	Thus,	they	must	be	reconstructed	for	the	sake	of	governance,	and	performed	through	a	series	of	practices,	interviews,	examinations	and	interactions	involving	data	capturing	devices.	During	this	process,	what	it	means	to	be	of	a	certain	nationality	or	age	is	reconstituted,	attributed	new	meanings,	and	the	ontological	status	of	a	person’s	identity	is	actually	the	point	at	which	the	“negotiation”	regarding	their	identity	ceases.	Before	it	reaches	that	point,	a	subject	is	required	to	interact	with	the	apparatus	of	examination,	be	that	a	screener,	a	medical	doctor	or	another	delegated	border	worker,	and	meet	or	fail	to	meet	their	standards,	according	to	which	the	subject’s	identity	elements	are	assessed.	Border	venues	such	as	Hotspots	are	spaces	where	individuals	find	themselves	in	a	succession	of	sovereign	bodies.	In	order	to	achieve	a	degree	of	inclusion,	they	must	progress	through	a	process	of	subjectification	that	will	render	them	“worthy”	of	further	examination,	and	potentially	of	higher	levels	of	inclusion.	This	process	does	not	necessarily	reflect	a	subjective	truth	concerning	
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their	identity,	nor	is	it	based	on	scientific	methods	on	behalf	of	the	border	agents	and	their	institutions.	Instead,	a	great	deal	of	the	work	and	expertise	on	which	the	entire	project	of	registration	is	based,	draws	on	insight	and	intuition,	instinct,	previously	shaped	beliefs	and	prejudice.	The	stability	of	the	outcome	of	this	process	is	relevant	with	regard	to	the	capacity	of	a	migrant	to	appeal	against	it.	Here,	again,	truth	and	subjectivity	are	less	relevant	than	time,	resources	and	social	capital,	as	well	as	luck.	Proving	a	nationality	assessment	wrong	is	a	process	mediated	by	the	availability	of	relevant	documents,	the	existence	or	not	of	a	family	or	social	network	who	can	provide	them	on	time,	and	the	dedication	and	availability	of	an	NGO’s	or	other	support	group’s	members.	The	settings	and	difficulties	of	the	process	are	also	in	constant	flux	on	a	national	level,	rendering	the	procedure	even	more	inaccessible	and	random.		
9.4.	The	importance	of	registration	in	the	context	of	the	“Statement”			 With	the	Hotspot	approach	in	place,	responding	to	the	demand	for	biopolitical	control	and	registration	of	the	incoming	populations,	and	a	domino	of	reinforcement	of	border	controls	all	along	the	Schengen	zone,	the	EU	opted	for	the	sealing	of	its	external	borders	towards	the	East,	namely	with	Turkey.	Outsourcing	and/or	expanding	border-related	procedures	to	third	states	is	by	no	means	innovative	in	its	conception.	On	the	contrary	it	is	a	timeworn	tactic,	and	one	of	the	most	potent	transformative	forces	that	has	caused	borders	to	become	what	they	are	today.	With	regard	to	the	number	of	arrivals	crossing	the	Aegean	Sea,	at	least	during	the	period	2016-2018,	the	Statement	met	its	target	of	sealing	the	Greek-Turkish	sea	border	for	irregularized	migrants.	However,	when	considering	borders	not	as	borderlines	but	as	outcomes	of	the	work	of	human	and	non-human	actors,	the	external	border	of	the	EU	became	even	more	fuzzy,	while	at	the	same	time	also	much	less	permeable.	This	seemingly	paradoxical	outcome	is	further	clarified	by	examining	not	only	the	content	of	the	Statement,	but	the	way	it	has	been	presented	in	the	political	debate	and	conflict	that	subsequently	ensued.	More	specifically,	Turkey	agreed	to	enhance	border	control	on	its	shorelines,	in	return	for	monetary	and	visa-related	exchanges	provided	by	the	EU.	In	the	years	that	followed,	when	tensions	rose	between	the	governments	of	the	Turkish	state	and	European	states,	such	as	the	Netherlands,	
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the	annulation	of	the	Statement	was	a	common	and	reoccurring	threat	in	the	hands	of	the	former.	Thus,	Turkey	undertook	border	practices	on	behalf	of	the	EU,	but	the	straightforward	exchange	of	services	included	in	the	Statement	rendered	the	European	border	subject	to	the	ups	and	downs	of	diplomatic	sparring.	In	turn,	this	relied	on	the	turbulent	interior	political	scene	that	existed	in	Turkey.	Thus,	while	hardened	as	crossing	points,	the	specific	borders	were	also	now	dependent	on	more	factors	and	were	therefore	more	vague.		 In	the	midst	of	the	situation	described	in	the	previous	paragraph,	migrant	bodies,	their	mobility	and	freedom	were	active	more	as	bargaining	chips	than	human	individuals.	The	publishing	of	the	Statement	initiated	a	period	of	what	Griffiths	calls	“frenzied	time”	(M.	B.	E.	Griffiths,	2014),	as	the	possibilities	of	mobility	were	radically	changed	–	literary	overnight.	Such	a	rapid	and	accelerated	shift	in	the	mode	of	governance	of	the	populations	on	the	move	is	rare,	if	it	has	ever	occurred	with	regard	to	beneficial	outcomes	for	the	migrants.	This	kind	of	radical	“emergency”	policy	making	is	difficult	to	achieve	and	legalize	in	the	public	debate	in	the	absence	of	a	well-rooted	“crisis”	discourse.	Moreover,	“crisis”	has	been	argued	to	be	a	device	that	authorizes	precisely	such	moves	in	terms	of	border	control	(De	Genova,	2016).			 The	Statement	is	an	extraordinary	piece	of	policy	making,	not	only	due	to	its	content,	but	also	with	regard	to	its	legal	status	within	the	EU’s	bureaucratic	and	legislative	universe.	Its	dubious	legal	status	has	been	exposed	by	several	organizations,	including	by	the	General	Court	of	the	European	Union	no	less	(General	Court	of	the	European	Union,	2017)	.	The	latter	has	referred	to	the	Statement	as	a	measure	“not	adopted	by	one	of	the	institutions	of	the	EU”	and	has	declared	itself	lacking	the	jurisdiction	to	hear	and	determine	cases	that	have	called	for	its	institutional	intervention.	This	means	there	is	no	juridical	body	to	control	the	activities	of	the	Member	States	in	the	direction	of	implementing	the	Statement.	Lack	of	accountability	has	been	an	issue	in	the	context	of	implementing	one	of	the	main	pillars	of	the	Statement,	namely	the	recognition	of	Turkey	as	a	Safe	Third	Country	(Nielsen,	n.d.).	The	abovementioned	considerations	render	clear	that	the	introduction	and	implementation	of	the	Statement	has	occurred	under	a	“state	of	exception”	(Agamben,	2005),	which	is	
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in	any	case	an	almost	inseparable	condition	of	border-related	work	and	policy	making.		 The	Statement,	was	an	important	issue	for	the	EU	as	a	whole	and	for	the	Greek	state	in	particular,	as	it	was	designed	as	a	“rupture”	between	the	previous	state	of	affairs	and	a	new	paradigm	literally	overnight.	Such	radical	transformations	produce	liminal	situations	with	an	undefined	status	that	can	challenge	the	entire	project.	Such	were	the	cases	discussed	in	section	8.7.	As	shown	by	the	testimonies	of	the	actors	I	interviewed,	the	smooth	implementation	could	not	be	allowed	to	be	hindered	by	such	implications.	In	this	context,	another	controversial	aspect	of	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	was	revealed,	this	time	with	reference	to	the	potency,	accuracy	and	agency	of	the	recorded	data	with	regard	to	the	date	of	arrival	of	specific	individuals.	This	case	is	another	example	of	how	technologies	and	artifacts	such	as	databases,	and	their	use,	are	often,	if	not	always,	embedded	in	the	social	and	the	political	conditions	that	affect	and	produce	their	users	and	their	actions.	
9.5.	Final	words		 In	this	thesis,	I	set	out	to	study	the	registration	of	irregularized	migrants	in	the	context	of	the	migration	management,	border	control	and	asylum	policies	of	the	EU.	Aware	of	the	many	levels	at	which	this	phenomena	exists	and	touches	upon,	I	chose	to	examine	the	topic	through	a	short	genealogical	examination	of	one	of	the	main	systems	used	for	this	purpose,	through	the	discussion	of	the	issue	in	the	public	debate	during	the	first	two	years	of	the	recent	“migrant	crisis”,	and	finally	by	looking	closely	at	the	practices	that	comprise	it	in	the	field.	The	reality	in	the	field,	the	complex	connections	between	the	actors,	the	embedded	social	meanings	that	shape	their	actions,	and	the	technologies	involved	are	not	featured	in	the	public	account	of	what	constitutes	identification	and	registration	of	irregularized	migrants.	This	thesis	aimed	to	stimulate	critical	dialogue	on	the	practices	of	border	guards	and	police	officers	as	well	as	the	complex	realities	underlying	the	uncontested,	naturalized	categories	dominating	the	public	debate.		
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